The Philosophy Of

ĀKHYĀTA & ITS NATURE.

In Observance Of

Mīmāṁsā Nyāya And Vedic Rituals. (Part-I)

मीमांसानये वैदिक कर्मसु च

आख्यात-तत्त्वशोधनम्.

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महामहोपाध्यायः, व्याकरणाचार्यः, दर्शनसर्वोपाध्यायः,
पेरि सूर्यनारायण शास्त्री।
राजमहेन्द्रि·

"वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलमि"ति श्री गौतममुनिर्व्याचष्टे। विधिमन्त्रनामधेय निषेधार्थवादरूपसम्पूर्णो वेदो धर्मस्य परमं प्रमाणम्। स च धर्मः वेदमूलकोऽपि वेदार्थज्ञानमन्तरा न बुध्यते। अतः वेदार्थज्ञापनाय मुनयः दर्शनशास्त्राणि अङ्गशास्त्राणि च निर्ममिरे। तत्र अङ्गशास्त्राणि "शिक्षा, व्याकरणं, छन्दः निरुक्तं, ज्योतिषं, कल्पश्चेति षट्। तत्र प्रधानं च षडंगेषु "व्याकरणमिति पस्पशायां पतञ्जलिः। एवं च वेदरक्षणायैव व्याकरणशास्त्रमिति पतञ्जलिः स्वीय महाभाष्ये स्पष्टमुवाच।

वेदवाक्यार्थ विचारणायैव जैमिनिना पूर्वमीमांसा शास्त्रमधिकरण पद्धत्याऽरचि। मीमांसा शास्त्रे "ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत," "नानृतं वदेत्" इत्यादि वाक्यविचारणावसरे धात्वर्थः कः? आख्यातार्थः कः? तयोस्सम्बन्धः कः? इत्यादि अनेकाः व्याकरण शास्त्रविषयाः भावार्थाधिकरणे, कर्त्रधिकरणे जंजभ्यमानाद्यनेकाधिकरणेषु विस्तरेण विचारिताः।

अत्रेदमवश्यं ज्ञातव्यम्। मीमांसा शास्त्रस्य वाक्यशास्त्रमिति व्याकरणस्य पदशास्त्रमिति च व्यवहारः। पदशास्त्रेण धातु कृत्तिङ् लकारादीनामर्थं निर्णीति तत्सहाय्येन मीमांसाशास्त्ररीत्या निरुक्तप्रकारेण धर्माचरणे अधिकारी भवति त्रैवर्णिकः। अतः एतादृश पदार्थ विचारः आख्यात तत्वविचारः न केवलं मीमांसकैः कृतः, किन्तु न्याय व्याकरणादि शास्त्रान्तरैरपि। तत्र प्राधान्येन वैयाकरणैः तत्त्वार्थप्रकटनाय बहुधा आख्याततत्त्वमवलोकितम्। यतः पदवाक्य शास्त्रयोः उपकार्योपकारकभावोऽस्ति। विना पदशास्त्रार्थ विचारं वाक्यशास्त्रस्य कथं वा परिनिष्ठिततत्वम्? अहो! दुराग्रहैः गौतम जैमिनीय व्याख्यातृभिः मूलग्रन्थाननवेक्ष्यैव द्वयोः शास्त्रयोः ऐकमत्यमनाकलय्य विरोधमुखेनैव शास्त्रसमन्वयः क्रियते। एवमाशयं मनसि निधाय परमप्रामाणिक वैयाकरणः कौण्डभट्टः तस्य वैयाकरणसिद्धान्त कथुमञ्जूषा ग्रन्थे उभयोः शास्त्रयोः वैरस्यं परिहृत्य ऋजुमार्गेण शास्त्रार्थसमन्वयं दर्शयामास।

मन्जूषा विषये अत्रेदमेवधेयम्। मन्जूषाग्रन्थः न केवलं व्याकरण शास्त्रार्थं प्रतिपादयति। किन्त्वनुकूलतया, प्रतिकूलतया च न्याय शास्त्रार्थं, मीमांसाशास्त्रार्थं च प्रतिपादयति। आधिक्येन मीमाम्सा शास्त्रार्थं, बोधयति। मीमाम्सा शास्त्रं च प्रजानां आचरणयोग्यं धर्मं प्रबोधयति। अतः मन्जूषा ग्रन्थमपि धर्मप्रबोधाय लोका आद्रियन्ते।

एवमनेकार्थगतोपि मन्जूषाग्रन्थः वैयाकरणैः न पठ्यते। तत्र हेतुः मन्जूषायामनेक शास्त्रार्थ विचार एव। सर्व शास्त्रार्थ परिज्ञानं विना मन्जूषा ग्रन्थो न ज्ञायते। अतः वैयाकरणानां विप्रकृष्टा भवति।

एवं स्थिते वस्तुनि चिरञ्जीवी सुब्रह्मण्यः आन्ध्रविश्वविद्यालये संस्कृत विभागे प्रविश्य तत्रस्थानमाचार्याणां सविधे, प्राधान्येन पाणिनीयमधीत्य गृहीत पट्टः आसीत्। अनन्तरं तत्रैव परिषदि पिहेच्०. डि (Ph. D) पट्टमपि लब्ध्वा अधुनाध्यापक श्रेण्यां रीडर (READER) पदवीं अलभत। चिरञ्जीविना एतादृशेन सुब्रह्मण्येन "वेदानां रक्षार्थमध्येयं व्याकरणमि"ति मनसि विधाय, तद्विवरणाय, व्याकरण शास्त्रे तत्रापि प्राधान्येन मन्जूषायां आख्यातप्रकरणं स्वीकृत्य "आख्यात तत्वशोध प्रबन्धः भागद्वयात्मकः व्यरचि। एतदवसरे तेन बहवः न्याय, मीमांसा ग्रन्थान् महाभाष्यं च संशोध्य विषयो विष्कर्षितः

प्रसङ्गवशेन तगत्यान्विषयान् मां श्रावयामास। ग्रन्थमामूलाग्रं परिशील्य तत्रस्थ पदार्थग्रहणं, विश्लेषणा पद्दतिः विवरण रीतयश्च सम्यगित्यहं सन्तुष्ट अभवम्। स च शोध प्रबन्धः आंग्लभाषायां कृत इति हेतवः परमामोदः। तेन विश्वविद्यालयेषु स्थितास्सर्वेप्यमुं आंग्लभाषस्थं "आख्यात तत्वशोध" ग्रन्थं पश्यन्ति प्रचारं कुर्वन्ति च।

एतादृशस्य निबन्धनस्य मुद्रणाभावात् सर्वेपि एनं प्रबन्धं प्राप्तुं न क्षमन्ते। महती संस्था एतादृशमुत्तमकार्यं कृत्वा लोकाय धर्मरक्षाबोधन विषये महदुपकारोतित्यहं दृढं विश्वसिमीति शम्।

पेरि० सूर्यनारायण शास्त्री

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Sincerely
The author

General Contents

N.B. : For detailed contents see the respective chapters and sections.

Chapter I

ĀKHYĀTA & ITS DEFINITION

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ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations used 1.	Name of the work in full 2.	Author of the work 3.
Akv. Sir	Ākhyāta Vāda Siromaṇi	Raghunatha Śiromaṇi
Bhā. Cin.	Bhāṭṭa Cintāmaṇi	Gagabhaṭṭa
Bhā. Rah	Bhāṭṭa Rahasyaṁ	Khaṇḍadeva edited by A' Subrahmanya Sastry
Kāsikā	Kāsikāvṛtti with (Nyāsa and Padamañjari)	Vāmana-Jayāditya Jinendrabudhi and Haradatta
L.M. (kk)	Laughu Mañjūsā with Kala & Kuncika commentaries	Nagesabhaṭṭa
K.M. (nbp)	Laghu Mañjūsā with Nāgesa bhāvaprakāsā	commentary Peri Suryanarayana Sastry.
La Sa Se.	Laghu Sabdendu Sekhara Vol. ii. (with comm. Guḍārtha dipikā)	Nāgesabhaṭṭa
M.B.	Mahābhāsya in three parts	Patañjali
Mi. Kau.	Mīmāṁsā Kaustubhaṁ	Khaṇḍadeva
Muktāvalī	Muktāvalī (with Dinakari and Ramarudri)	Viswanatha
Nir.	Niruktaṁ (with Durga commentary)	Yaska
Ny' Ku.	Nyāya Kusumañjali with Commentary Prakāsa),	Udayana
	Nyāya-kośā	Bhimacharya Jhalakikar.
Nya. Man.	Nyāya Mañjari	Jayantabhatta
N.B.	Nyāya Sūtras (with Vatsyāyana Bhāsya)	Gautama
Nya.Rat.	Nyāyaratnamāla	Parthasarathi Misra
P.	Astādhyāyī	Panini
Pa. Va. Ra.	Padavākya Ratnākara	Gokulnath Upadhyaya
P. L. M.	Parama Laghu Mañjusā	Nagesa Bhaṭṭa
Pra. Pan.	Prakaraṇa Manidarpna)	Sālikanatha

1.	2.	3.
Phil.Sen.Pts.	Philosophy of Sentence & Its parts	Prof. V. Subba Rao
Pra. Man.	Prauḍha Manorama	Bhattoji Dıksita
R.P.	Ṛk Pratiśakhya	Saunaka
Sa.Sak.Pra.	ŚabdaŚakti Prakaśa	Jagadisa
Sab. Kou.	Śabda Kaustubhaṁ	Bhattoji Diksita
Sas.Dip;	Śastra Dīpika	Parthasardhy Misra
	Śamkhyakarikas (with Tattva Kaumudi Com')	Isvara Krishna Misra
S.K.	Vaiyakaraṇa Siddhantakaumudī	Bhattoji
Tat. Bo.	Tattvabodhinī (commentary on S.K.)	Jnanendra Saraswati
Tan. Var.	Tantravartika (Comm. on Sabara bhaṣya)	Kumarilabhatta
Tar. Sam	Tarka Saṁgraha	Annambhaṭṭa
Tar. Tan.	Tarka Taṇḍava (parts ii & iii)	Vyasatīrtha
TTv. Cin.	Tattva Cintamaṇi (Part iv-Vol. ii)	Gangesa
TTv. Dar.	Tattva Darśani (comm. on Vai. Bhu. sara with text)	Peri Suryanarayana Sastry
V.P.	Vakyapadīya part 3 (1 & 2) Commentary by Helaraja	Bhartṛhari
Vai.Bhu.Sa.	Vaiyakaraṇa Bhusana Saraṁ (with Prabha & Darpaṇa commentaries)	Kaundabhatta
Si.Su.Ni.	Vaiyakaraṇa Siddhanta Sudhanidhi	Parvatiya Visweswara suri
Vi.Vi.	Vidhiviveka with Nyayakaṇika	Mandna
Vya.Vi.	Vyakti Viveka	Mahimabhatta
Vyu.Va.	Vyutpattivada (with Adarsa Com)	Gadadhara
	Yoga Sutra (with Bhaṣya)	Patanjali
	Whitney's Sanskrit Grammer	W.D. Whitney
	Technical Terms of Sanskrit Grammer	K.C. Chatterjee

ĀKHYĀTA - A DEFINITION.

The present work is captioned as "Ākhyāta and Its Nature" So it is obligatory first to define what the word Ākhyāta denotes. This question arises, because the word Ākhyāta has been used by various scholars since the remote past in different senses. Hence in the following pages tha various views of the scholars, mainly belonging to Tarka, Mīmāṁsa and Vyākaraṇa schools of thought are investigated and presented in brief.

We know that in this world every kind of knowledge is conveyed mainly in the form of sentences. A sentence is defined as a group of words syntactically connected, which gives a complete sense. Among such words, the verb is the most important one, In Sanskrit language the verb word generally consists of two parts viz., the root and the suffix. There exists a great deal of difference as regards the connotation of the word 'Ākhyāta' in the opinion of the Mīmāṁsaka, the Naiyāyika and Vaiyākaraṇa. Both the Mīmāṁsaka, and the logician argues tnat the word Ākhyāta connotes the Tiṅ suffix alone. Among the grammarians a section argues that the root alone is connoted by the Ākhyāta while another section urges that both the root and suffix together (Tiṅanta) is to be called Ākhyāta. Now let us examine their various arguments.

PRE-YĀSKA PERIOD :

In the remote past i.e. long before Yāska, it appears that grammarians like Sakatāyana, Gārgya etc., used this word Ākhyāta in the sense of the 'Root'. This is evident from the Nirukta statements as Sākatāyana holds that all nouns are derived from the verbal roots.[1] Śākapūni, another grammarian is also of the same view. Yāska quotes Śākapūni as saying that the word Agni is derived from three ĀKhyātas.[2] Here the word Ākhyāta is doubtlessly synonymous with the root.

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1. Sarvāṇi nāmānyākhyātajānīti Śākatāyanaḥ, Na sarvāṇīti Gārgyaḥ (Nir. 1-12)
2. Tribhya ākhyātebhyo jāyata iti Śākapūṇiḥ (Nir. 7-14).

In the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya also we find the word Ākhyāta defined one comprising a root and expresses bhāvaṁ.[1] Here some commentators read the word 'Sadhātuḥ' as two words i.e. Sa dhātuḥ and thus conclude that the word Ākhyāta stands for the root. But others read the word. Sadhātuḥ' as a single word and interpret that only inflected verbal root is to be connoted by the word Ākhyāta. Thus the definition runs "that is an Ākhyāta which denotes 'becoming or action and it comprises the root". It is only a complete verb word that comprises the root. Otherwise if the definition is to connote only a root or suffix, then the word "comprises a root" (Sadhatuḥ) in the definition is superfluous.

YĀSKA'S DEFINITION :

The great sage Yāska has defined Ākhyāta in his work Nirukta as a word which has activity as its primary sense.[2] This definition has unanimously been accepted by all the scholars belonging to the various disciplines besides the three mentioned in the beginning. Yāska further clarifies the meaning of the word Ākhyāta as a word denoting activity having a beginning and an ending. This definition is required in order to distinguish the verb from Verbal nouns like Pāka, Rāga etc. This is all what Yaska speaks about the word Ākhyāta and no specific answer can be found here to the question on hand.

THE VIEW OF THE MĪMĀṀSAKA :

According to the Mīmāṁsaka, the word Ākhyāta connotes only the suffix Tiṅ. The authority for such a conclusion is based on the definition given by Yāska i.e. "Bhāvapradhānamākhyātaṁ". To him a verb word denotes Action, result, Bhāvana, number person and time. Of these Bhāvana is primary. And this Bhāvana is denoted by the Tiṅ suffix. Hence the Tiṅ suffix is called Ākhyāta. This Bhāvana is primary because it is responsible for

1. Tadākhyātaṁ Yenābhidadhāti Bhāvaṁ Sadhātuḥ (R.P. xii-19).

2. Bhāvapradhānamākhyataṁ. Pūrvāparībhūtaṁ Bhāvamākhyātenācaste. (Nirukta 1 : 1)

the production of the action denoted by the root. Further there is a maxim that when a word which has a root and suffix as its parts, gives a certain import, in that import the meaning of the suffix is predominant.".[1] Kumārila Bhatta makes an elaborate discussion on this topic in his 'Tantra Vārtika' in Bhāvārthādhikarana. There he says that the relation between the accomplished and the means of accomplishment always has Bhāvana as its substratum[2] and Bhāvana due to its importance is always denoted by the suffix. Further as quoted in the Vaiyākarana Bhūsana he has gone to the extent of saying that even if you struggle for the whole life period, the meaning of the root cannot be predominant[3] Thus a root cannot be called Ākhyāta Hence it is the Tiṅ suffix that is to be connoted by the word Ākhyāta.

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN :

The logician also argues that it is the suffix which is called Ākhyāta. According to his theory the meaning of the Tiṅ suffix is neither agent nor object as argued by the grammarian but it is activity not different from subject hood, otherwise called kṛti. And this kṛti is the most important of all the meanings signified by the suffix. Hence he concludes that the suffix Tiṅ and the word Ākhyāta are synonyms.[2]

Thus the word Ākhyāta is used in these two disciplines to connote the Tiṅ suffix only.

It is a matter of great surprise that the word Ākhyāta was not defined either by Pānini or Kātyāyana any where in their works. Pāṇini used this word only once in his Aṣṭādhyāyi i. e. in one of

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1. Parkṛti pratyayau sahārthaṁ brūtaḥ tayoḥ pratyayārthaḥ pradhānaṁ. (Sabara Bhashya)
2. Sādhyasādhana Saṁbandhaḥ Sarvadābhāvanāśrayaḥ (Ibid)
3. Dhātvarthasya pradhānatvaṁna Tāvadiha Janmani. Autsargiko na ca nyāyo matpakṣe hi nivartsyate. (Vai. Bhu. under Karika-8).
4 Tiṅākhyātayoḥ paryāyatvāt (Sab. Sak. Pra.)

his Sutras.[1] Here the word Ākhyāta is a nominal base after which the taddhita Ṭhak suffix is added. So from this instance we cannot make out the view of Pāṇini regarding the question on hand. And again we come across this word in the Vārtika "Ākhyātamākhyātena kriyā sātatye" under Sutra P. 2. 1. 72.[2] Of course here the word Ākhyāta denotes a complete verb word as is evident from the examples given "Asnītapibatā, Khādatamodatā etc. Here Asnīta and Pibata are complete verb words compounded together.

SOME OTHER GRAMMARIANS :

Even in the later period many grammarians used the word Ākhyāta to denote suffix, or the root or inflected verb word. Śarva Varman, the author of Kātantra Vyākaraṇa and Jivagoswamin, the author of Harināmāmṛta Vyākaraṇa have used the word Ākhyāta to denote the verbal suffix. Chandrakirti, the commentator of Kātantra Vyākaraṇa commented the word Ākhyāta to mean the suffix[3] and also an inflected verb word.[4] The Prayoga Ratnamālā (Vyākaraṇa of Puruṣottama recognises Ākhyāta as a suffix.[5]

Thus from all the above observations we are to understand that the word Ākhyāta had an un-restricted usage to donete either a Suffix or a Root or a complete verb word. Therefore among the later grammarians Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa have taken a definite stand refuted the arguments of the Mīmāṁsakas and the Logicians.

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1. Dvajṛdbrāhmaṇa ... Ākhyātāt ṭhak (P. 2. 1. 72).
2. Mayūra vyaṁsakādayśca (P. 2. 1. 72).
3. Ākhyāyante kathyante arthataḥ niṣpadyante bhvādīnām rupāṇi yena tadākhyātaṁ. Athavā ākhyānti āchakṣate kartṛvyāpāramityākhyātaḥ.
4. Asamyak prādhānyena nirākānkṣatven asādhyatvena vā khyātaḥ pratipāditāḥ pachanādirūpāḥ kriyāḥ kālakartṛtvādirūpo arthāśca anena iti ākhyataṁ pacatyādirūpaṁ.
5. Vibhakti taddhitākhyātakṛtāścha pratyayāḥ (1. 172).

THE VIEW OF BHAṬṬOJI AND KAUṆḌABHAṬṬA :

Of the various meanings denoted by a verb word, action (Vyāpāra) is the primary one. And this part of the meaning is denoted by the root. Hence, on the basis of the Nirukta maxim "Bhāvapradhānamākhyātam" Dīksita and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa argue that it is the root that is connoted by the word Ākhyāta. In further support of his stand, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa quotes the Nirukta which states that all nouns are derived from Ākhyātas. [1] As it is unanimously accepted by all schools of philosophy that nouns are derived from verbal roots but not from suffixes, in the above statement of the Niruktakāra the word Ākhyāta should denote the Root only.

And again Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa quotes Patanjali in support of this theory. He contends that according Patanjali also, the word Ākhyāta and the Root are synonyms. Patanjali while commenting on the Sūtra Uṇādayo Bahulaṁ (P. 3. 3. 1.) makes the statement "Sarvaṁ nāma dhātujamāha Nirukte". According to the Nirukta, the statement is 'namāni Ākhyātajāni'. Here the replacement of the word Ākhyāta by the word Dhātu, Patanjali, gives strength to the argument of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa that Ākhyāta and the Root are synonyms. Further he stresses on the etymology of the word Ākhyata. It is called Ākhyāta since the most important part of the meaning is expressed by it. [2] According to the grammarian, action is denoted by the Root alone. And also referring to the definition of Noun and Verb as given by Yāska, they argue just as the word 'Noun' refers only to the nominal base, but not to the complete noun word, so also the word Ākhyāta. denotes only the verbal root. Thus according to Dīksita and Kaunṇḍabhaṭṭa the words Ākhyāta and Dhātu are synonyms.

Now we are left at cross roads regarding the connotation of the word Ākhyāta. But on a close examination of the above views, with reference to the authoritative books of the respective

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1. Tatra nāmānyākhyātajānīti Śākaṭāyano nairukta samayasca (Nir. 1-12)
2. Atra ākhyāyata sarva pradhānibhūto arthaḥ anena iti vyutpatyā Dhāturākhyātapadenocyate. (Vai. Bhu. P. 44.)

schools and also the Nirukta, it becomes clear that the authors have entertained divergent views. It is peculiar that the sages who originally propounded the various schools, viz., the Sūtra-kāras, the Bhāṣyakāras and the Vārtikakāras are all very clear in their conception, according to whom the word Ākhyāta means an inflected verb word only but not either the root or the suffix. It is like this......

Firstly from the authority of the Nirukta, it can be concluded that the word Ākhyāta is a verb word fully inflected with the suffix, since it is one of the four categories of words. Further all the examples given by Yāska are inflected words as Pacati, Vrajati etc.. Also the word Ākhyāta has been further clasified as one denoting the process of an action which has a beginning and an ending. Thus according to the Nirukta neither the Root alone, nor the suffix alone can be denoted by the word Ākhyāta.

The sage Jaimini has defined the Ākhyāta words as those that denote action; and it is further stated that verbs are those words which on their origination i. e. utterance, have no object; [1] that is to say that Ākhyātas are those words which denote the action of bringing something into being. This type of comprehension cannot be had through the suffix (Tiṅ). This view has been amply explained by Śabara in his commentary on the Pūrva mīmāmsa sāstra in various places. [2] And the examples given are also inflected verb words as Yajati, Dadhāti, Juhoti etc.

Regarding the arguments based on the maxim "Prakṛti pratyayau ...etc., Śabara has himself made clear its sope of application. He says that it is the argument of the Pūrvapakṣin who thoroughly misunderstood the very interpretation and application of

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1, Jaimini - Pūrvamīmāmsa Sūtras 2-1-1-1, 2. 4. Bhāvarthāḥ karma śabdāḥ ..., Yeṣām tūtpattau arthe sve prayogo na vidyate tānyākhyātāni ... etc.

Śābarabhāṣya on Sūtras 2.1.1, 11.1.22; 3.4.13 etc..

that maxim. Śabara himself concedes that the maxim applies only in the case of nouns like Pācaka, Lāvaka etc., derived from the verbal roots [1] Thus according to the sage Jaimini and Śabara the Bhāṣyakāra, the word Ākyāta means only the inflected verb word but not the Suffix alone.

The sage Gautama, the propounder of the Nyaya school' also, defines Ākhyāta as one which ends in a suffix.[2] And Udyotakāra the author of the Nyāyavārtikas has commented that there are two types of suffixes, viz., Sup and Tip. That which ends in the verbal suffix (Tibādi) is called Ākhyāta and gives Pacati as the example.[3]

Vātsyāyana, commentator on the Nyāya sutras, also expresses the same view. [4] This being the position, it is not proper on the part of the later Logicians to argue that the word Ākhyāta means only the suftix. Hence the views of these later Mīmāmsakas and the logicians are not cosistant with the fundamental tenets of their respective doctrines as laid down by the respective sages and interpreted by the authoritative commentators. Hence the word Ākhyāta does not connote the sense "Suffix (Tiṅ)".

Nāgesa who is the final authority on Sanskrit grammatical semantics, refutes the theory that "The Ākhyāta connotes Root only" as propounded by Bhaṭṭoji and Kauṇḍahhaṭṭa. Nāgesa, in his Laghumañjuṣa establishes that the Ākhyāta is always a full-word and has the predominance of action, or to be more precise "Ākhytāa is one which ends in a suffix capable of giving

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1. Yattu Prakrti pratyayau sāharthaṁ brūta iti. Tat karma nimittesu nāmapadeṣu pācaka, lāvaka ityevamādiṣu (Śab. Bha. on IXI-1-24).
2. Te Vibhaktyantāḥ padaṁ (Nyaya Sutra 2.2.60).
3. Dvayī Vibhaktiḥ. Svādayo tibādayaśca. Svādyantaṁ Nāma, Tibādyantamākhyātaṁ. (Ibid Vārtikakāra comments).
4. Vibhaktyantāḥ Padesaṁjñā bhavanti. Vibhaktirdvayī, Nāmikī Ākhyātikī ca. Brāhmanaḥ Pacatīti Udāharaṇaṁ.(ibid)

word-hood and produces a definite expectancy".[1] Here it is to be noted that Nāgeśa leaves Ākhyāta as a word which always ends in a suffix and produces a definite expectancy, but does not restrict by defining it specifically as Tiṅanta, as is done by the Nyāyavārtikakāra.

Nāgeṣa argues that the word Ākhyāta defined in the Nirukta refers to one which ends in a verbal suffix and produces a definite expectancy of bringing something into existence Thus the designation Ākhyāta is not barred in the case of words like Edhitavyaṁ; gatvā etc., Accordingly it is neither the root nor the suffix that can be called Ākhyāta. This does not mean that words like Pācaka etc., come under the Ākhyāta category. Of course it is true that from the root part of the word "Pācaka" there arises the expectancy but not from the word which ends in the kṛt. suffix.[2]

Further the Ākhyāta always be one which ends in a suffix. This is evident from the Vārtika "Ākhyātaṁ Ākhyātena kriyāsātatye" where the examples Pacata-bhṛjjatā, khādata-modatā etc., are all fulfledged verb words.[3] And from compounds of this type, popular understanding is of activity only. Since this type of compounding is not possible between either mere roots or mere suffixes. Ākhyāta means a verbal root ending in a suffix.

Further, according to the Nirukta, the Ākhyāta is a word, and according to Pāṇini a word is that which ends in a Sup or Tip suffix.[4] Here it may not be urged that the words Nāma and Ākhyāta in the said Nirukta statement refer to the nominal base

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1. Tatra Ākhyāta śabdena niyamato jankāmkṣaṁ vibhaktyantaṁ (L. M. (nbp) P. 90,).
2. Pācaka ityādāvekadesārthasya tadākāmkṣatve Api vibhaktyantārthasya na tadākāmkṣatvaṁ. (L. M. (nbp) P. 90,).
3. Under the the Sūtra Mayūra Vyaṁsakādayaśca (P.2.1.72).
4. Cātvāripadajātāni - Nāmākhyāte copasarganipātāsca. Suptiṅantaṁ padaṁ (Nirukta 1.1).

and the verbal root forms only but not to fulfledged words; for Durga in his Nirukta - commentary says that these four viz., action, time, tense and number are the meanings of the Ākhyāta and of the four, action is more important.[1] Here action (Bhāva) means both activity and result. Thus by a verb in the active voice like Pacati the predominance of action is understood; and by a verb in the passive voice like 'Pacyate' the predominance of the result is understood And all the above four meanings are there only in words like Pacati, Pacyate etc., which always end in a suffix. Neither. the mere root nor the mere suffix posseesses these four types of meanings.

Further if the root alone is considered to be the Ākhyata in view of its Bhāvārtha, then the definition as given by Kaundabhatta over-applies in the case of impersonal forms of the full-fledged verbs like 'Śiṣye' etc.,. Similarly in the case Pācaka, Rāga etc., words, there will be the flaw of in-applicability of the defination of Ākhyāta given by Kaundabhatta. Since the meaning of the suffix is prominant and not Bhāva, it cannot be maintained that Bhāva is predominant in such cases. Of course the opponent may argue that in the case of words like Pācaka, Rāga etc., there is no compatibility hence the predominance of the meaning of the root cannot be cognised.[2] But where such compatibility exists, as in the case of verb words (Tiṅanta) the predominance of the root-word is cognised. Thus it is the matter of compatibility that decides the importance of the meaning; but not the fault of designating the root with the word Ākhyāta. But this argument of the opponent is not sound. If a word possesses predominance of a particular meaning in the presence of a particular suffix and looses its predominance in the presence of a different suffix, then the

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1. Bhāvakāla lakāra saṃkhyāścatvāro artha ākhyātasya. Tatra Bhāvaḥ Pradhānaṃ (Ibid).

2. Nanu Pācaka ityādau dhātubhāgasya Pradhānyena bodhakatva abhāvepi, tata eva Tiṅ tadbodhakatvamastyeveti, tadyogyatvāt Ākhyāta lakṣanaṃ tatra na avyāptam (L. M. (nbp) Tiṅartha P. 93,

predominant nature of the meaning of that word cannot be said belonging to it. Thus when we say that the Ākhyāta has Bhāva as its predominant meaning, it should not depend upon some other variable suffix for its predominance. Hence by accepting that the word Ākhyāta connotes the complete verb word such defects do not crop up.

Further in the Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's definition, the very fact that, he gives prominence to Bhāva than to the other meanings (of the suffix), is enough proof of his acceptance that the entire verb word is called 'Ākhyāta'. Otherwise the word 'Pradhāna' (in Sarvapradhānībhūto arthaḥ) in his definition serves no purpose. Nāgeśa further states that the nominative usage of the word 'Sadhātuḥ' in the definition given in the Ṛk Prātiśākhya is actually to be construed in the instrumental as interpreted in the concerned commentary. Then the definition means "That is an Ākhyāta, which comprising a root, expresses the action". [1]

Further Bhāṣya on the Sūtra 'Praśaṁsāyāṁ Rūpap" [2] also is in support of Nāgeśa's contention. The argument put in there by the Bhāṣyakāra would have not been possible if he (the Bhāṣyakāra) had accepted that the Ākhyāta was mere root or a mere suffix. Thus it is evident that the Bhāṣyakāra also is of the opinion that the word Ākhyāta stands for fullfledged verb word. However, only in two instances like Nāmanyākhyātajāni and Luptākhyāteṣu, the word Ākhyāta does not denote a verb word but denotes the root and the kṛdanta (as illustrated by Niṣkausambiḥ) respectively by implication (Upacārāt). [3]

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1. Dhātusahitena yena bhāva mabhidadhāti tadākhyātamiti tadarthaḥ (L. M. (nbp) Tiṅartha P, 93,).
2. Kriyāpradhānamākhyātaṁ, ekāca kriyā yataḥ kriyāmāpṛṣṭe tiṅācaste. (Bhāṣya on P.5.3.66).
3. "Luptākhyāteṣu ca". iti samarthasūtravārtike kṛti Ākhyāta padaprayoga upacārāditi bodhyam (L.M. (nbp) Tiṅartha P.90.

Further Nāgeśa claims certain advantages if we accept his definition. Accordingly not only the words ending in Tiṅ suffix, but also the words like Gatvā, Bhoktavyam, Edhām etc., can be called Ākhyātas as they primarily denote action.

CONCLUSION :-

Now taking into consideration the various definitions and examples as given by the Nirukta, the sages Gautama and Jaimini, and the Bhāṣyakāras like Vātsāyana, Śabara and Patanjali it appears prudent to accept that the word Ākhyāta connotes a Tiṅanta in general 'rather strictly speaking' a word ending in a suffix capable of giving word-hood and producing a definite expectancy. It is not a mere root as argued by Kaundabhaṭṭa; or a mere suffix as argued by the latter Logicians and the Mīmāṁsakas. Thus an Ākhyāta is a fully inflected verb word like Pacati, Vrajati etc.

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Chapter II

Section-1

ROOT—DEFINITION—CLASSIFICATION

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The Root-Its Definition And Its Classification

The Indian grammarians' in their quest to study the nature of Sanskrit language, did not satisfy themselves with the analysis of language into sentence of different types. They further divided the sentence into the various parts of speech viz. Noun, Verb etc. They observed that evn these words, though they appear to be single in from, can be divided further into their component parts. They identified these component parts, as is stated in the Bhāṣya, by following the process of Anvaya and Vyatireka. There Patanjali says that the division of a word into the component parts viz., stem and suffix and the determination of their meanings is possible by applying the technique of 'agreement and negation' (Anvaya and Vyatireka).[1] Following this process, they stripped off all the component parts from a verb-word anb they arrived at an irreducible unit which they called Dhātu (Root).

The very word Dhātu has a great signification in it. In the scince of grammar Dhātu is also called 'Prakṛti', which word is familiar to any Indian Philosopher as the one out of which in the course of evolution, the entire universe has come into existence. So also a 'Dhtāu' is like primordial matter, the chief element which when modified in different ways gives rise to the world of words (Sabda Prapanca). Besides verb words, a fairly large number of nouns too are found to have been derived from these verbal roots. This study of language has its origin in the Brāhmanās' and seems to have reached its zeneth during the period of Yāska. Already by that time there had existed the views among scholars that all the nouns are derived from verbal roots[2] and they tried to explain thir derivations.

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1. Siddhametat. Katham, Anvayavyatirekācca, M.B. on P.1-2-45

2. Sarvāṇi nāmānyākhyātajānīti sākaṭāyano nairukta samayaśca (Nirukta 1-4-1).

One may question if the component parts of a word have their own meanings why are they not used independently in a sentence.To this it is replied that the relationship between the root and the suffix, the component parts of a verb word, is innate and is established according to usage. Patañjali makes it clear in the Mahābhāṣya that inspite of the fact that the root and the surffix are accepted to possess their own independent meanings; still as a result of this innate relationship, neither the stem nor the suffix is allowed to have an independent usage in the language.[1] The veteran logician Jagadiśa also says that the relationship existing between the Prakṛti and the Pratyaya is one of interdependence, because the conjoint utterance of the stem and the suffix alone is said to be significant.[2]

In the etymological language (Nirukta) this technique, involved in the formation of a word by the harmonious combination of the Prakṛti and the Pratyaya; is called ,Sāstrakṛtdyogaḥ'. Thus the science of grammar is nothing but a compendium of such principles as would show the processes or both the permutations and combinations of the various parts of the words. Thus a verb word is analysed into its component parts and they are named as Dhātu (Root) and Partyaya (the formative affix). In Sanskrit it is observed that primarily there are about two thousand roots(Dhātu). So we have to find out the generic nature or the common characteristic among them, so that we can call any crude form poossesing that particular characteristic, a root.

DEFINITION OF ROOT :—

In Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, we do not find anything specifically as a definition of the root as we find in the case of word, etc.[3]

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1. Pratyayena nitya sambandhāt. Nityasambandhāvetāvarthau Prakṛti Pratyaya iti. Pratyayasya nitya sambandhāt kevalasya prayogo na bhavati. (M. B. 1-2-45.)
2. Śabdāntaramapekshyaiva sārthakaḥ, svārthabodhakṛt (Sab. Sak. Pra. Kārika 6).
3. Suptiṅantaṁ padaṁ. (P.1.4.14),

When one puts a question 'what is a root', normally a student of the Pāṇinian school, replies quickly 'a root is that one which is found in the list of roots read by Pāṇini. Pāṇini instead of strictly defining the root states that the forms Bhū VĀ, etc., are roots.[1] We find another aphorism that the forms ending with suffixes 'san' etc., are also roots (sanādhyantā dhātavaḥ).

Here one is inclined to feel that the aphorism 'Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ' cannot be a strict definition; because it is a list of forms. A definition is that which enunciates a special chracteristic which exists in all those froms, so that these can be distinguished from other words which have the same form (Ānupūrvi) e. g. the word 'Ghaṭa' denotes a 'a pot'. And this from is also found in the list of roots. So the question arises "how are we to distinguish the verbal root from a nominal base."

Patañjali, the Mahābhāsyakāra takes up this question and discusses it under the sutra "Bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ". There he offers three alternative definitions. In the first instance, he defines a verbal root as "one which signifies action."[2] Another definition he puts forth is 'the verbal root is one which signifies Bhāva',[3] and the final alternative is "the verbal root is that which is read out by Pāṇini in the list of roots", but however he says that the statement "Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ" is the definition and the sutra "Bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ" can be replaced by it.

Let us see what the sutra means· The word "Bhūvādayaḥ is treated as a Bahuvrīhi compound and is dissolved as Bhūvau ādī yeṣām te." Here "Bhūvau is a dvanda compound of Bhū and VĀ; similarly Ādī also as Ādiśca Ādiśca. One Ābiḥ is read with Bhū, in the sense of "beginning with" and the second 'Ādiḥ' has the sense of 'similarity' and is read with VĀ. Thus the whole sutra Bhūvādayo

1. Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ (P.1.3.1.).
9' Kriyāvacano Dhātuḥ (M.B. on P.1.3.1,).
3. Bhāva Vacano Dhātuḥ.

dhātavaḥ is explained as "Roots are those which begin with Bhū (in the list of roots read out by Pāṇini) and those that are similar to VĀ (to blow) (in denoting activity). Thus for an entity to be called a root two conditions are to be satisfied, 1. It should be read by Pāṇini in his Dhātupāṭha (i.e. Bhvādi list) and 2. It must also denote action.[1] Unless we explain the word Bhūvādayaḥ as above, we cannot properly account for the word 'VĀ' in the sūtra. Here the opponent may argue that of the two conditions stated above, the first one (i.e. a root is that which is read in the Dhatupāṭha) itself can be a definition but not the other part of it. But it is not so. Of course it is true that the Bhāṣyakāra and the Vārtikakāra explain the word 'VĀ' as to ensure auspiciousness,[2] but they again give an alternative explanation. Unless the second condition is also laid down, forms like Yā, (which is also a pronoun) and VĀ, also a particle (Nipāta or Avyaya) etc., will have to be treated as roots. It may be argued that when two words of the same form are available, one individually uttered (Pratipadokta) and the other derived with the help of grammar (Lakṣaṇā) then only the former one should be taken into consideration but not the other one,[3] and as such there will be no question of pronouns etc. to be treated as verbal roots, but still the trouble continuous with prefixes like 'Su' and prohibitory particles as Māṅ or Mā. Consequently words like Māti, Mimīte etc., may result in the sense of prohibition etc.,[4] since Māṅ the particle is read in the sense of prohibition (niṣedha).

Some may suggest that depending on the meaning of the word, it can be decided whether it is a verbal root or not. But this argument also is not sound, because these meanings are not given by Pāṇini or Kātyāyana, but by later grammarians like Bhīma-

1. Itham ca kriyā vācakatve sati gaṇapaṭhitatvaṁ dhātutvaṁ paryavasitaṁ (Vai. Bhū. karika 9).
2. Bhūvādīnāṁ vakāroyaṁ mangalārthaḥ prayujyate (Ibid).
3. Lakṣaṇpratipadoktayoḥ pratipadoktasyaiva grahaṇaṁ.
4. Tathā ca samīcīna varjanādyarthe śavati, Mimīte mātītyāpattiḥ (Ibid).

sena, etc. The meaning of each root as shown there, is only indicatory but not exhaustive. Some times a single root may have different meanings, some of them may be revealed only in the presence of an upasarga etc., e.g. tiṣṭati and upatiṣṭati· And the purpose of giving the meaning is just to show that they denote activity.[1] Therefore the second condition viz. 'which denotes activity' is essential in the definition of the root.

Similarly, in the absence of the phrase "being one read in the list of roots" the Prākṛt verbs like Āṇavedi, Vaṭṭedi etc. may be treated as Sanskrit verbs since they denote activity. Further particles like Hiruk (Varjane) etc. which speak of activity but are not found in the Bhvādi list, will have to be treated as roots. Therefore to avoid either type of inconsistency the two phrases are required in the definition.

Some may doubt that this being the definition,[2] roots like Stambh which are found only in the Pāṇinian aphorisms but not in the gaṇapāṭha and classical roots like Culumpa etc. fail to get the designation of root, but one need not entertain such a doubt, because the addition of mute letters etc. indicates that these also are roots. Infact Pāṇini himself says that this list is only indicative but not exhaustive; which means, "besides these roots any other root found in usage is also to be accepted". Thus strictly speaking those forms which denote activity are defined as roots.

The Bhāṣyakāra also confirms this view and he defines the root as "Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ" and he replies to all possible objections. while commenting on the said sutra, he says the Prākṛt roots can be excluded by being guided by the usages of scholors.[3]

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1. Kriyāvācitvabodhārtham taduddesāt. Taduktam- Kriyāvācitvamākhyātumekaiko arthaḥ pradarśitaḥ. Prayogato anusartavyā Anekārthāhi dhātavaḥ (Ibid).

2. Kriyāvācikatve sati gaṇapaṭhitatvam dhātutvaṁ.

3. Siṣṭaprayodāṇāvayatyādīnāṁ nivṛttirbhaviṣyati (M. B. on P 1-3-1).

Then if we are to accept this definition, the roots As, Bhū, Vid cannot be treated as verbal roots, because no activity is found to be denoted by them. Activity implies movement; but here there is no movement at all. Hence a separate aphorism is to be formulated to bring them under the designation of roots. The Bhāṣyakāra refutes this arguement and states the above definition itself is competent to designate them as verbal roots. The arguements can be summarised as follow.

WHETHER 'AS', BHU, VID ETC. ARE THEY VERBAL ROOTS :

Now having defined a verbal root as one which signifies action and also is read in the list of roots enumerated by Pāṇini: we are put a question whether the forms As, Bhū, Vid, etc., are verbal roots. In these cases activity is not signified by them: i.e. on hearing these words we get an import neither of activity nor of sāmānādhikaraṇya with the root 'kṛ' as Bhavanaṁ karoti etc. To be more clear, when we put a question "what does one do (kiṁ karoti) we do not know an answer with any of these verb words asti, bhavati etc. [1]

Secondly in the case of verb words like 'Pacati' etc. when all the accessories (Sādhanas) are present, some times only, in the presence of a particular action, there is the use of the form 'Pacati' (He cooks) and some times (i.e. when such an action is not present) it is not there. But in the case of the verbs 'Asti, etc., this is the ease : because no such restrction is found to be existent in the case of these verbs.

And further, in the case of the verbs 'Pacati' etc.' we find that the intesity of activity is being denoted by the

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1. Kiṁ karotīti praśne astyādibhiḥ Prativacanābhāvadakriyāsanatvāmeṣāmiti manyate..............Naivamastitarāmiti. (Pradīpa under P 1-3-1-11).

suffix 'Taram' added to them as instanced from the usage 'Pacatitaram (he cooks intensively); but no such usage as 'Astitaram' etc., is found in the case of these verbs (Asti) etc. Thus it becomes evident that these verb words differ from verbs like Pacati etc, and hence the above definition, given to a verbal root, does not cover these roots, as such it (the definition) suffers from the fault of partial applicability (Avyāpti doṣa). So there is need to formulate a separate aphorsm to confer root-hood to these also,

REFUTATION OF THE OBJECTIONS ;

The Bhāṣyakāra refutes the above objections. As for the first objection raised above, the Bhāṣyakāra suggests that the root may be defined as "one which signifies action in general" with or without movement" (Bhāvavacano Dhātuḥ) in which case all these 'asti, bhavati' vidyate etc. come under the scope of this definition. There is a difference between the imports signified by the two words Kriyā and Bhāva. The word 'Kriyā' denotes activity to be accomplished through the instrumentality (sādhana) of movement, while the word 'Bhāva' on the other hand, denotes the same activity to be accomplished through an instrumentally involving movement or no movement. [1]

Kayyata equates Bhāva with Kriyāmātra i.e. action in general. But this 'action-in-general' is different from the meaning of the root 'kṛ' which also means "action in general".

The idea of "Bhāva" is made clear further by Kayyata himself by referring to the Sūtra "Bhāve (P. 3-3-18). There it is said that suffixes like 'ghan' etc. are added to roots like Pac etc. in the sence of Bhāva to form the words Pāka etc. There are two elements in the word 'Pāka' viz., the root Pac' and the suffix 'ghan'. The root element expresses the

1 Kriyāśabdeḥ saparispanda sādhana sādhyarthe rūḍhaḥ, Bhāvaśabdaśca sāprispandāparisandānyatara sādhanasādhya itibhāvaḥ (Udyota under P 1-3-1).

special type of action of the form 'cooking' etc. The suffix part expresses the 'action-in-general' and two coexist in the same thing. It is to be noted here that the 'action in general' expressed by the suffix is not in the form of something to be acheived (Sādhya) but as a thing achieved (Siddha) and this very 'action in general' is expressed by the roots As, Bhū, Vid etc. as sādhya but not 'Siddha'. Of course roots like Pac can express both these actions (i e. action in particular like cooking (and action in general) as Sādhya only and these two coexist in the import of the root. Thus all roots signify action in general (Bhāva) as is evident from the usages "Bhavati pacati, 'Bhavati' pakṣyate" etc. Here Bavati stands for Bhāva (action in general) and pacati for action in particular. Here the action in general is nothing but existence or being (sattā or Ātmabharaṇa) and it is found in everything, be it a finished product (Siddha) or a thing achieved (Sādhya). Thus the expression 'Bhavati pacati' ultimately means "Existence, the agent of which is the same as that of cooking".[1] This " Existence is the meaning of the root Bhū and is inherent in the meaning expressed by every other root. And the meaning of every other root is only a variation of the meaning of the root 'Bhū' and so it (Bhāva vacano dhātuḥ) is said to be the definition of a root. By so defining the root As Bhū, Vid etc., can also be designated as roots because they all express just this 'Existence'. Further this Existence is exclusively affirmative (Kevalānvayi). Therefore, it is coextensive with all.[2] Thus

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1. M. B. edited by Keilhorn-Part I P. 256
2. Bhāvanā-lakṣaṇā-bhāvasya sattārūpatvāt, sattāyāsca kevalanvayitvena sarvasamānādhikaraṇatayā Bhāvavacana iti lakṣaṇam na kvāpyavyāptamiti uttarabhāṣya tātparyam (udyota under M. B. on P. 1.3. 1-12).

the definition "Bhāva vacano dhātuḥ" confers root-hood not only on roots like Pac etc., but also on As, Bhū, Vid etc.' and presents them as verbal roots.

The Bhāṣyakāra examines the same question with respect to the other definition, i.e. "Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ". Even according to this definition, he says, the forms As, Bhū etc., become designated as verbal roots. It is to be noted that every activity differs from every other activity in as much as its speciality in its employment (Pravṛttiviśeṣa) of the agent is concerned: and strictly speaking this 'speciality in employment' is called activity. Such difference in the employment can be found in the case of these roots as between 'Asti' and Mriyate'. In 'Asti' the activity of self supporting is found and in 'Mriyate' the activity of abandonment of the above activity is observed.[1] Thus we find in the meaning denoted by the word 'Asti' a particularity in its employment (Pravṛttiviśeṣa) of the form of 'self supporting' (Ātmabharaṇa) as against the particularity in employment of the form Ātmatyāga denoted by the verb 'Mriyate'.

Further Patanjali makes this very clear by giving a striking example. He says that ones behaviour towards plain rice is quite different from one's behaviour towards rice with meat in it. Of course we use the same verb 'eats' (Atti) in regard to both of them. Similarly we observe that on the occasions when we use 'Asti', the behaviour of the people concerned is different from that when the word 'Mriyate' is used.[2] Thus it is clear that the roots As, Bhū, etc. signify

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1. Astāvātmabharaṇa rūpa pravṛttir mriyatau tattyāga rūpā (Pradipa under M.B. on P1.3.1-16),

2, Anyathā hi kārakāṇyastau Pravartante, Anyathā hi Mriyatau (M. B. on P. 1.3.1, ibid)

a process (Kriyā). Thus even if we accept the definition 'Kriyāvacano dhātuh' the form As, Bhū Vid etc. can be designated as verbal roots because due to the difference in the employment of Sādhana's concerned.

And as regards the the sameness of the substratum (Sāmānādhikaraṇya) of the words 'Asti' etc with the root 'kṛ', it is our common experience, that when the question 'what does one do (kiṁ karoti) is asked about the one who is on death bed, we get the reply he exists' (Asti). Similarly the cognition of the intensity of the meaning signified by the verbs 'Vidyate' etc. is brought out by adding the 'suffix' Tarām as in the sentence "Vidyate tarāmiha dhānyaṁ" (Intensive existence of the corn is here).[1] Thus it becomes clear that either of the definitions 'Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ', 'Bhāva vacano dhātuh' covers the entire world of roots As, Bhū, etc., and neither of the definitions suffers from the fault of partial applicability.

Further the Bhāṣyakāra takes recourse to the 'Nirukta' to prove that the words Asti, Bhavti etc., are denotative of Bhāva. In the Nirukta it is said, that Jāyata, Asti Viparinamate etc., are the modifications of becoming (Bhāva). Of those six modifications (Vikāras) of becoming (Bhāva), Asti is one. Here some may question 'what is the action denoted by the word 'Tiṣṭati' (stands) Vartate (exists) etc.? To stand means to be static. Activity denotes a state of dynamism. Therefore the verb Tiṣṭhati representing a state opposit to that of dynamism cannot be grouped with other verb words like Gacchati etc. which denote activity. But this argument is not logical. Let us take the case of a person who is walking. There is a particular type of action subsisting in him which keeps the body in motion. Now when one asks him to stop, naturally the person brings another type of action into force which is opposite to the previous action and the man comes to halt. And even then he continues the same action to keep the body static. Otherwise the body would be in motion. So this type of activity which keeps

1. Prakarṣa pratyayopi dṛsyate, vidyate, tarāmiha dhānyaṁ (Pradīpa under M.B. on 1-3-1-11.).

the body at rest' (Nivartanārūpā kriyā) is the denoted meaning of the verb words Tiṣṭhati; Vartate etc.. Thus the activity existing here is internal but not external which can directly be inferred. Thus all such words are covered by the definition 'Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ' etc.

Now to prove that the verb words 'Asti' 'Bhavati' 'Vidyate', Jānāti, etc., fall under the scope of the definition given to the verbal root', the Bhāṣyakāra finally gives an alternative arguement taking recourse to the usage of elders. He argues that unless activity is denoted by these words (Asti etc.), the verbal suffixes indicating past, present or future states, activity could not have been appended to these roots. But in the day to day usage of elders, we find these roots in all the tenses e g. " Asti, Abhūt, Bhaviṣyati, Ajānan etc. " Thus it becomes evident that all the above roots viz., Asti, Bhavati etc denote action and hence the definition 'Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ' itself holds good and covers all the verbal roots.

CLASSIFICATION OF ROOTS :-

The roots in sanskrit are broadly divided under three classes viz. Primary roots, derived roots and aphoristic roots.

1. Primary Roots :

The sage Pāṇini listed out almost all the roots numbering about two thousand, This list of roots is generally known as "Dhātupāṭha". And the roots listed herein are called simple roots or primary roots.

Now as regards the classification of primary roots, it is observed that normally every root takes a particular suffix after it, before it takes the verbal affix. Such an intermediatory suffix is called Vikaraṇa suffix. This Vikaraṇa suffix plays an important part in the division of primary roots into ten major groups called Gaṇas. The basis for such division being the particular Vikaraṇa suffix which is responsible for, mainly, the formation of the concerned active-present-stem

when followed by a sārvadhātuka affix.[1] The grammarian's choice of this basis of classification is very natural, because' to quote Whitney[2] "the present system is the most prominent and important part of the whole conjugation, since from the earliest period of the language, its forms are much more frequent than those of all other systems together". Therefore all the roots which take the same Vikaraṇa suffix are grouped together and that group is named after the first root that tops the list of that group. Thus, for example, some of the entire number of roots take after them, the Vikaraṇa suffix 'Śyan', they are all grouped together. The first root in this group being Div, this group (gaṇa) is called Divādi gaṇa i.e. a group of roots of which the first one is Div.

In the case of some roots e.g. Adādi and Juhotyādi groups, we do not find the Vikaraṇa suffixes, but the roots in Juyotyādi group have a peculiar common feature, which is not found in the Adādi group, in forming the verb word. The Juhotyādi group of roots takes reduplication before taking the verbal suffix. But the Adādi group does not get reduplicated. Thus taking some special nature, which is common among a number of roots, into account, these two thoushnd roots are divided into different gaṇas (groups). The following table shows it clearly.

CONJUGATIONAL TABLE

Conjugation No. and Name 1	No. of roots (round about) 2	Vikarana Apparent 3	suffix Actual 4	Verb form (3rd per. Sing.) 5
1 Bhvādi	1035	Śap	A	Bhavati
2 Adādi	72	—	—	Atti
3 Juhotyādi	24	—	—	Juhoti
4 Divādi	140	Śyan	Ya	Dīvyati
5 Svādi	35	Śnu	Nu	Sunoti
6 Tudādi	156	Śa	A	Tudati
7 Rudhādi	25	Śnam	Na	Ruṇaddhi
8 Tanādi	10	U	u	Tanoti
9 Kryādi	61	Śnā	Na	Krīṇāti
10 Curādi	410	Śap	A	Corayati

1. Tiṅ sārvadhātukaṁ (P.3.4,113).
2. Whitney's Sanskrit grammar - Article 600;

Form the above table it is evident that the 1st 6th and 10th Conjugational roots take practically the same suffix 'A' after them, before taking the actual verbal suffix. So the question before us is how to divide them. It is true that they take the same 'A', but there exists certain diffcrence in the formation of the stem and the verb word For instance the Vikaraṇa sutfix in general (and this of the 1st conjugation) is introduced as 'Sap', while that of the 6th conjugation is 'Śa' only' The verbal base of the 1st conjugational roots after taking the Vikaraṇa suffix, has the anudātta accent on the last vowel and this fact is indicated by adding the 'P' (pakāra) to the suffix as a mute letter [1] But the verbal base of the 6th conjugation does not possess this feature. Thus those two groups are separated.

The Vikaraṇa suffix for both the first conjugational roots and the tenth conjugational roors is 'sap' only But there lies a pecularity in the behaviour of the tenth conjugational roots These roots invariably take the suffix 'Nic' after them, and thus after becoming a Nijanta the root takes the Vikaraṇa suffix 'sap'. This Nic forms a part and parcel of the verbal base in all lakāras (tenses and moods). It should be noted that Nic is not a Vikaraṇa suffix. Of course some roots of this class optionally take Nic[2] and this Nic does not have any meaning of its own but is appended only for the sake of grammatical purity.

The roots of the third conjugatin differ from other roots in as much as they get reduplicated before they take the verbal affix. Thus based on some particular or special charateristic e g. svara, similarity in functional behaviour (Prakriya sāmya) etc. which is common among some of them, the roots have been classified into various conjugations to facilitate an easy understanding of the verbal system in Sanskrit for the reader.

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1. Anudāttau suppitau (P.3 1.4).

2. S.K. on P.1.3.74. "Ṇicasca Iditkaraṇaṁ nichh Pākṣikatve lingam', And also the Gaṇa Vartika "Adhṛsādvā". And also S.K. on P. 7.3.35 - Artidhrivtı Puṅ nau"-Nitkaraṇa sāmarthyat Nijvikalpam". And the gaṇa sutra "Āsvodh sakarmakāt" etc.

2 Derived Roots :-

There is another type of roots. They are popularly known as Derived roots or complex roots. There are certain suffixes, San etc., twelve in number having their respective menings. Some of these suffixes are added to simple roots. and the resultant form is again treated as a fresh verbal root. Similarly some other suffixes are added to either nouns or nominal stems and the resultant derived form is treated as a fresh verbal root. The causative (Ṇijanta) the frequentative (Yaṅanta) the denominative (Nāmadhātu) the Desiderivative (sannanta), etc. roots come under this group. For example. Jigamiṣa (to desire to go) Putriya (desire to possess a son) Ābharaṇāya (to act like an ornament) etc; all these forms have the designation 'root' sanctioned by Pāṇini through a separate aphorism P. 3.1.52.[1]

3. Aphöristical Roots :-

A third variety of roots are those which are found only in the aphorisms of Pāṇini but not read in the Dhātupāṭha e.g. Skanbhu ju etc. . Scholars opine these roots also might have been originally read in the Dhātupāṭha but later on lost from it. Of course the reasons for such a drop-out is beyond comprehension.

Besides such a broad and general division, taking different stand points of grammar into account, these roots have been variously divided again into sub-groups.

1. These roots are divided as mono-syllabic and nonmono syllabic. The criteria for such a division is the number of vowels contained in a root (Ekācka and Anekācka)[2]. This division has been made by Pāṇini in order to facilitate certain grammatical operations.

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1. Sanādyantādhātavaḥ Discussed in detil in the second Part of the book.
2. Ekāco dve prathamasya. Ekāca upadeśe anudāttāt (P. 7.2.10).

2. Ātmanepadi and Parasmaipadi Roots : The veabal suffixes are of two types. They are called Atmanepada suffixes and Parasmaipada suffixes. Of the eighteen Tiṅ suffixes enlisted in the sūtra[1] the first nine i.e. Tip, Tas, Jhi, Sip, Thas, Tha, Mip, Vas, Mas are called parasmaipada suffixes and the remaining nine suffixes i.e. Ta, Ātāṁ. Jha, Thās, Āthāṁ, Dhvaṁ Id Vahiṅ Mahiṅ are called Ātmanepada suffixes. Of the two thousand verbal roots some roots always take after them the parasmaipada suffixes only and such roots are called Parasmaipadi roots, and some others take the remaining set of the suffixes and are called Ātmanepadi roots. These ātmanepadi roots are read with an anudātta accent at the end or with 'ṅ' as a mute letter.[2] However under special circumstances an Ātmanepadi root may take parasmaipada suffixes giving rise to a slight difference in the meaning of the verb.[3] Sometimes the reverse is also possible. There are some roots which take either set of suffixes alternatively and such roots are called Ubhayapadins.[4] When the speaker wants to convey that the result produced by the activity, is intended to be enjoyed by the agent himself, then those roots which end with a Svarita accent or with a mute letter ṅ; take Ātmanepada suffixes. For example 'Pacate'. Here the Atmanepada indicates that the agent is cooking for himself but not for others. But the verb 'Pacati' indicates that the agent cooks for others. These roots' taking Atmanepada suffixes are further subdivided as svaritets, Ṅits, Anudāttets.

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1. Tip Tas Jhi, Sip Thas tha mip vas mas, Ta Ātāṁ Jha Thāsāthāṁ Dhvaṁ Idvahiṅmahiṅ (P. 3.4·78) and Thaṇāṇā vātmanepadaṁ (P· 1.4.100.)

2. Anudāttaṅita ātmanepadaṁ (P. 1.3.12). Seṣāt kartari parasmaipadaṁ (P. 1.3.79).

3. For details Vide Ātmanepada prakriya—Parasmaipada Prakriya, as given separately in S.K.

4. Svaritañitaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale (P. 1.3.78).

3. Some of the roots are called sets i.e. they get augmentation of the letter 'i' (iḍāgama) and others which do not get this augmentation are called Aniṭs.[1]

The above two classifications are purely from the point of view of grammatical operations.

4. Transitive - Intransitive Roots :- Another very important classification of these roots is based on their capacity to take an object or otherwise. Generally the roots which have the capacity to take an object are called Transitive roots (Sakarmaka Dhātus) and others which do not have this capacity to take an object are called "Intransitive roots (Akarmaka Dhātus). This capacity is the result of their natural denotative capacity (Śabdaśakti svabhāva). It should be noted clearly that it is the verbal root that takes an object or not but not the verb word. Thus the transitiveness or intransitiveness lies in roots only.[2]

Generally it is said that a root is transitive, if the result and activity denoted by it, subsist in different substratums. If the activity subsists in the same substratum as that of the result, then the root is said to be intransitive. For instance observe the root Pac. Here the activity in the form of supplying heat etc., exists in the (substratum) agent, say Caitra and the result i.e. Softening (Viklitti) exists in a different substratum i.e. rice. Hence this root is transitive. In the case of the root Jīv (to live), both the result holding life (Prāṇadhāraṇa) and the activity congenial to hold them in the body, exist in the same substratum Caitra etc. Hence the root is said to be intransitive.[3]

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1. Vide Verses in S. K. under the Sutra P.7.1.5

2. Transitiveness-intransitiveness (See Chapter IV of this book).

3. Jayarāmabhaṭṭācārya classifies transitive roots as follow i.e. 1 roots possesing single object; 2 Roots possessing two objects but denoting single activity 3 Roots possessing two objects and denoting two activities (Nyayakośa P.390).

How Transitive Roots Become Intransitive :-

It is observed that in Sanskrit many transitive roots become intransitve and vice-versa under some peculiar conditions.[1] These can be summarised as follows :

(1) A transitive root becomes intransitive when it is not used in the original sense. For instance the root Vah is transitive in the sense 'to bear' but it becomes intransitive when used in the sense 'to flow' Nadī vahati.

(2) Some roots which include the meaning of tha object also in the root meaning become intransitive e.g, Jīv (Jīvati).

(3) Some roots are by usage treated as intransitive e.g. "varṣati" Here actually the object water (Jalam) as in Megho jalaṁ varṣati; but the object 'water' is too well known by long usage, to be specifically mentioned; and hence in such cases the root is treated as intransitive.

(4) Again a root becomes intransitive if its object is not desired to be expressed as in sentences like Mātuḥ smarati.

It may be noted that sometimes intransitive roots too become transitive by the addition of a prefix (upasarga) as in the case of Bhū with 'Anu' prefixed to it. Similarly some times transitive roots also become intransitive on the addition of a Prefix as in the case of 'Saṁgacchate'.

Generally all those roots meaning "being born, existing, changing, decaying, perishing", and roots meaning standing, sitting, fearing, feeling shy, keeping awake, playing, shining etc., are intransitive.[2]

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1. Dhātorarthāntaravṛtteḥ Dhātvarthenopasangrahāt, Prasidheravivakṣātaḥ karamano akarmikā (V. P. III-7-87).

1. Vṛddhi kṣayabhaya jīvita maraṇaṁ lajjā sattā Sthiti jāgaraṇaṁ Śayana kridā ruci dīptyarthāḥ dhātugaṇaṁ tamakarmakámāhuḥ.

ROOTS TAKING TWO OBJECTS :-

Normally a transitive root takes only a single object i.e. in a sentence there will be only one single word denoting the object. This word may denote a single individual as the object or even more, but there will be only one word denoting the object in a sentence. Now observe the sentence "Aśvaṁ, gāṁ gajaṁ ca dadāti". Here one may think the root 'Dā' is taking three objects, but it is not so. But in all these cases the root takes only a single (type of) object. Then naturally arises a question what is it that we mean by "a root having two objects." Khaṇḍa Deva replies this in a more technical way.[1] This to explain in the words of my learned professor, having an object means "to have the nature which is the determinant of the nature of substratum of collective extensity of objectness which is the theme of the one understanding."[2]

In the (above cited) sentence "Aśvaṁ gāṁ ca dadāti" though we find two words as objects they can be compounded into a single 'compound word.' Hence roots having such objects two or more in number should not be treated as 'Dvikarmaka' (having two objects) for our present purpose. Thus here also the word denoting object is one only. But there are sentences where such a compounding is not possible. The verbal roots of such sentences are said to be taking two objects e.g. Baliṁ vasudhāṁ yācate caitraḥ.

It is peculiar that in Sanskrit a very few roots take two objects as in English. If we observe these sentences in the English language - "Give him food; I whish you all success". Here we find the verbs "give" and "wish,, have each two objects. Similarly in Sanskrit too, some (a very few) roots take objects as in the sentences "gāṁ payaḥ dogdhi Rājānaṁ yācate vasudhāṁ; Pitaraṁ panthānaṁ pṛcchati" etc.

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1. Eka bodha viṣayaka karmatvaparyāpta adhikaraṇatā vacchedaka dharmavatvaṁ. (Bhā. Rah. P.68, last line.
2. The Phil. Sent. - Pts., P. 120.

As already said there are only a few such roots which can take two objects and they are enumerated in the following verse.[1] There it is said the roots Duh, Yāc, Pac, Daṇḍ, Rudh, Pṛc, Ci, Brū, Śās, Ji, Manth, Muṣ (tosteal), Nīr Hṛ, Kṛṣ, Vah and also others having their signification, e.g. Bhāṣ, Vāc etc. take two objects.[2] In the cases of the first twelve roots from Duh to Muṣ the nouns payḥ, vasudhām etc. are principal objects and words gām, Rājānaṁ etc. are secondary objects because these secondary objects, depending on the speaker's volition can be put in other cases like ablative etc. as in the sentence goḥ dogdhi payaḥ etc.

In accounting for the phenomena of possessing two objects some scholars explain "that in these cases the root has two activities so that each object agrees with the respective activity. Thus we can explain and account for the roots taking two objects Or this phenomenan is sanctioned by the Sūtra "Akathitaṁ ca".[3]

IMPORTANCE OF MUTE LETTERS :-

As already said every simple root is read with a particular sign i.e. ending in a particular accent or ending with a particular mute letter. Thus the accent helps us in classifying the root as a Parasmaipadi root or Atmanepadi root. The mute letters ṅ, n also serves the same purpose. Besides these two mute letters there are many other mute letters such as n' i, u, ṛ, n, etc. Generally a mute letter indicates a particular peculiarity in the grammatical observations. For instance the roots which have 'i' as mute get 'n' (Nuṁ) as an Āgama,[4] Thus Pāṇini added these mute letters either to a root or suffix to indicate a particular peculiarity in the concerned grammatical operations.

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1. Duhyācpac daṇḍ rudhi pracchi ci brū śāsu ji math muṣām, Karmayuksyādakathitaṁ tatha syānnīhṛksvahām (S.K. Sl. 539).
2. Māṇāvakaṁ dharmaṁ bhāṣate vakti.
3. For a detailed discussion see Chapter IV of this book).
4. Idito nuṁ dhātoh (P.7.1.58). Oditasca (P.8.2.45) Udito vā (P.7.2.56).

REVIEW AND CONCLUSION :-

Summing up this subject we can conclude that according to the grammarian a verbal root is one which signifies activity or process. The various definitions viz. Bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ, Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ Bhāva vacano dhātuh have the same import.

The Mīmāmsaka also accepts that a verbal root signifies activity and the Tin suffix denotes Bhāvanā.

The Logician too accepts that the verbal root denotes action favourable to the result.

Thus almost all scholars belonging to various disciplines and schools, excepting Maṇḍana, have accepted the definition of the root as given by the grammarian.

As regards the various types of classification there is no trace of objection. Thus "A Verbal root in Sanskrit signifies activity". There are nearly two thousand primary roots in Sanskrit. The verbal roots in general are classified as :

1. Primary roots-into ten conjugations.
2. Derivative roots.
3. Aphoristical roots.
4. Transitive roots and intransitive roots.
5. Atmanepadin and Parasmaipadin.
6. Mono-syllabic-non-mono-syllabic.
7. Seṭs - Aniṭ roots.
8. Roots taking a single object and two objects.

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Chapter II

Section-ii

SUFFIX

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THE SUFFIX

INTRODUCTION :

Of the two components of a verb word i.e. the root and the suffix, we have discussed in the foregoing pages about the root, its classification etc. Now let us study the suffix, its definition and classification etc. in general.

The word Pratyaya (suffix) is derived from the verbal root "iṇ" (to go) prefixed with upasarga 'Prāti'. Thus it means which goes towards (a root). Apart from this meaning this word is used in Prātisākhyas and their commentaries in the sense of a subsequent word or sound; but many other grammatical treatises define it as one which follows the Prakṛti.[1]

To quote Sri K.C. Chatterji - "In the Vājasaneyi Prātisākhya" this word is used both in the sense of "following" and in the sense of "suffix". In Caturardhyāyikī (Atharva Veda Prātisākhya) it (the word Pratyaya) is used in the sense of a suffix but in its commentary the word is used in the sence of "the subsquent". In the Taittiriya Prātisākhyā this word is used in the sense of 'augment' in "Akurva itica Pratyaya paraḥ". In the Śrauta Sūtras and the Nirukta it is used in the sense of "certainity of meaning". From the Prātisākyas it would appear that Pratyaya at one time included suffixes, prefixes, infixes, and augments. The word "Pratyaya" is used in this sence only once by Pāṇini in the Sutra "Anuditsavarṇasya cāpratyayaḥ (P.I.1.69)".

According to Jagadısa, "That particular entity which is different from the Prakṛti, and is a nipāta, and is enjoined in a certain meaning possessed of the capacity of either Śakti or nirūḍalakṣaṇa, is a suffix in that particular sense. There incidentallay Jagadīsa quotes Bhartṛhari whose (alleged) definition is not acceptable to him. As quoted by Jagadīsa, Hari defines a suffix as follows : When two wordforms

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1. K. C. Chaterji's "Technical terms of Sanskrit Grammar" Part 1

are in juxtaposition, the former expecting the meaning of the other with which its own meaning can agree ; then the former one is called Prakṛiti and the following one is called Pratyaya (Śuffix).[1]

In the Pāṇinīyan system, we find this word 'Pratyaya' is used in a limited sense of a suffix. A thorough and systematic discussion was made by the Vārtikakāra and Patañjali, the Bhāṣyākāra while commenting on the sūtra "Pratyayaḥ (P.3'1.1). Patañjali takes the etymological sense and tries to define the Pratyaya. He gives the etymology of the word as on which makes us cognise its meaning.[2] The word is explained in a causal meaning- "one which causes a special or particular import distinct from the base to which it (the Pratyaya) is added. Kaiyata explains the from as "Prati+in+ṇic+Ac".[3] Here the Ac suffix is added in the sense of agent-hood. But Nāgesa opines that the word Pratyaya need not be explained as a causal form but a simple form with an implied causal sense. Hence the word is explained as one which produces or gives an important sense or special import. Hence the derivational explanation is of the form "Pratyeti iti pratyayaḥ".[4]

Now if we accept the first definition in the causal sense then there arises an inconsistency that certain suffixes which do not have any meaning such as 'Kan, An, Ka etc,' are not covered by the definition, because they do not cause an import of

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1. Yādṛsārthe prakṛtyanyo Nipātasca vṛttimān, Sa Tādṛsārthe sabdah syāt. pratyaya asau caturvidhaḥ. Yādṛsārthe saktiniruḍhā lakṣaṇā nyatamātmaka prasasta- vṛttimān yādṛsah sabdaḥ sa tādṛsārthaka pratyayaḥ. (Sab. Sak. Pra. P. 43)
   Yassvetarsya yāsyārthe svārthasyānvayabodhane, Yadopekṣas tayoh pūrvā prakṛtiḥ pratyayaḥ paraḥ.(Ibid.)
2. Yastamarthṁ sampratyāya yatīti sa pratyayaḥ, p.3.1.1.8.
3. Nyantasya niyātanāt aciṇerluk (Ibid Pradipa).
4. Vastutastu antarbhāvita ṇyarthāt pratyayāḥ iti vaktumucitaṁ (Udyota on P.3.1.1)

any kind.[1] So the Bhāṣyakāra offers an alternative explanation to the word Pratyaya as one the sense of which is rendered intelligible by the base itself to which it (the pratyaya) is enjoined.[2] To put in other words, this suffix, due to the nature of its meaning being expressed by the base itself is treated to be meaningful and hence is called a Pratyaya.[3] Now if we accept this explanation, the other suffixes which are expressive, or not, also are covered. So the Bhāṣyakāra advises us to accept both the explanation.[4] Thus these two explanations, i.e one with a causal sense and the other in the passive construction, cover all types of suffixes both expressive and suggestive.

The author of the Nyāsa on the Kāsika on P 3.1.1 defines a pratyaya as "Pratiyanti anena arthaṁ iti Pratyayaḥ" i.e. people understand the meanings through this. And the meaning is of two types one is the sense in which the word is used (i.e. lokataḥ) in the society and the other is as fixed in a technical way limiting it to that particular śāstra (Śāstrataḥ). If it be so, neither type of the meaning is signified by the suffixes like Ka, Kan, An etc. because the base gives the same import with or without the said forms. Therefore they can not be counted as Pratyayas. But to this the Nyāsakāra replies that where the meanings are not specifically mentioned then they have the same meaning as that of their bases.[5] Bhattoji defines it as one that is enjoined.[6]

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1. Yadi pratyāyanti iti pratyayaḥ, avikādīnāṁ pratyayasaṁjñā na prāpnoti Nahite kincit pratyāyanti (M.B. on P.3.1.1.)
2. Evaṁ tarahi pratyāyata iti paratyyaḥ (M B. on p.3.1.1).
3. Yasyārthaḥ prakṛtyā pratyāyyate; sa pratyyamānārthatvāt pratyāyyamānāḥ svārthika. pratyayasaṁjñobhavati (Ibib Pradipa).
4. EVaṁtarhi ubhayasādhanametat. Kartṛsādhanasca.(Ibid).
5. Anirdiṣṭitārthāḥ svarthe bhvantītiyamāeva āptavacanāt samadhigamyate. Taṁāttairapi svārthe pratiyantiti te api pratyayā ityalamativistareṇa. (Nyāsa On p.3.1.3 last few lines)
6. Pratīyate vidhīyate iti prayayaḥ.

A pratyaya (suffix) always follows a base,[1] but that does not mean that whatever form comes after a base is recognised as pratyaya. In as much as the Pāṇinian grammar is concerned with, only those forms, which are enjoined by or specifically mentioned in the various aphorisms as pratyayas, and those which are governed by the Sūtra "Pratyayaḥ" are called Pratyayas. The aphorisms dealing with the various pratyayas are spread over three chapters i.e. from the Sūtra P. 3.1.1. to P. 5 4.160 of Aṣṭādhyāyī.[2] In these three chapters, besides the suffixes, some other forms such as Āgama, Ādesa are also mentioned but they are not denoted by word pratyaya becuse they do not come within the jurisdiction of the governing sūtra P. 3.1.1. Thus this word Pratyaya is having a limited etymological meaning just like the word Paṅkaja.

TYPES OF SUFFIXES :

In the above said three chapters of the Aṣṭādhyāyī about 401 pratyayas are enumerated. They belong to different categories. They can broadly be divided into (1) those appended to the nominal base and (2) those appended to a verbal root or base.

These suffixes enjoined after a nominal base (prātipadika) are of three types in general. They are:

1 Sup Suffixes :

These are twenty one in number and are generally known as case suffixes. They are enjoined after the nominal base to indicate the relation with which that word agrees i. e. the verbal root (generality), i.e. the relation being Agent-hood, Object-hood, Instumentality etc.

2 Strī Suffixes :

These are nine in number. These are enjoined, subject to certain rules, after nominal bases to indicate the feminity (even

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1. Parašca (P.3.1.2).
2. Pratyayaḥ P.3.1.1, Niṣpravāṇišca.

verbal) existing in the being denoted by the concerned word.

Taddhita Suffixes :

These are about two hundred in number. These are enjoined after nominal bases to derive the different nominal bases in different meaning, such as Apatya, Gotra etc. These suffixes are known as secondary suffixes.

Thus the total number of suffixes enjoined after a nominal base is about two hundred and thirty.

The suffix enjoined to after a verbal root or base are of five types, viz:

1 **San etc. affixes :**

These are twelve in number. Some of these are enjoined after nouns; some are enjoined after nominal bases and some others are enjoined after the verbal (simple) roots. Thus the composite unit (Samudāya) so formed, now behaves like a regular verbal root and takes after it all lakaras, Tin suffixes Krt suffixes etc. Such roots are called "Derived or Complex" roots,[1]

2 **Vikarana Suffixes :**

These are twenty one in number. These suffixes are enjoined after a verbal root but before the Tin suffixes. These are enjoined to indicate the various (grammatical) modifications in the formation of the concerned word.

3 Krt Suffixes :

These are about one hundred and ten in number. These suffixes are enjoined after the verbal roots in different meanings such as Kerta, Karman etc. so as to form nominal bases. These suffixes are known as primary suffixes.

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1. Vide Chapter IV-Section iii of this book.

4. Lakaras :

These are ten in number. These are enjoined after a verbal root to denote the substratum of the meanings of the root, time, number etc., besides some other meanings.

5. Tin affixes :

These are eighteen in number. These are enjoined as Ādesas in the place of Lakāras. Hence they denote the same meanings (but with their own restrictions) as the concerned Lakāra in which place they are enjoined.

Thus the suffixes enjoined after a verbal root or base are one hundred and seventy one in number. Besides this division, the suffixes falling under the governing sutra "Dhātoḥ" are further divided as Sārvadhātuka suffixes and Ārdhadhātuka suffixes. The Tin suffixes and those having the letter 'S' as "idvarna" (mute) are called Sārvadhātukas[1] and the rest of the Pratyayas are called Ārdhadhātukas. The total number of suffixes as enumerated in the above said three chapters (3rd, 4th and 5th) of the Aṣṭādhyāyī comes to round about four hundred and one.

Classification of Suffixes :

All the above suffixes are broadly classified into two groups viz (i) Expressive (Vācaka) (ii) Suggestive (Dyotaka) or Swārthika. This division is based on the nature of the modification in the import we get from the combination of the base and the suffix (Prakṛti-Pratyaya samudaya).

Expressive Suffixes :

The expressed sense of a suffix is defined as "That particular or special import which we get on adding the suffix to the

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1. Tin Śit Sārvadhātukam. P.3.4.113

base and which (particular sence) is not recalled from the base in the absence of that particular suffix (i.e. by following the process of 'Anvaya and Vyatireka'). That suffix which possesses this character is called an expressive suffix. Thus an expressive character of a Suffix is determined.

Suggestive Suffixes : (Dyotaka) :

Certain suffixes are classified as suggestive suffixes. They do not have any meaning of their own, but it is accepted that the base itself has many meanings of which some are popular and some others are not. Therefore the suffix when added to the bases restricts the meaning of the root and reveals only a particular meaning. Now this property of revealing is defined as Dyotakatā. This may be of two types, one is to leave the popular meaning; the other is to accept relevant meaning,[1] as the context warrants. It is also defined as the property of the suffix by virtue of which, the inherent or latent meanig of the base is revealed,[2] in its presence. Some other explain Dyotakatva as Śaktyādhāyakatva i.e. the property of being that which brings out the capacity (of the denotative function proper to the signifier) or as tātparyagrāhakatva i.e. the property of being the conveyer of intention (of the speaker). Such suffixes as tara, tama, iyas etc. are called dyotakas.

SELF-SUGGESTIVE (ĀTYANTASVĀRTHIKĀH) Suffixes :-

Now there are certain suffixes, e.g. Ka, Aṇ, Kan etc. which when added to the base, the composite whole (Samudāya) gives an import which is identical with (or not different from) that of the base to which these suffixes are added. For instance the meaning of the words Prajña and Prājña is the same.

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1. Tatra prasidhārtha parityāgaḥ aprasiddhārtha parigrāhaśca ityubhayam dyotokakṛtyamiti Nañ sūtre bhāṣye spaṣṭaṁ. (L.M. (nbp)-Part 1 - P. 74).
2. Svasamabhivyāhṛtapadaniṣṭa śaktyudbodhakatvaṁ dyotakatvaṁ (Śabdaratna under P.2.2.6).

Here the suffix Aṇ is added to the base Prajña. There is no difference in the meaning of the resultant word. Similar are instances like Avirevāvikaḥ, Coraḥ, eva cauraḥ; Vaya eva vāyasa etc.[1] Such suffixes are called Atyanta svārthikas. In this connection the remarks of Bhaṭṭoji on P.5.4.28 are worth mentioning in which he justifies the suffixnesa to these suffixes also.[2]

As a matter of fact, strictly speaking there is no such a special class as 'Atyanta svārthikas' mentioned by the Bhāṣyakāra or others. But it is a conventional name given to those suffixes which are rendered meaningful by the maxim "Anirdiṣṭāḥ pratyayāḥ swārthe (bhavanti)."

Now it is worth noting that the discussions of the Bhāṣyakāra on the sutras 'Hetumatica' and Striyāṁ etc. reveal that he accepts the fact that some of the suffixes are expressive and some are suggestive even. Bhaṭṭojī and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa accept both the conventions. Nāgeṣa too accepts this.

Thus to conclude, in the parlance of the grammarians a suffix is that which is designated as suffix by Pāṇini and thus the word is a Yoga-rūḍha one.

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1. P.5.4.28 Avehkaḥ, P.5.4.29 Yavādibhyaḥ kan etc,
2. Na Caivaṁ Aveḥ Kaḥ ityādīnāṁ samāsāṁtānāṁ ca pratyaya saṁjnā na syāt, anarthakatvāditivācyaṁ, svārthikā api pratyayārthenārthavantaḥ. (Śabdakaustubhaṁ on P.3.1.1).

Chapter III

CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

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ACTION (VYĀPĀRA)

In the last chapter we discussed how to differentiate a root from what is not a root and arrived at the conclusion that, a root is one which expresses action (vyāpāra). Hence it becomes necessary on our part to have a clear idea of action or activity as expressed by a verbal root. The earliest definition of a verb word as given by Yāska in his Nirukta is "The verb word is one which primarily signifies Bhāva".[1] He further continues that this Bhāva constitutes six types of modification.[2]

As regards this Bhāva diverse opinions existed. As explained by Durgācarya, some looked upon it, as different from Kriyā. And Kriyā comes into being for the sake of Bhāva. They admit that action is invisible but is inferred from the Bhāva which is the particular condition brought about, by it. So action is the secondary meaning signified by the root, as compared with Bhāva which is primary. That is why Bhāva is said to be the primary meaning of the verb (Bhāva pradhānaṁ). A thing is subordinate to that for the sake of which it comes into being.[3] Therefore when we say that Bhāva is the meaning of the root, it is nothing but saying that this action in the form of 'cooking' brings about a particular condition of change, say sofetening in the case of rice. This action diversifies itself being associated with each of the different accessories (Kārakas) of tha action. Thus according to these scholars Kriyā is a process and Bhāva is the result of it; of course both are expressed by the verb itself.

Even among the Nairuktas, there is another section which views the verb (ākhyāta) as one which signifies action, that is to say, no difference is made between Kriyā and Bhāva; the alle-

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1. Bhāvapradhānamākhyātaṁ. (Nir. 1.3).
2. Jāyate, asti, vipariṇamate, vardhate, vinasyati iti sadbhāvavikārāḥ.
3. Yasya ca yadartha ātmalābhaḥ tattad guṇabhūtaṁ bhavati. Bhāva siddharthaśca kriyā ātmalābhastasmāt guṇabhūteti gamyate (Nir. Chapter 1).

ged result of the process as viewed by the former school. To them the words Bhāva, Karma, Kriyā, Dhātvartha are all synonyms (Anarthāntaraṁ). This is the primary one of all the meanings expressed by a verb word, To be explicit, it is the root that expresses action (Kriyā). The sense in which a word is frequently used that sense is said to be the meaning of that word.[1] In the word Ākhyāta action is predominant, while it is subservient in the accessories (Kāraka).

This action is a process through which something (the result) is brought into existence. It is called a process because it contains various parts arranged in a temporal sequence. For example when we say that "one cooks" (Pacati) his activity includes all the intermediatory activities such as supplying heat, blowing wind, keeping rice in a pot, adding water etc. . Thus keeping the predominance of this action in a verb word, Yāska gives "Pacati, Vrajati" etc., as the examples of an "Ākhyāta".

Patañjali tries to explain what is ment by Kriyā in a very simple and striking way. Action is a property. Action and movement inhere in something or other. And there is no such thing as .action or movement not associated with an object in which it inheres. For instance examine the sentence "Caitra goes". In fact there is nothing as his going apart from his presence at different points at different times. And the person that goes, Caitra. his starting point (say Pātalīputra) and the place of destination (say Prayāga) all these may be present at a certain moment yet one does not say "Caitra goes", But at another moment we may say "Caitra goes" i.e. some new factor must have come to enable us to make such a statement as "Caitra goes". There this new factor is action. To put in other words that factor which inheres in the object and is responsible for its presence now at one point and at another point after some moment is called action. This action is not directly perceptible but at the same time, it is to be inferred form its effects. This action is different from the accessories which accomplish action, either directly or indirectly.

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1. Yasya ca yasminnarthe viśeṣeṇa vartate śabdaḥ sa eva tasya pradhānaṁ. Viśeṣeṇa ca kriyāyāmākhyāta śabdo vartate, Guṇa bhāvena kārakeṣu. (Ibid).

It is also different from the objects in which it inheres. it is not perceptible but can only be inferred.[1]

Patañjali further clarifies the nature of this action (Kriyā). He says 'action is the special mode of behaviour of the accessories'.[2] This definition is so flexible that many different scholars could interpret it in their own way to suit their own dicipline. From the above definition it is not definite whethr all accessories have the same activity or each has its own. But we can logically conclude that all the accessories can possess some activity of their own as is evident from the designations agent kāraka etc. The activity of each differs from that of the others. Now one ma' ask if the root is defined as one which signifies action, If so it has to signify all the various activities of the different accessories. This is true but however only the activity of the agent or object is primarily signified. Hence they are understood with the help of the verbal affix at the end of the verbal root. This is how a section of scholars conclude.[3]

Some other scholars who argue that action and its result called Bhāva are one and the same, interpret the statement of the Bhāsyakāra to their advantage. To them the word "Pravṛtti viśesaḥ,, means Pravṛttīnāṁ viseṣaḥ. They say that action is a particular (viseṣa) or rather a distinct result of the activities of all the accessories. In the case of the root "Pac" the "softnes(" of the rice after cooking is the result achieved by the activities of

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1. Kriyānāmeyamatyanta aparidṛṣṭā aśakyā piṇḍībhūtā nidarśayituṁ. Yathā garbho nirluṭhitaḥ. Lāsāvammānagamyā. (M.B. Pt. I, P.1.3.1. - P.115).
2. Na brūmaḥ kārakāṁ kriyeti. Kim tarhi, Kārakāṇāṁ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ kriyā (M.B. P.1.3.1.16).
3. Prādhānaāt tu kartṛkarmaṇorlakārotpattestadvyāpāra eva Lāntāt pratīyatā ityekīyamataṁ. (Helārāja on V. P. 3-8-1).

all the accessories. Thus to them action is of the form of result.1

A few scholars are of the view that the word "Kārakāṇām" in the above statement refers only to the agent and the object as the case may be and hence their behaviour alone is called action (kriyā).

There is another section of scholars who explain the above statement of the Bhaāṣyakāra in a different way. They offer more logical interpretation and draw more agreeable conclusions.

According to these scholars Kriyā is activity in general but not any particular activity. Therefore this activity in general would be found in every accessory. The bringing about the ultimate result is the common thing found in the activity of every accessory. Thus the word "Pravṛttiviśesah" refers to this common feature subsisting in every accessory. The pecularity (Viśeṣa) lies in bringing about the ultimate result The word "Pravṛtti" refers to movement only. But by adding the word "viśeṣa" the entire word signifies something other than mere movement. Thus the action signified by the root "Pac". has the various othet activities denoted by the different accessories with the aim of achieving the result. Hence that action of general nature having sequence in it and which is understood from a verb word is called "Action". Action is a process and this idea has been there since Yāska's time.

The View Of Bhartṛhari :-

Bhārtṛhari brings out the implication of the statement of Patañjali. As already stated process means something which has parts in it arranged in a temporal sequence but not coexistent. So one may doubt how there can be the idea of a single action arising from parts or moments. To this Hari replies that the moments or parts come into existence to serve a single purpose

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1. Anyetu viśeṣapade bharaṁ kṛtva ... phalabhūta kāraka pravṛtteḥ kriyeti vyācakṣate (Ibid 11-9-10).

i.e. to bring out the result. All these parts are mentally united in one act of cognition. Thus the parts exist for the whole. Strictly speaking, action is one a whole and is conveyed by the root. On the basis of its parts, we can observe its sequence. Verbs like 'Pacati' 'Paṭhati', Gachati' etc., stand for that collection of parts which is conceived by the mind as a unity, though some of the parts of the activity lie far behind in the sequence. Each one is as essential as any other part to produce the ultimate result.[1] Since the result is one all the parts lead us to the idea of oneness of the action.

Another thing is, as we experience it in our daily life, that at the very first moment of the act of working we use the words He cooks; though many other parts have yet to come into existence. It is so, because we have the ultimate result in view; and the whole is superimposed on each part. But strictly speaking a process has some parts already over and some parts yet to be accomplished. We can directly perceive only those parts of process but never the process as a whole. So the statement that action which is an aggregate of different moments is directly perceptible holds good as far as particular moments are concerned. The oneness of action denoted by a root is as true as the "Torch-wheel" (Alāta cakra).

Now just as pouring water etc., are parts of the action "cooking", in the same way, even pouring of water etc., have parts of their own. Now if we go on analysing every part, we reach a stage when the part cannot be further subdivided. As a matter of fact this is the actual action. But neither can a root speaks about it, nor can we make use of it in our daily life. Such an atomic action is perceptible only to sages but not to the common man. And Hari says that such a final subtle entity cannot be named 'Action'. As expressions and usages are concerned, action is something having parts "a process". To be more explicit,

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1. Guṇabhūtairavayavaiḥ Samūhaḥ kramajanāṁ, Budhyāprakalpitābhedaḥ kriyeti vyapadiśyate. (V.P. 3-8-4).
2. Indriyairanyathā praptu ... parikalpyate. (V.P. 8-8-8).

a grammarian is not concerned with the fact whether action has actually parts or not,[1] but whether the verb presents it as such or not.

Hari records another view regarding the form of action. According to this section of scholars "that final part of the activity soon after which the result is produced, is said to be the actual action as denoted by the root." The other parts of the action are also said to be denoted by the root by Adhyāsa, as they are helpful to the final activity.[2]

THE VIEW OF THE JĀTIVĀDIN :-

So far we have explained the views of the Vyaktivādin who treats that action is an individual one. Now according the jātivādin all the words denote the universal, existing in all the individuals. A universal is something the existence of which is proved by the unity of our cognition. Now as far as action is concerned, the idea of cooking continues though the agent and object of cooking change or vary. So they argue that there exists the universal called action, inhering in different indivisible actions and the root expresses this universal. This universal is really eternal but it appears to be a process i e. something to be brought about and to have the sequence through its indivisible parts of different moments of an action.[3]

Here also some people opine that the universal subsisting in the last part is the actual action. When the individual is brought about the universal also is construed to have been brought about.[4]

THE VIEW OF THE MĪMĀṀSAKA :-

Hari records another view which according to the commen-

1. V.P. 3-8-11.
2. V.P. 3.8.15.
3. V.P. 3-8-20.
4. V.P. 3-8-21.

tator belongs to the Mīmāṁsaka. According to this view action is a "Pravṛtti" and does not exist in particular any where. It is an eternal force. The result is brought about by this Pravṛtti in co-operation with the capacities of the accessories.[1]

THE VIEW OF BUDDHISTS :-

The Buddhists accept the individual, appearing in the mind as action. A section of them think that the universal appearing in the mind, is action. Another section of them think that the existence (sattā) inhering in the individual i.e. appering in the mind, is action.[2]

THE VIW OF BHAṬṬOJI :-

Bhattoji says that there is no difference among the imports of the various words like Vyāpāra, Bhāvanā, utpādanā. kriyā etc.. They are all synonyms. To him all the activity both external and internal (which is otherwise called Bhāvanā or kṛti) put together is denoted by the root alone. He defines action (kriyā) as non-different from the Bhāvanā in the form of action congenial to bring into being (the result). To speak broadly it is what the opponent call the meaning of the root kṛ.[3] Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa also follws the same theory.[4] Thus to the grammarian all types of activity which is responsible to bring into being some result appears as a single unit and is denoted by the verbal root itself.

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN :-

According to the logician, "the non-inherent cause of any

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1. V.P. 3-8-36 and also Pravṛtti Viśeṣaḥ kriyeti Mīmāṁsakāḥ (Nyayakośa P.248).
2. V.P. 3-8-24.
3. Kā punaḥ kriyā? Ucyate - Karotyarthabhūta utpadānāparaparyāya utpatynukūlā vyāpārarūpā Bhāvamaiva kriyā. (Śa. Kau. on P.1.3.1 Bhāvādayodhātavaḥ).
4. Bhāvanābhidhaḥ Sādhyatvenābhidhīyamāno vyāpāra viseṣaḥ kriyā. (Vai. Bhū. P.3, 11. 16-17).

contact (Saṁyoga) which is itself different from saṁyoga is called action.[1] Generally speaking, action is divided as external activity and internal activity. The logician argues that only the external activity is called kriyā, and the internal activity is called kṛti. The Mīmāṁsaka says that this internal activity is called Bhāvanā. According to these two schools, the root denotes only external activity which can exist either in a sentient or an insentient object. According to them this activity is called vyāpāra. Kṛti exists always in sentient beings and gives rise to action (vyāpāra) which can externally be perceived. Kṛti being internal cannot be perceived.[2]

SUMMARY :-

On studying the various arguments we can sum up them as under.

1. A section of Nairuktas opine that kriyā is something which comes into existence to bring Bhāva into being.

2. Another section opines that the words kriya (action,) and Bhāvā signify the same thing i.e. process.

3. According to Patañjali action is īhā or kriyā or vyāpāra. The Bhāsyakāra says īhā, ceṣṭā etc., are synonyms. Hence it becomes evident that the grammarian does not accept the external activity and the internal activity to be different and to be expressed by different words as vyāpāra, and BhāVanā or kṛti. Action is the peculiar mode of behaviour of accessories. It cannot be directly perceived but inferred. Action has parts arranged in a sequence. All the parts are mentally cognised as one single unit and is called a single activity. This is what the later grammarians follow.

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1. Samyogabhinnatve sati saṁyogāsama vāyakāraṇatvaṁ.
2. Cetanā cetanasādhāraṇadharmo vyāpāraḥ, kṛtistu ātmaniṣṭhā (or) Kṛtistu āntarangika ceṣṭā, Bāhyavyāpārāstu kriyādayaḥ.

4. Some scholars opine that the last part (moment) of the activity immediately preceeding the result is the vyāpāra signified by the root. But it is super imposed on the whole and the whole is super imposed on it.

Besides the above prominent views, Bhartṛhari, in the kriyāsamuddesa of his Vākyapadīya, records many other views which are of minor importance.

X—X—X

RESULT (PHALA)

A result is produced after performing a certain activity. Now the question is what is meant by result. Are this result and the result as explained in grammar one and the same? These are the questions for which an answer is to be sought.

In the language of a common man result is that to achieve which, one acts. For instance one cooks to have a meal; one sacrifies to achieve Heaven. Thus Bhojana and Swarga are the results of the respective actions. Along with some primary benefits, there may be some secondary benefits also. But as far as the word Result is concerned it applies only to the primary benefit for which one acts. The Mahābhāṣyakāra expresses the same view while commenting on the sutra P.1.3.72,[1] that swarga is the fruit of the action of sacrifice. Bhartṛhari also records the same view in his Vākypadīya,[2] This is true as far as our daily life is concerned, But concerning the science of grammar it is not so.

In grammatical parlance a root denots action and result. The substratum of this result gets the designation object (Karma). So if we accept Bhojana or Swarga as the result of the actions of cooking or sacrifice respectively, then the person who eats or

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1. P.1.3.72 Swaritamñitaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale.
2. Yasyārthasya prasideyartham ārabhyante pacādayḥ, Tat pradhānam phalaṁ teṣām na lābhādi prayojanam. (V.P.3-12-18).

who enjoys heaven has to get the designation of 'Karma'. But it is not like that in grammar. In the sentence Taṇḍulaṁ Pacati, rice is the object kāraka. Therefore the grammarian has defind the 'result' of an action denoted by a root in a different way. It is peculiar that none of the three sages i.e. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Patañjali specifically defines the result as denoted by the root. However the Bhāṣyakāra commenting on the sūtra P.3.1.26[1] gives us an indication. Here the Bhāṣya is "what is the primary meaning of the root Pac?" It is softening of rice". Thus it is evident 'softening' is the primary meaning of the root and hence is the result. This is produced by the activity denoted by the root 'Pac'. From this it is deduced that "Result is that which is intended finally to be produced by activity" .i.e the entire activity is considered as one unit both being the meanings denoted by the same root.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa defines the result as one which is denoted by a root and which is the attributive of the other meaning of the root.[2] That is in verbal import the meaning of the result part is an attributive of the activity part of the meaning, both being denoted by the same root. Thus in sentences like 'Caitraḥ pacati' the verbal import is "an action, having Caitra as its substratum and qualified by the result softening (Viklittyamkūlavyāpāraḥ). In the definition the word 'tad' is very important i.e. both the result, and action should be denoted by the same root. Thus though the result denoted by one root becomes an attribute of the activity denoted by another root, that former cannot be designated as fruit. Observe the sentence " Paśya Mṛgo dhāvati ".

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1. P.3.1.26r Hetumatica. (Bha). Kaḥ Paceḥ Pradhānārthāḥ? Ya asau Taṇḍulānāṁ Viklittiḥ. In the Bhāsya Viklitti is said to be primary from the view point of the person who acts. But for the purpose of grammatical operations action is primary and the result is substantive.
2. Taddhātvartha viseṣaṇatve sati tadbhātvarthatvaṁ phalatvaṁ. (Vai. Bhū. P.53).

Here Dhāvana (running) denoted by the root Dhāvṛ, is an attributive to the meaning of the root 'Dṛs' but not to that of the Dhāvṛ. Hence it is not the meaning of the root. Thus though the animal is the substratum of running, it does not get the Karmasaṁjña.

Now one may urge in the case of the passive construction of sentences like "Taṇḍulaḥ pacyate" the result is primary and activity is attributive; and as such softening cannot be called "Result". In order to avoid this defect Dīkṣita adds the words "in the active voice" (Kartṛpratyaya samabhivyāhāre) to the definition given above.[1] Strictly speaking, according to Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, even in the passive construction the verbal import has activity as primary.[2] However in Karma kṛdanta words such as "Pakvaḥ Taṇḍulaḥ" we meet this inconsistency. Hence Nāgesa does not accept activity as the primary entity in the import of a sentence in the passive construction. He says there also, as in Karmakṛdanta, the result is primary.[3]

Thus finally it is evident that the phrase "in the active voice" is to be included in the definition. By adding this phrase it results that "of the meaning of the root which ever is attributive to the other, in the active voice--that alone is the result of that particular root". Thus even in sentences in the passive voice objecthood (Karmatva) is not barred. Hence is the final definition.[4]

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1. Kartṛpatyayasamabhivyāhare, taddhātvartha viśeṣaṇatvesati taddhātvarthatvātn phalatvaṁ.
2. Taṇḍulaḥ pacyate = Taṇḍulaniṣṭ a viklittyanukūlo vyāraḥ.
3. Taṇḍulaḥ pacyte caitreṇeti karmalakāratu...phalaviśeṣyako bodhaḥ (L.M.K.K. P.832).
4. Kartṛpratyayasamabhidāne, taddhātvatrha viśeṣaṇave sati taddhātvarthatvaṁ phalatvaṁ'

THE VIEW OF HARIVALLABHA :-

Harivallabha, the author of the Darpaṇa, a commentary on the Bhūṣaṇasāra defines result as that entity which "while being the meaning of a root, is produced from the meaning of that root".[1] In the definition "being produced" means "being the object of the knowledge in which producedness (Janyatva) is the attribute;[2] The clause "which is the meaning of the root" is to prevent over application of the definition on "Separation produced by action denoted by the root gaṁ" etc. The phrase "being produced from the meaning of the root" is to prevent over-application of the definition of the result on activity (vyāpāra). For example in senteces like "Taṇḍulaṁ pacati" the activity is of the form of blowing wind etc... Since it is not produced from the result viklitti, the definition does not over apply on activity. Thus he holds his definition is more justified.

This contention of Harivallabha that activity is not produced from the result denoted by the same root, does not appear to be correct. No activity is accomplished without deciding the fruit to be achieved. Thus the fruit is first conceived in the mind and activity is produced from this knowledge. Hence Harivallabha's contention that "because Viklitti (result) does not produce activity" is not correct. Thus even Harivallabha's definition suffers from the fault of over application[3] This is the view of the Tattvadarsinīkāra on the lines suggested by Nāgesa.

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1. Taddhātvartha Janyatve Sati' taddhātvarthatvam Phalatvam' (Vai. Bhū. Sā. P.15-Darpana).
2. Janyatvaṁ ca Janyatvaprakarāka Pratīti viṣayatvam (Ibid).
3. Phalasyāpi kriyājanakatvam, Tatjñānapūrvakaṁ kriyotpādanāt. (L.M.K.K. P1202) and also "TTV. Daf. P.16' para2.

NĀGEŚA'S DEFINITION :-

Nageśa defines Result as follows :

"Result is that, which being produced from the meaning of the root when conjointly uttered with an affix in the active voice, possesses attributiveness as described by the substantiveness subsisting in the meaning of the same root".[1] This definition is different from that given by Dīkṣita. Here the phrase "being produced from the meaning of the root" is added just to avoid resulthood either to the mere contact or division in the case of the root 'Pat' etc. The meaning of the root 'Pat' is "contact produced from division". Here mere contact is not the result because it is not attributive to activity. Division is also not the result because it is not produced from the meaning of the root.

Harivallabha criticises this definition and says "Taccintyam" (Meaningless). He says the meaning of the root 'Pat' is neither 'separation' nor 'contact'. It is very clearly stated in the Dhātupāṭha Pat gatau. Therefore the meaning is gati i.e. activity favourable to contact with a latter place. Hence division or separation is the meaning of the fifth case (Vṛkṣāt parṇaṁ patati). Further if we are to accept contact produced by division as the meaning of the root (Pat), then this contact produced by separation from the former, being not perceived, cannot be activity. So the root 'Pat', which does not have activity as its meaning, looses its elgibility to be called a root. Therefore according to Harivallabha, the definition given by Nāgeśa, and

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1. Taddhātvartha janyatve sati, kartṛpratyaya samabhivyāhāre, Taddhātvartha niṣṭha viśeṣyatānirūpitaprakāratavatvaṁ phalatvaṁ Vibhāgajanya saṁyogarūpe patatyarthe; vibhāga saṁyogayoḥ phalatva vāraṇāyobhayaṁ. (L.M.(NBP)-P. 15).

he justification of the various phrases therein is not logical and acceptable.[1]

HARIVALLABHA CRITICISED :-

In the commentary 'The Tattvadarṣanī' on the Bhūṣaṇasāra, we find a reply to Harivallabha's criticism. The author of the Tattvadarṣani refutes Darpaṇakāra as follow:

According to Darpaṇakāra, in sentences like 'a leaf falls from a tree' the meaning of the fifth case is separation (Vibhāga) and the object from which a thing is separated is called Avadhi. Now Tattvadarṣanīkāra says that if we accept the above contention of the Darpaṇakāra, then there will be a serious setback to our accepted (import) contact produced from separation having the tree as its Avadhi. Further in sentences like "A leaf gets separated from the tree (Vṛkṣāt parṇaṁ vibhājate)" the verb is redundent, since its meaning is conveyed by the fifth case.

In such cases, suppose you say that the meaning of the fifth case is only 'limit' (Avadhi) then enough of this Aradhjaratīyata.[2] Hence we cannot find fault with the definition of result as given by Nāgeśa.[3]

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1. Taccintyaṁ, Anugata phalatvāniruktcḥ, vibhaāgajanyasaṃyoga Patatyarthatvābhāvasya vakṣyamāṇakatayā vyvarātya aprasidhesca idyadhikaṁ agre vakṣyate. (Vai. Bhū. Darpaṇa, on Sā. P.15, and also P. 209).

2. Atreyam cintā vṛkṣāt parṇam patati ityādau vṛksāpādānaka vibhāgajanya samyoga ityanubhavasya apalāpāpattiḥ. Vṛkṣāt vibhajata ityādau vibhāgasya bodāvṛttiprasaṇgaśca. Tatra apādānatvasyaiva pancamyarthatve tu kimarthajaratīyena. (TTV-Dar.-P.17, 2nd and 3rd paras).

3. For more details TTV. Dar. P.17,18.

It is to be noted here that the above definition given by Nāgeśa is not satisfactory for him, as it suffers from non-applicability in sentences like "He knows the pot" (Ghaṭaṁ jānāti). In this sentence the meaning of tha root jñā is viṣayatā (the result). This is a substance. Now some scholars do not agree that this result is produced by jñāna. Of course some others admit that viṣayatā is produced from jñāna. Concerning them there is no trouble and in their opinion Viṣayat agets karmatva. But in the case of farmer section of the scholars, the definition of result is not applicable.[1]

FINAL DEFINITION :-

Hence to ward off this defect, Nāgeṣa gives another definition free from the phrase "being produced from the meaning of the root." The definition, given previously is according to the opinion of elders (Prācāṁ mate). His final definition is "result is the meaning of the root which (Meaning) is the substratum of the attributiveness as described by the substantiveness which subsists in the (other) meaninig of that root itself in the active voice".[2]

Harirāmaśāstry, author of the commentary, Kāsikā on the Bhusaṇāsāra gives a definition simlar to that given by Nageśa formerly.[3]

Of course result is generally defined as one produced from the activity part of the meaning of the root.[4]

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1. Because here Viṣayatā is not produced from the activity meaning of the root jñā.
2. Phalatvaṁ ca kartṛpratyayasamabhivyāhāre, taddhātvārthaniṣṭha viseṣyatānirūpita prakāratāśraya tabdhātvarthatvaṁ. (L M KK. P. 1204)
3. Hari Ramasastry defines Result "Taddhātvartha Janyatvesati taddhātvarthaniṣṭha viseṣyatānirūpita prakāratavatvaṁ phalatvam". This definition is not different from that of the former definition given by Nāgeśa and hence has the same defects as pointed out there in.
4. Dhātvarthāvacchinna vyāpārajanyatvam.

AGENT (KARTĀ)

Now, having examined the nature of action and result denoted by a verbal root, we examine the nature of their substratum i e. agent (Kartā) and object (Karma). Generally speaking, one who performs the action is called the agent of the particular action. Not only one who actually does the work, but the one who employs others at work and gets it done is also called 'agent'. But as far as it concerns the science of grammar, "an agent is one who is independent" as defined by the sage Pāṇini, vide Sūtra P.1.4.54[1] Into this sūtra the word "Kārake" is read in, from the previous sūtra. Thus the whole sūtra gives the meaning "one who is independent in performing action, gets the designation 'Agent'". Here action means the action denoted by the verbal root. Of course in a sentence a number of activities, subsisting in different kārakas, help in bringing about the result. For instance take the sentence "Caitra cooks rice with fuel for Maitra in a pot". Here each kāraka i.e. Caitra, rice, fuel, pot etc., bring in some action peculiar to them to produce the final result. Thus every kāraka is the substratum of its own activity part. So much so, there arises a doubt as to which should be designated as agent (kāraka.) To this Kaiyata replies that particular kāraka who is independent in employing other kārakas is called the agent (kartā). But normally a root is deemed to express the action subsisting in a particular kāraka who is independent in regulating the other kārakas to act in an appropriate way so as to enable to achieve the desired fruit. Thus in a sentence like "Caitraḥ taṇḍulaṁ kāṣthaiḥ sthālyāṁ pacati" Caitra alone becomes the agent because it is he who can control the other kārakas. Thus his action alone is denoted by the verbal root and this action is primary (principal) with respect to the actions of other kārakas. However, if the speaker intends the root to denote that particular action subsisting in any other kāraka as primary with respect to others, then that particular kāraka becomes the agent as in the sentence "Firewood cooks rice in the pot". This is vouchsafed by the Bhāṣyakāra who states when the action

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1. Svatantran kartā. P.1.4.54.

subsisting in the pot is deemed to be primary and is denoted by the verbal root, it becomes independent, but when the activity subsisting in Caitra is denoted by the root, then the pot is dependent 1

Another peculiarity is that, if the speaker desires he can treat a verbal root as denoting the activity subsisting in any of the kārakas viz., object, instrument or Locus besides the agent, in which case that particular kāraka is treated as the agent and we construct the sentences like "Firewood cooks; the pot cooks rice; rice gets itself cooked" etc.[2] Generally other kārakas as stated are mentioned as agents by superimposing the independence in them and thus ease, emphasis etc., with which the action is being done, is expressed. Another peculiarity is, if the root is transitive it remains transitive when the instrument or the locus is treated as agent, but when the object itself is treated as the agent as in the sentence "Taṇḍulāḥ pacyate svayameva" the root becomes intransitive, since the object itself becomes the subject of activity. This type of construction is called "Karma kartṛprayoga i.e. a sentence wherein the object itself is treated as the agent. And such construction of sentences is governed by the aphorism P.3.1.87.[3]

THE VIEW OF LOGICIAN :-

The logician does not admit the grammarians point that the substratum of the action denoted by the root, is the agent. He argues that the substratum of kṛti denoted by the verbal affix alone is to be called agent. The etymological meaning of the word "Kārā" itself is the authority for such a conclusion. Here the root "Kṛ" denotes kṛti and the suffix 'Tṛc' denotes substratum.

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1. Sthālīsthe yatne kathyamāne sthālī svatantrā, Kartṛsthe yatne kathyamāne paratantrā. (M.B. under P.1.4.23.)
2. We must note that under no circumstance does a verbal root denote the activity subsisting in the Sampradāna or the Apādāna kāraka. Hence there is no possibility of these kārakas to be denote as agent in any kind of construction of a sentence.
3. P.3.1.87, Karmavat karmaṇā tulyakriyaḥ.

Hence his contention is justified. Thus an agent must be a sentient being only. But there are many usages where insentient objects are used as agents e.g. Ratho gacchati; Kūlaṁ pipatiṣati etc. In order to justify agent-hood in the case of such insentient objects, he takes recourse to the secondary signification or conventional implication (Nirūḍha Lakṣanā).[1] Thus he justifies such usages as "The pot cooks" etc. Udayana also argues that an agent is always a sentient being and he is the substratum of the activity (kṛti) denoted by the root kṛ.[2]

However the grammarian does not accept this definition of the logician.[3] The logician comes to the above conclusion taking it for granted that the root 'kṛ' denotes kṛti. But it is not so. The root 'kṛ' denotes mere action in general. Hence there is no need to resort to conventional implication.

Of course one may urge how the grammarian can justify the usages like "Ratho gacchati" wherein the insentient objects are agents. The reply is that they superimpose sentiency on the non-sentient objects. This is evident from the Bhāṣya[4] on the sūtra P.4.1.27. It should not be considered that one resorts to implication and the other resorts to super imposition. Super-imposing is not a fault but has the sanction of the Bhāṣyakāra, whereas the logician cannot resort to implication as it is prohibited in the case of affixes.

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1. Yadyapi svatntra vyāpāramātra eva tṛtīyāderanusāsanaṁ, tathāpi lāghavāt kṛtirūpe eva kartṛtve tṛtīyādeḥ saktiḥ. Acetana vyāpāre nirūḍha lakṣaṇaiva (Vy. Vā.).
2. Apica kartṛvyāpāra eva kṛñarthaḥ, Cetanaśca kartā. (Ny. Ku. V-9) Independence means inherence of knowledge, desire and activity (kṛti) (Ibid Commentary Prakāsa).
3. L.M. (K.K.) P.1245.
4. Acetaneṣvapi cetanavadupacāro dṛsyāte (M.B. on P.4.1.24).
5. Na Vibhaktau lakṣaṇā.

THE VIEW OF KHAṆḌADEVA :-

Khaṇḍa Deva finds fault with the definition that "the substratum of action, denoted by the root is called agent," as given by the grammarian. He points out that in the case of a negative sentence like Caitra does not cook (Na pacati), the import is the absence of activity in the agent. Thus when the verb is conjointly uttered with the negative particle "Na" the said agent Caitra is not the substratum of the action denoted by the root 'pac'. Hence the nominative affix of Caitra cannot be justified. Hence Khaṇḍa Deva gives another definition. Of course speaking in a general way, the Mīmāṁsaka defines the agent as the substratum of Bhāvanā denoted by the suffix 'Tiṅ'. This view is expressed by Khaṇḍa Deva in a more technical way, so as to aviod the general faults like over application etc.

According to him "an agent" is the substratum of the meaning recalled by a word (Padopasthāpya) with which (meaning) the gender etc, does not agree (Liṅgānanvayin) and which meaning is delimited by the meaning of the verbal root (Dhātvarthāvachinna).[1] The word Lingānanvayi helps in preventing agenthood to the substratum of the Bhāvana obtained through words denoting an object, person substance etc. Further in the passive voice the result is not expressed either by the suffix or by the root but is obtained by syntactical relation. The word Padopasthāpya prevents agent-hood taking such meaning into account.

Thus in the sentence Caitraḥ pacati, the substratum of Bhāvanā is the agent. In a sentence like Caitreṇa Pācayati, the substratum of the inducement denoted by the Ṇic suffix is the agent.

Further in the instances of kṛdanta sentences like "Caitraḥ Pācakaḥ paktā" etc., the kṛti (Bhāvanā) which has no gender, is

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1. Yad dhātyarthāvacchinna lingānanvayi Padopasthāpya arthāśaryatvaṁ yasya tasya tatkartṛtvaṁ. (Bhā. Rah. P.107)'

expressed by the suffix and Caitra, being the snbstratum of it is the agent Similarly in sentences like "Caitrasya Pākaḥ" the ghañ suffix expresses kṛti by implication. Thus the said definition holds good in the case of various sentences like Sthāli pacati; Ghato bhavati; Peṭau na bhavataḥ etc.

This definition also is not satisfactory. According to this it results that an agent is one who is the substratum of Bhāvanā denoted by the Tiṅ suffix. But people generally comprehend the agent as the substratum of the action denoted by the root. So this definition is contrary to popular experience. Further in some sentences the agent is the substratum of the meaning of the casual suffix; in some other cases it is the substratum of activity, a secondary meaning of the kṛt suffix. Thus there is no uniformity in the apprehension of the agentness. Further in instances like 'Caitrasya Pākaḥ' acceptance of kṛti or Bhāvanā as the secondary sense of the ghañ suffix goes against all the accepted norms. It is unanimously accepted by almost all the scholars that Bhāve ghañ suffix does not possess any meaning but is used after a verbal root for the sake of grammatical purity in denoting the meaning of the verbal root itself as something already produced (Siddha). Resorting to Lakṣanā in the case of Tiṅ affixes etc. is not admissible.[1]

Most probably taking all these things into account, Khaṇḍa Deva does not seem to have been satisfied with this definition. So he offers an alternative definition that "principle agenthood is the property of being the substratum of Bhāvanā."[2] But this definition is also not free from faults. As such he finally concludes that in fact Agent-hood, Object-hood etc., are all un-analysable entities (Akhaṇḍopādhi).

THE VIEW OF NĀGEŚA :-

In view of the several defects pointed out in the different definitions, Nāgeśa offers his own defintion to the word 'Karta'

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1. Na vibhaktau lakṣaṇā.
2. Athavā kṛtyāśrtyatvameva mukhyakarmatvaṁ, Anyatra kartṛ vyavahāro bhākta eva dṛṣṭavyaḥ.

and interpretation to the word "Svatantra" in the aphorism P. 1.4.54. The word 'Swatantra' in the said sūtra, is to be explained as one who engages the other kārakas the action of which is related to the meaning of the root; or the indepedence, as stated in the sūtra is "being capable of controlling all other kārakas in their actions. Only Caitra, the agent, can do that but not any one of the other kārakas. Thus the independence of an agent (person) means being capable to act (bringing something into being) or not to act (restrain or) prevent something coming into being as he desires.[1] Thus both the employer and employee gets the designation of agent in sentences like Pacayati Maitraḥ Caitreṇa etc. Of course in the case of insentient objects, such an independence is superimposed on those objects and they are treated as agent, because it is an accepted fact that a verbal root always expresses the activity subsisting in the one designated 'agent'.[2] This is due to the peculiar capacity existing in words.[3] However in casual sentences, substratum of the activity denoted by the Ṇic suffix, as well as the substratum of the activity denoted by the original non-causal root also get the designation agent. This view has the sanction of Bhartṛhari also.[4]

Thus the agent is one who controlls all the other kārakas, the activities of which are subordinately related to tha action expressed by the root in producing the result.

1. Evaṁ svecchādhīna pravṛtti nivṛttikatvamapi svātantryam. L.M (KK) P.1245 Further details Ibid P.1245-49).
2. Dhātunoktakriye nityaṁ kārakē kartṛtesyate. Sa. Kau. under P.1.3.1).
This kārikā is said to be that of Bhattṛhari. But in the present day avilable texts' it is not found as explained by the Prof.K. V. Abhayankar, in the book Vākyāpadīya edited by him,
3. Śabdaśaktisvabhāvāt.
4. V.P. III - 7-99,100.

OBJECT (KARMA)

Having defined the nature of the agent, let us examine what the word object (Karma) stands for. In Pāṇinian grammar an object is that what is most desired by the agent.[1] (to be achieved through his activity). The word 'desired' means related (Sambadhaṁ) indicating the cause for one to act. Thus the Sūtra gives the import "an object is that accessory related to the agent" i.e. related with the action subsisting in the agent. The relation between the action and this accessory is being the substratum of the result produced by it (action) [2] Thus in a sentence like " Caitra cooks rice ", the activity subsisting in the agent is of the form of blowing wind etc., and the result produced is softening This subsits in rice. Hence rice gets the designation 'object'. Therefore taking all this into consideration an object is normally defined as "the substratum of the result produced by the action subsisting in the agent denoted by the root".

Now one may urge that in sentences like "He goes to Village" (grāmam gacchati), the result is 'contact with the later place.' Now 'contact' always rests in two entities. As such here besides the village the agent also is the substratum of the contact. Hence he also has to be designated as object, in which case sentence like "Caitraḥ caitram" gacchati" are rendered possible, which, in fact are irregular. To this grammarian replies that it is true that Caitra gets the designation agent, as well as object. But in the Pāṇinian system, the aphorism enjoining agent designation is later in order to that enjoining the object designation. Hence Caitra gets the agent designation only which stultifies the

1. P.1.4.49 Karturīpsita tamaṁ Karma.
2. Svajanyāśrayatva saṁbandhaḥ. (La. Śa. Śe. P.1273).

object-designation.[1] As such there is no possibility for the much feared wrong construction of sentences as "Caitraḥ caitraṁ gacchati" etc.. As far as enjoining of case affixes is concerned, the guiding factor is only the designation of the accessory as agent, object etc..

The word 'Most' (Tamap) in the definition of the object given by Pāṇani has a definite importance. Observe the sentence "Caitra prevents the boy from fire" (Caitraḥ bālaṁ agneḥ vārayati). Here the word "prevnts" denotes an action congenial to the absence of action congenial to contact.[2] Here activity conducive to contact lies in the boy and action congenial to its absence lies in Caitra. Now the word "Most" indicates primariness Here the action subsisting in Caitra is primary. The result produced by this action is "the absence of contact of the boy with fire". And this subsists in the boy. Thus the boy gets the designation object. Otherwise the boy would have got the Apādana designation on the authority of the Sutra[3] P.1.4.27 which is latter, the former being the one which enjoins the karma samjna.

Thus an object is the substratum of the result produced by the action subsisting in the agent. Thus action is denoted by the verbal root. Besides this general definition, there are many special circumstances under which other Kārakas also get designated as object.[4]

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1. Here the idea is this. Caitra is excluded from being an object only by a grammatical rule which designates him as subject (or the agent of action) which designation negates the designation "object" and also prohibits two designations simultaneously as per to the sutras Vipratiṣedhe paraṁ kāryaṁ (P.1.42) and Ākadārādekā saṁjñā (P.1.4.1).
2. Saṁyogānukūla vyāpārābhāvānukūla vyāpāro vārayatyarthaḥ.
3. P.1.4.27 Vāraṇārthānāmīpsitaḥ.
4. Vide S.K. Sutra Nos from 538 to 558.

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN :-

Though every one accepts that the substratum of the result is the object, still the logician feels that a faultless definition is to be given So he defines an "object as the substratum of the result which is the determinant of the nature of the meaning of the root and which result does not subsist in the same substratum as the meaning of the root "[1] Thus in the sentence 'Caitra cooks rice' the result "Softening" which is the determinant of the meaning of the root, subsists in Taṇḍula which is not the substratum of the meaning of the root.

The words "not being the substratum of the meaning of the root" in the definition are included in order to avoid over application of the definition on roots like vṛṣ (varṣaṇe) where the object (water) is included in the meaning of the root itself. Similarly the clause "which does not subsist in the same substratum as that of the meaning of the root" helps us in preventing the designation 'object' to Caitra in the case of sentences like "Caitra goes to the village". The clause "which is the determinant of the meaning of the root' helps us in preventing the designation 'object' to both the tree and the ground in sentences like "A leaf falls from the tree on the ground". Hence the logician is confident that his definition is perfect.

However this definition of the logician is also has its own defects and has been criticised. The grammarian opines that in sentences like "Caitra goes to the village" the object-designation to 'Caitra' is prevented by a mere aphorism and we need not bring in all the clauses and make it much more cumbersome. Further the given definition does not apply satisfactorily in the case of casual sentences. For instance take the sentence "Caitra causes Maitra to go to the village (Caitraḥ Maitraṁ grāmaṁ gamayati) and Caitra causes Maitra to cook rice (Caitraḥ Maitreṇa Pācayati taṇḍulaṁ). The said definition cannot equally account for the accusative case in one sentence and instrumental in the other sente-

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1. Dhātvarthānadhikaraṇatve sati dhātvarthatāvacchedaka phala śālitvaṁ (Vy. Vā.)

nce. A similar discrepancy creeps in sentences like 'Ghataṁ Jānāti' etc. To explain these, the logician has to resort to implication etc..

THE VIEW OF MĪMĀṀSAKA -:

The Mīmāṁsaka accepts that objectness is the meaning of the accusative case affix. The objectness is of an unanalysable character (Akhaṇḍopādhi).[1] The meaning of the nominal base agrees with objectness. The relation of the object with activity (Bhāvanā) is that of being the theme (Uddeṣyatva) or favourability to the root meaning which it indicates.[2] Thus he finds a solution for all the defects hitherto pointed out.

Resorthing to such definition as unanalysable entity etc., should not be accepted normally. There must be some rational means to explain things. There fore Nāgeśa offers his own definition in this connection.

THE VIEW OF NĀGEṢA :-

According to Nāgeśa that thing which is the subject in the intention of the agent, is known as object. The nature of "being subject in the intention" is of the fram of being the substratum of the result existing in a locus different from that of the activity caused by the activity denoted by the root and which activity subsists in the agent.[3] The 'subject in the intention' means the object desired by one to acheive and that is nothing but the result only. Hence its substratum becomes the objebt.

However in the instance, 'car goes' etc., one may question how an insentient thing like car can desire to have an object. To

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1. Ataḥ uktayuktyā lāghyvāt karmtvamakhaṇḍopādhi rūpameva dvitīyārthaḥ. (Bhā. Rah)
2. Vide Phil. Sen. Pts. P204.
3. Kartṛgata prakṛta dhātvartha vyāpāraprayojya vyāpāravyadhikarṇa phalāsryatvena karturuddeṣyatvaṁ. (L.M. (kk)

this Nāgeśa replies that in such instances it will be treated that the Uddeśyatva is super - imposed on the car and hence the definition.

Now in view of the various definitions the definition given by Nāgeśa seems to be more logical-Resorting to 'implication' in the case of case affixes etc. is a fault. Further. Nāgeśa's definition applies in all cases like causal and non-causal etc.. Thus speaking in a general way the substratum of the result denoted by the root is the object with respect to the activity denoted by the same root. Nāgeśa says after all as far as it concerns grammar, an object (Karma) is one to which that particular designation is enjoined by the various Pāṇinian aphorisms.[1]

SAMSARGA (SYNTACTICAL CONNECTION)

In the language of the Logicians, the Mīmāṁsakas and the grammarians, the word 'Saṁsarga' means syntactical connection between the meanings signified by words in a sentence. According to the logician the meaning of the sentence is the relation existing among the various substances recalled by the different words in it. This syntactical connection between the words has a peculiar property. This syntactical connection brings in some additional meaning which is not signified by any of the words. For instance observe the sentence "Caitraḥ pacati". Here the word Caitra means Caitra only. Pacati denotes 'activity of cooking' (Pākakṛti). Thus these two meanings as they stand bear no relation to each other. But the actual verbal import of that sentence is of the from "Caitra is the substratum of effort of activity (kṛti) conducive to softening." Thus in the verbal import an additional sense of substratum hood (Āśrayatva) and conducivenss (Anukūlatva) is heard. This additional meaning is not that of either of the words. It is secured through syntactical connection (samsargalabhya).

1. Tatra karmatvaṁ Vyākaraṇ-śāstre-bodhitakarma-saṁjñakatvam.

Further the Mīmāṁsaka also admits that in sentences like "Caitraḥ pacati" the non-differential relation between the subject and the noun in the nominative is secured through "Saṁsarga" only. Even the grammarian cannot do away with this samsarga. He too resorts this import in explaining the non-differential relation between the noun in the nominative case and the agent meaning of the verbal affix. The import is ,Activity having a substratum (agent) non-different from Caitra '

Thus all the meanings comprising the verbal import cannot be denoted or connoted by the words actually present in a sentence. Certain meanings such as substratumness (Āśrayatva), favourability (Anukūlatva) etc,, are accepted as supplied by syntactical connection itself. All the scholars accept that these meanings should not be attributed to any one of the words in the sentence, because, when the meaning could be secured through the very combination of the words, there is no logic in burdening the constituent word with the same meaning. After all it is a matter of frugality.[1]

Thus Samsarga means syntactical relation among the meanings signified by different words in a sentence. And through this samsarga some additional meaning denoting certain relationship is considered to exist between the meanings of the words in a sentence. It may be noted that the followers of the Anvitābhidhāna theory, i e. Prābhākara, however regards this 'syntactical connection' also as the meaning of the word.[2]

ABHIHITA-ANABHIHITA-VYAVASTHA :-

The word 'Abhihita' means 'expressed'. Anabhihita means "Not expressed". This system (Vyavasthā)[3] relates to the

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1. Anaya labhyasya Padārthatvāt.
2. For further details vide "Phil. Sen. Pts. P.49-49.
3. This system is popularly know as "Abhidhānānabhidhāna-vyavasthā"

enjoining of case affixes to words. In a sentence each Kāraka is related to action denoted by the verb with a particular relation, such as, of agent-ness, object-hood, instrumentality etc.. And this relation is generally indicated by the case affixes enjoined after the word denoting the particular Kāraka. Thus the accusative case affix after a particular word indicates that, that particular accessory agrees with the verb word as the object of the action. Similarly instrumental case after a particular word indicates that that pa.ticular accessory agrees with the verb word as an agent or an instrument. In a similar way we can explain other relations also.

Here, the sage, Pāṇini restricts that these accessories take the respective case affixes to indicate the particular relation, provided such relation is not already expressed (or made known) by other means, otherwise the word denoting the particular accessory takes the nominative case affix only which affix is enjoined in the sense of the Prātipadika. Generally these relations can be expressed by the Tiṅ, Kṛt, Taddhita suffixes or by a compound even besides the case affixes.[1]

Now let us examine this system with respect to the agent and object Kārakas. Take the sentence "Caitraḥ Taṇḍulaṁ pacati". Here the grammarian contends that the agent denoting the kāraka (Caitra) takes the nominative case affix on the authority of the Sutra[2] P.2.3.1; because to the grammarian agentness is already made known by the Tiṅ affix on the authority of the Sutra[3] P.3.4.69. Otherwise the word Caitra would have taken instrumental case affix on the authority of the Sutras P.2.3.1 and[4] P.2.3.18. For example in the sentence "Caitreṇa pacyate Taṇḍulaḥ" the Tiṅ suffix does not denote the agent, hence the word Caitra takes the instrumental. The Tiṅ suffix denotes the object, hence the word denoting the

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1. Abhidhānaṁ tu prāyeṇa Tiṅ kṛt taddhitasamāsaiḥ.
2. P.2.3.1 Anabhihite.
3. P.3.4.69 Laḥ Karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ.
4. P.2.3.18 Kartṛkāraṇayostṛtīyā.

object (Tandula) takes the nominative case affix. Thus the grammarian argues that unless it is admitted that the verbal affix denotes the agent and object, we can not justify the nominative and objective case affixes in the case of words Caitra and Tandula in the above two cited sentences.

The Logician contends that this abhidhāna-anabhidhāna system does not relate to the expression of agent and object by the verbal affix but to the number qualifying the agent or the object; because the knowledge of agent or object is secured by Samsarga for him.

The Mīmāṃsaka contends that the word 'Abhihita' does not mean "Expressed" but it means "Made known (Bodhita or Ākṣipta). Hence he argues that the Tiṅ suffix denotes Bhāvanā and the agent or object is secured by presumption with the help of Bhāvanā.

Thus these three schools interpret the Sutras, "Anabhihite", in their own way to suit their own theories. The merits and demerits of these interpretations are discussed in relevant places in this book.

TRNSITIVENESS—INTRANSITIVENESS :-

Generally speaking, a root is said to be transitive if the activity and the result parts of the meaning denoted by the root have different substratums For instance in the case of the root 'pac' the activity in the form of blowing wind etc., exist in the agent say 'Caitra, and the result softening (Viklitti) exists in a different substratum "rice". Hence the root 'pac' is designated Transitive. Likewise a root is said to be intransitive if the activity and the result denoted by the root exist in the same substratum. For example the root 'Jīv' denots the result of the form holding life (Prāṇadhāraṇa) and activity conducive to it. Both these result and activity subsist in the same person. Hence the root is designated 'intransitive'. Similary the root "Swap" (to sleep) is also intransitive. Here the activity is of the form of sleeping (i.e. lying on the bed etc) and the result is of the form 'rest' to

body. These two viz' activity and result exist in the same person who sleeps. Hence this root also is designated intransitive.[1]

Thus now on generalisation Transitiveness of a root may be defined as the nature of a root whose fruit (result part of the meaning of the root) subsists in a locus different from that of the activity denoted by the same root.[2] Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita favours this definition of transitive and intransitive roots.[3]

Kumārilabhaṭṭa defines transitive root in a different way-which is severely criticised by the latter scholars. According to Kūmārila there is no difference whatsoever in the action (Bhāvanā) expressed by both transitive and intransitive roots. But in a case where the root meaning is always directly concerned with a certain objective, the root is transitive; whereas in a case where the connection with an objective is only indirect, through the medium of the Bhāvanā, the root is intransitive.[4] For instance, in the case of the root 'to sit', to lie down, the objective is not always directly cognised and as such they are spoken of as intransitive; whereas the roots 'to cook' etc., are always accompanied by an objective, which is directly connected with it, through the actions of softening etc., and as such these are spoken of as transitive.

The view of Helārāja seems to be almost the same. He says that some actions have connection with the agent alone; they have no expectancy for an external result of the action. Such are

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1. For a list of generally intransitive roots and how transitive roots become intransitive. Vide Chapter II - Section.1.
2. Svārtha vyāpāra vyadhikarana phala vācatvaṁ sakaramakatvaṁ. Tatsamānādhikaraṇa phalavācakatvaṁ ca akarmakatvaṁ.
3. Phalavyāpārayorekaniṣṭhāyāmakarmakaḥ,
   Dhātustayordharmibhede sakarmaka udahṛtaḥ.
   (Vai. Bhū. Karik.13).
4. Sākṣādavyabhicāreṇa dhātvartho yatra karmabhāk,
   Sakarmakaḥ sa dhātuḥ syāt pāramparyetvakarmakaḥ.
   (Tam. Vār. Sutra 2.1.1).
   Āsana sayanādau hi na niyamenā nantaryeṇa Vedaṁ taditi vā karma nirūpyate. Tenākarmakā abhidhīyante. (ibid).

the actions expressed by Śī. Ās etc. roots. Here the result (Bhāvya) of action is not different from Bhāvanā, and hence Āste is equal to Āsanam karoti and there is no expectancy expressed by the question "what" (kiṁ) connected with an external result of action. When there is such an expectancy, there the verb becomes transitive owing to its having an object consisting of an external result of action.

However, Boṭṭoji and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa do not agree with the above view of the Mīmāṁsaka They argue that if 'Nirūpyate' in the definition means "is used" (Prayujyate) then the definition is open to the fault of mutual inter-dependence (Anyonyāsraya); For, it comes to this that when the object is used the verb is transitive, and a transitive verb is that which has an object used. If 'Nirūpyate' means 'expectancy (Ākānkṣyate) and a verb is called transitive or otherwise when there is on invariable expectancy of an object or otherwise as the case may be, then the definition suffers from the fault of Avyāpti. Because on hearing the verb words like 'gacçhati', the immediate natural expectancy is who (goes) or to where but not 'what for'. So much so if we accept Kumārils's definition these roots like Gaṁ etc. are to be treated as intransitive.[1]

Nāgeśa also supports Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in refuting Kumārila's theory.

Khaṇḍa Deva accepts neither the definition of Kumārila nor the general definition.[2] He argues that if it is ment a root is transitive when it denotes an action existing in a locus different from that of the result, then it does not apply in the case of roots like 'pac' etc., which are treated as intransitive by not desiring to express the object.[3] Nor can we say that a transitive root denotes

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1. Vai. Bhū.
2. Phalavyadhikaraṇa vyāpāravācakatvaṁ hi dhātossakarmakatvaṁ, Kriyāpealayoreka vṛtti vādakarmakatvaṁ.
   (Mī. Kau. on 2.1.1.5).
3. Pacyadeḥ api phala avivakṣāyā makarmakatvānīkārāt tatra ca ahalavyadhikaraṇntvasya vastutaḥ sattvādativāypteḥ. (Ibid).

such action, the result of which exists in a different substratum. If it be so there is the fault of prolixity.[1] Hence he offers another definition. He defines "transitiveness is the nature of the root having expectancy with an object qualified by the absence of not being desired to be expressed by the speaker".[2] For instance the root kṛ, if treated as a transitive root; has always the expectancy of an object. This property of being capable of expecting an object is peculiar to the word. So much so the root yat, inspite of its meaning being the same as that of kṛ, does not possess this property of expecting an object.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa accepts this definition of Khaṇḍa Deva. Thus he feels the revised definition does not over-apply in instances like "Neha pacyate, bhujyate" etc. bhāve sentence. Because Bhāve lakāra is possible only in the case of intransitive roots. But the root Pac, Bhuj etc. cannot be considered as root haivng the result (subsisting in a different substratum). Nor can we say these roots Pac etc. in the above sentences are different from the roots Pac etc. in sentences "Taṇḍulaṁ pacati" etc. If we treat them as two different roots then the popular experience "This is the same root" is not possible. And Kaiyaṭa expresses the same view.[3] Therefore to justify the above Bhāve sentences we have to admit the adjective "Avivakṣāviraha" in the definition. Now though the root 'Pac' is naturally has the expectancy of the object, since it is not intended to be specified, we treat it as intransitive and justify the Bh‾ve sentences as "Odanasya pacyate" etc. Similarly the roots Ās etc., though by nature they are intransitive, when there is a close connection with time etc

1. Kiṁ vā phala vyadhikaraṇatvena vyāpāra vācakatā abhipretā. Na Dvitīyopi. Phalavyadhikaraṇatvasya vastusvabhāvabal labhyatvena vācyatāṅnīkāre gauravācca. (ibid).

2. Avivakṣā viraha visiṣṭa karmākāṅkṣa dhātutvaṁ akarmakatvaṁ. (Ibid).

3. Pradīpa on Bhāṣya on P.1.4.52, last few lines. (M.B.)

as in sentences "Māsamāsyate Caitreṇa" etc.,[1] are treated as transitive.

Nāgesa Bhaṭṭa does not accept any of the above definitions. He refutes the theory of Kumārila on the same lines argued by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa. We cannot define a root to be transitive, on the utterance of which, there always arises the expectancy of an object. Because on hearing the word 'Gaccha' the expectancy is to where or by what means. So this definition cannot be accepted. Nor we can accept what is not intransitive is transitive, because intransitiveness is not defined. Further even transitive roots become intransitive under some special circumstances i.e. when used in a different meaning etc..

Even the modified definition of transitiveness i.e. by adding the word 'Avivakṣāviraha' etc. is not perfect. In sentences like Mātuḥ Smaryate (i e. Bhāve prayoga) we cannot say that the root does not have the result part of its meaning; because such postulation contradicts the Bhāṣya on the Sutra[2] P.2.3.52. Khaṇḍa Deva and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa suggested "not to treat the roots as having the result" so much so the roots become intransitive and the Bhāve usages like 'Neha pacyate, Mātuḥ Smaryate' etc. are justified. Now Nāgeśa says that if the root is treated as not having result, then the question of its substratum does not arise. Consequently the word 'Māta' cannot be an object'. Unless it is an object[3] enjoining of sixth case affix by volition (Karmanah śeṣatvena vivakṣā) is not possible. But the Bhāṣyakāra says that the usages 'Mātuḥ Smaryate' etc. are justified on treating the word 'Mātṛ' as the substratum of the result denoted by the root. So the addition of the word 'Avivakṣāviraha' to the original definition

1. Ata eva odanasya pacyata iti bhāvepi prayogaḥ, Āsādi dhātūnāṁ ca svarūpeṇākarmakāṇāmapi māsādi kālayoge karma sākānkṣatvāt sakarmakatvāt Caitreṇāsyate māsa iti prayogopapattiḥ. (Bhā. Rah.).

2. P.2.3.62 Adhīgarthadayeśām karmaṇi.

3. Vide Nāgesa Bhāvaprakāṣa P.35, para.2.

does not solve the problem, further it results in wrong conclusions which go against the Bhāṣya.

Further the word "Avivakṣātaḥ" the Kārika Dhātorarthāntare1 ... etc., become superfluous. If the contention of Bhartṛhari is in favour of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's definition, he would have not included the word 'Avivakṣātaḥ in his Kārikā. So the said definition of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa goes against the declarations of Hari. Hence the definition is not acceptable. Nāgeśa further opines that even the phrase "Avivakṣā viraha viśiṣṭha" is added to the original definition, still the fault of over applicability continues, because we recognise that it is the same transitive root which has been used, though in certain places it is used to denote result qualified by the absence of "not being desired to express".[2]

Now having refuted the other definitions, he gives a definition by modifying the original definition of Transitiveness etc.. He says that "the non-denotation of the fruit as subsisting in a substratum different from that of the action is intransitiveness.[3] This non-denotation is due to two reasons. One is due to the result subsisting in the same substratum as that of action as in the case of roots like Svapiti, Jīvati Tiṣṭhati etc.. The second reason is due to the absence of the result as in the case of roots like Asti etc.. Nāgeśa is of opinion that this definition of his covers all the roots which denote mere action or mere result. However, Nāgeśa is not satisfied with this definition also because he feels that this cannot satisfactorily explain the transitiveness etc., in sentence like "Svargamadhisete etc., Adhyāsitā Bhūmayaḥ" etc.. Hence he gives a final definition as "being possessed of a meaning which agrees with the meaning of one (object) as

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1, Dhātorarthāntare...Prasiddheravivakṣātaḥ Karmano 'akarmikā kriyā. (V.P. 3-7-87.

2. kinca viśeṣaṇa-dānepi kvacidavivakṣāviraha viśiṣṭaphala Vācakatvena tattvapratyabhi jñiyātivyāptir durnivāraiva. (L M. (nbp) P.333, 11. 19-20).


3. Yadvā vyāpāra vyadhikaraṇa phala vācakatvābhāvo akarmakatvaṁ.

declared by the grammatical rules."[1] This definition covers all the intransitive roots to which transitiveness assigned or vice versa.

But normally a root is said to be transitive when the fruit and action denoted by the root exist in different loci and the root is intransitive when its meanings exist in the same locus.

Vastutastu [illegible] ... phalānvayyarthakatvaṃ [illegible] ... tadanvayyarthakatvam akarmakatvam.

(L.M. (nbp) P.33, 11.1-2).



Chapter IV

Section-i

MEANING OF THE ROOT

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MEANING OF THE ROOT

INTRODUCTION :-

In the chapter "The Root and its Definition" the nature of the root has been discussed at length based on the Mahabhāsya. There it has been asserted that a root is one which denotes action and result. Patañjali explained this while commenting on the Sūtra "Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ". Now in this chapter we will examine the views of various scholars belonging to the schools of Mīmāmsā, Tarka and Vyākaraṇa. The credit of discussing and deciding the meanings of various words, suffixes and their relation goes to the Mīmamsaka. It is the duty of the Mīmāmsaka to explain the Vedic scriptures. Hence in their effert to explain these scriptures, the Mīmamsakas have to discuss the semantic aspect of words and their meanings. Later on taking these theories into consideration the grammarians, the logicians and various other scholars basing on their own logic and reasoning, developed, modified and presented these semantic themes according to their own philosophies. However, the credit goes to the Mīmāmsaka who first initiated the semantic study of a language.

Today, for us, the avilable old Mīmāmsaka's theory regarding this semantic study, is that of Maṇdana Miśra and his followers So hereunder let us examine the theory regarding meaning of the root and the suffix and also examine its merits and demerits.

THE VIEW OF MANDANA MIŚRA :-

According to Maṇdana Miśra, a root signifies the result or fruit (Phala) alone, and activity which produces this result is denoted by the verbal affix. Thus each root signifies its own result peculiar to itself. For example the meaning of the root 'Pac' (to cook) is but softening (viklitti), of the root 'Gam' (to go) is but "contact with latter place (uttaradeśa samyoga)"; of the root Tyaj (to leave) is but "separation from the former place" and

so on and so forth. The result is attributive to the activity part in the active construction of the sentence. The time element, meaning of the affix, agrees with the activity (vyāpāra) part, being expressed by the same word. Hence when the activity of cooking is completed we say "Caitra is not cooking" (Caitraḥ na pacati) and when the activity is not completed we say Caitra is cooking (Caitraḥ pacati). It is the fault of prolixity that prevents Maṇḍana from accepting both result and action as the denoted potentialities of the root itself.

According to this theory, Transitiveness of a root is defined as the denotation of result subsisting in a substratum different from that of activity[1] signified by the suffix. Similarly "Intransitiveness" is defined as the denotation of the result subsisting in the same substratum as that of activity signified by the suffix. Agentness is defined as the character of being the substratum of activity'. Similarly we can define Karmatva etc. without any difficulty. One thing is to be noted here. According to Maṇḍana, it is not the Tiṅ suffix alone that expresses activity, but other suffixes like the causal Ṇic, Lyuṭ, ghañ etc. also express activity. Hence it is that in the sentences in causal construction "Devadattena Pācayati Caitraḥ" and the like, it is possible to admit both Devadatta and Caitra as the agents, they being the substratums of activity denoted by the causal suffix (Nic) and the Tiṅ suffix respectively. Simlarly wrong constructions such as "Grāmo gamanavān" etc. can be avoided.[2] Here the word 'Gamana' signifies the result 'contact' denoted by the root (gaṁ) and also the activity denoted by the Bhāve Lyuṭ suffix. Thus though the village possesses the result, 'contact', as it does not possess activity such improper usages as grāmo gamanavān are not rendered possible.

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1. Vyāpārāśraya vyadhikaraṇa phala vācakatvaṁ sakaramaktvaṁ.
2. Here the idea is this. Since the meaning of the root 'Gam' is Samyoga, we can make sentences Grāmo gamanavān on par with sentences like Grāmaḥ samyoga vān. Hence there is a possiblity of constructing wrong sentences.

But Gāgābhaṭṭa is not satisfied with this reason to avoid wrong constructions as 'grāmo gamanavān'. He opines that there exists a certain activity in the village also being connected by the relation of coming nearer. Therefore he suggests the root has denotation in "the result" described by activity expressed by the affix, in which case the much-feared wrong constructions can be avoided.[1] Further roots like As, Bhū, Vid etc. are populary used in the sense of result and no activity is clearly indicated in these words. The meaning of the root Kṛ is production (utpatti) and the activity in the form of effort, congenial to such production is denoted by the suffix. Therefore the roots Kṛ and Yat are not synonyms and the root 'Yat' also cannot be transitive.

Further if we do not accept that the suffix Ghañ etc. denote activity also, there result wrong usages as 'Pāko vidyate, Pacyartho vartate' etc. on par with regular usages 'Viklittiḥ vartate'. But if we accept activity to be denoted by the root besides Bhāva etc., since activity is not present in Pāka such wrong usages can be avoided.

Maṇḍana argues the very explanatary sentence 'Pākaṁ karoti' of the word 'Pacati' shows that the meaning of the root 'Pac' is result (Pāka) and the activity denoted by the suffix is represented by the word "Karoti". Hence it is evident that the root denotes result alone.

According to him, Kṛt suffixes too denote activity besides agent or object. One may question how Maṇḍana could accept that both the agent and the activity are signified by the kṛt suffix. In that case it is good enough to accept both result and activity to be denoted by the root itself. But Maṇḍana replies that the number of various kṛt suffixes is round about a hundred only

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1. Tathātve api nirūpakatvādi sambandha viśeṣeṇa vartamānasyaiva phalasya vācakatvāṅgīkārāt. Anyathā ābhimukhyasambandhena saṁyogānukūla kriyāyāḥ grāme' api sattvāt vyāpārāvācitve api Tulyo doṣaḥ (Bhā. Cin. p.77)

whereas the number of primary roots alone is nearly two thousand. And added to it, if we take the derived roots also into account, then it will be innumerable. Hence it is definitely parsimonious to accept both agent or object and activity to be signified by the fewer kṛt suffixes than accepting result and activity to be denoted by the innumerable roots.

Further Maṇḍana claims that his theory has the sanction of the age old Mīmāṁsā maxim "of the meanings denoted by the root and the suffix in a word, the meaning of the root is attributive to that of the affix. And the meaning of the affix is primary".[1] In the case of a Verb word, between result and activity, it is activity that is prominent. Therefore according to the above maxim, it is logical to accept the prominent meaning to be the expressed sense of the suffix. Hence activity is to be signified by the suffix alone and in no case by the root. For example on hearing words like Pācaka, Aupogava etc, we have an import where the suffix-meaning is primary and that of the root is attributive. Similarly in words like 'Pacati', 'gacchati' etc., also the activity which is primary is signified by the suffix. Hence the remaining part viz. 'result' is to be signified by the Root.

Thus according to Maṇḍana result alone is the meaning of the root and activity is the meaning of the Tiṅ suffix enjoined after the root.

A Critical Examination and Refutation Of Maṇḍana's Theory :

At the outset Maṇḍana's Theory appears to be very logical but on a close and critical analysis many defects have been pointed out by various scholars in the above theory. That is why even Khaṇḍadeva and Parthasarathi Misra, who belong to the same Mīmāṁsā school as Maṇḍana, discard this theory of Maṇḍana and propound a new one. Of course, in refuting Maṇḍana's theory neither Logicians (old or modern) nor Grammarians have spared any effort. Before examining the new theories propounded by

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1. Prakṛtipratyayau sahārthaṁ brūtaḥ tayostu pratyayārthaḥ pradhānam.

several other scholars, let us consider the various defects pointed out in Maṇḍana's Theory and the way in which his followers tried to defend the theory : but failed.

The main objections as pointed out by various critics and replies in defence can be summarised as under :

The opponent, grammarian argues that the theory of Maṇḍana is contrary to the sūtra1 P 3.4.69 which clearly states that the affix denotes the agent or object but not action. This is clear from the words Kartari, Karmaṇi etc., Hence the theory is defective.

But this objection is replied to by Maṇḍana that the words Kartari, Karmaṇi, etc. do not speak of the agent or object. But the locative case affix denotes Viṣaya (i e. the locative case affix is visya saptami). Therefore the words denote primarily the property in the form of agentness (Kartṛtva) objectness (Karmatva) etc. Just in the same way as the words Dvi and Eka in the Sutra2 P. 1.4.22 denote twoness or oneness (Dvitva, Ekatva) but not the two and one. Thus the sutra Laḥ karmaṇi ca ...... etc. does not contradict Maṇḍana's theory.

Another defect in the theory of Maṇḍana is, we have to accept the signification of activity in the various suffixes as in the words Pacati, Pakṣyati' Pakvavān etc. and it is a matter of prolixity. So it is parsimonious to accept the denotation of such activity only in the verbal root say "pac" which is common in all the words. But this objection is not sound, because the same fault of prolixity exists in the opponent's theory too. Maṇḍana argues that in words like pacati, gacchati, jayate as the roots are different the same prolixity exists here also. Further the number of suffixes is far less than the number of roots. So it is parsimonious to accept activity to be denoted by the suffixes ; failing which either the prolixity or parsimony is same to both the opponent and propounder.

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1. Laḥ Karmaṇi ca Bhāve Cākarmakebhyaḥ (P.3.4.69).
2. Dvyekayordvivacanaikavacane (P.1.4.22).

Another defect in Maṇḍana's theory is that, if the suffix denotes action, then the same action is to be denoted by the same suffix in all the verbs. Thus the verbs Pacati, and Gacchati should express the same activity, but this is contrary to experience. Hence it is essential to accept activity as the denoted potentiality of the root only but not that of the suffix. Then in words like Pacati' Gacchati etc., the difference in action is explained as due to the difference in the root. And the suffix denotes the substratum, uniformly in all the verbs. But this objection can be set aside very easily. The affix denotes action, but the action varies according to the result denoted by the root. That is to say in a conjoint utterance of the root and the affix, the affix denotes action congenial to produce the particular result as denoted by the root concerned. So there is no scope to the suffix to express the same action in the words Pacati and Gacchati.

Another defect that is much urged by the grammarians in the theory of Maṇḍana, is that the generally accepted system of Transitive and Intransitive arrangement is disturbed. The grammarian and the later Mīmāṃsakas and Logicians accept that root denotes both action and result. So their definition of transitiveness and intransitiveness of a root, contains the phrase "the activity which is the meaning of the root" similarly the result which is the meaning of the root.[1] But Maṇḍana's definition does not contain these phrases. Hence the grammarian argues unless we accept that result and action are the denoted potentialities of the root itself we cannot properly explain the nature of transitive and intransitive roots. Hence Maṇḍana's Theory fails here.

But this objection also cannot be taken seriously. Here Maṇḍana's followers argue that the principle involved in the system of Transitive and Intransitive nature of roots is the existence of result and action in separate substratums or in the same

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1. Svārthaphala vyadhikaraṇa vyāpāra vācakatvaṁ sakarmakatvaṁ. Svārthaphala samānādhikaraṇa vyāpāravācakatvaṁ akarmakatvaṁ. For a detailed discussion Vide Chapter III of this book.

substratum. So it does not adversely affect his theory though the result and the action are expressed by the root and the affix separately The word "Svārtha" is added by those who admit both result and action as signified by the root itself. Hence the word "Svārtha" can safely be dropped and as such there is nothing wrong with Maṇḍana's theory.

Further, Maṇḍana explaines the transitiveness of the roots jñā, 'ich' etc. as in sentences Ghaṭaṁ Jānāti, Icchati, like this. Here one may mistake that the activity in the form of knowing and the result in the form of objecthood appear to be subsisting in the same individual, hence the roots jña etc. are to be treated as intransitive To this Maṇḍana replies that activity, which is the meaning of the affix, in the form of knownig exists in the individual by the relation of 'Samavāya'; whereas the result Viṣayatā, which is the meaning of the root subsists in the Pot, by the relation of being its theme.. Similarly in causal sentences like 'Ghaṭaṁ Bhāvayati' too the pot gets Karmasaṁjña, because it is the substratum of the result which (substratum) is different from that of the activity denoted by the suffix Ṇic.

Now the opponent argues that inspite of this explanation, the system of Abhidhāna-Anabhidhāna[1] is adversely affected. If we are to follow Maṇḍana's theory, then wrong sentences like Caitreṇa pacati (instead of Caitraḥ pacati) and Taṇḍulaṁ pacyate (instead of Taṇḍulaḥ pacyate) are rendered possible; since the agent and object are not expressed by the Tiṅ suffix in the above instances. Thus Maṇḍana's theory lands us in constructing wrong sentences as illustrated'.

But the followers of Maṇḍana set aside this objection. They argue that since action and result cannot exist independent of a substratum they must rest in some substratum which is otherwise called the agent or the object. Thus the agent and the object can be obtained indirectly i.e. by presumption (Ākṣepa). Hence the sutra "Anabhihite' can be interpreted as "Anākṣepe" so that

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1. For details see Chapter III.

it becomes clear that if the agent or object is not obtained through presumption, then the word denoting agent or object takes the instrumental or accusative case affixes as the case may be. Hence Maṇḍana argues that his theory does not suffer from any defect.

Now the grammarian takes advantage of such an argument of the Mīmāṁsaka and points out the impropriety in his argument. He says, as in the Ākṛtyādhikaraṇa[1], here also the individual (agent or object) obtained through presumption, gets predominance over Bhāvanā, the expressed sense of the verbal affix which is much against his stand.[2]

Another irregularity in Mandana's theory is that if activity is expressed not only by the Tiṅ suffix but also by other suffixes such as ghañ lyuṭ, kṛt etc. besides other meanings. Then in the case of kṛt suffixes the agent can be obtained through presumption from the activity denoted by the kṛt suffix. So much so in the Sutra[3] 'Kartari kṛt' the word Kartari becomes redundant. And again sentences like 'Caitrasya pākaḥ' become irregular. In the above

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1 Vide Mīmāṁsā Sūtra 1-3-9:33 And Śabarabhāṣya.
2. L.M. (nbp) - Tiṅarthanirṇaya - P:38
3. Apadaṁ na prayuñjīta; Na kevalā pratyāḥ prakṛtaya api.

Note : According to Akṛtyadhikarana; words like cow, pot etc. denote genus i e. cowness, potness etc. (jāti), but not the individual entity cow, pot etc. However the individual is obtained through presumption (i.e. by Ākṣepa), because genus cannot have an independent existence. In certain places this individual gains predominance over the expressed sense 'genus'. Hence Nāgeśa argues that in the present case also on the same lines, the agent obtained through presumption should be considered predominant with respect to the expressed meaning Bhāvanā ; unfortunately the Mīmāṁsaka has no reason to putforth why the grammarian should not draw such a parallel conclusion on par with AKṛtyādhikaraṇa. Nor can he accept the grammarian's view point : because to him (the Mīmāṁsaka) Bhāvanā is more predominent over any meaning expressed by a verb word.

sentence according to Maṇḍana the agent is known from the suffix 'Aka' itself by presumption, because to Maṇḍana the Bhāve ghañ denotes action also and hence Caitra cannot take the sixth case affix, but should take the nominative case. Hence the grammarian argues that agent or object should not be presumed. So much so, the suffix does not denote action but agent or object etc., Further if Ghañ, Lyuṭ etc., denote action also, then the sūtra 'Bhāve' (P.3.3.18) is not necessary. And also it is an admitted fact in all disciplines that (Bhāve) ghañ does not possess any meaning except reiteration of the meaning of the root after which it is enjoyined or that it secures grammatical validity and make it a word.

Another defect in Maṇḍana's theory' is that causal sentences like Guruḥ sisyābhyāṁ Pācayati etc. cannot be formed. In such sentences as above, it is evident that there are two types of activities denoted by the sentence, one is that of the inducer, signified by the causal affix (Nic) and another is that which subsists in the induced (Śiṣya). Now it is accepted by one and all that Nic denotes the activity subsisting in the inducer (here the teacher). So the remaining activity subsisting in the two students is, according to Maṇḍana should be denoted by the Tiṅ aftix. If it be so here arise three types of inconsistencies.

(a) Since the Tiṅ suffix is in singular number does it presume two agents or one agent? And since the induced agents (two pupils) are obtained through Ākṣepa, then according to Abhidhāna - Anabhidhaan system (Ākṣepa-Anākṣepa system) the word Śiṣya cannot take the instrumental case affix but should take the nominative affix only.

(b) Secondly, the number meaning of the Tiṅ suffix i.e. singularity has to agree with the number of the substratums in which the activity denoted by the Tiṅ affix subsists.

(c) Thirdly, since the inducing agent (teacher) is not obtained by Ākṣepa from the activity denoted by the Tiṅ suffix, the word denoting the inducer (Teacher) has to take the instrumental case affix but not the Nominative. Of course it may be argued that the inducer is obtained by Ākṣepa from the activity denoted by the

causal affix, yet the first two defects cannot be avoided. Thus if we are to accept Maṇḍana's Theory, construction of a sentence like "Guruḥ śiṣyaiḥ pācayati" etc., cannot be rendered possible. The grammarian argues that in his theory these sentences are rendered possible. According to him the root denotes the result as well as activity congenial to it. The suffix denotes the agent only. So in the above sentence the agent is the Teacher, because he is independent,[1] he is expressed by the Tin suffix. So the number agrees with the word and the word "Guru" takes the nominative. So much so since the other agents (pupils) are not expressed by the Tiṅ suffix, the word 'śiṣya' takes the instrumental case atfix.

Khaṇḍandeva in the Bhāṭṭarahasya argues that, if we are to accept Mandana's theory, then usages like "Gamyartha janya saṃyogāśrayo grāmaḥ" are rendered impossible. Because according to Maṇḍana the meaning of the root gaṁ (gamyartha) is saṁyoga (contact). And there can be no saṃyoga janya saṃyoga. So Khaṇḍadeva insists to accept that the root denotes action also, congenial to the result in which case the sentences of the above nature are rendered possible.

Another defect in Maṇḍana's theory is that wrong constructions like "Gamanāśrayo grāmaḥ" are rendered possible because the Lyuṭ suffix reiterates the meaning of the root only. And the meaning of the root is 'Saṃyoga'. Just as we say Saṁyogāśrayo grāmaḥ, we can say gamanāśrayo grāmaḥ. Though such sentences can be avoided in the manner already explained, still we will not be in a position to prevent the construction of sentences of the form "Gamyārthavān grāmaḥ". And the grammarian says that, if we accept activity also to be the meaning of the root, then, as the village is not the substratum of action in the form of walking, there will be no possibility to make such incorrect statements 'Gamanāśrayo grāmaḥ' in his view.

Further if we accept Maṇḍana's theory, there would be no need to accept or create Apūrva as the final means in achieving

1. Svatantraḥ kartā (P.1.4.54).

Heaven (Svarga). The various activities like Yāga etc., are momentary; hence the Mīmāṁsaka feels that, from such momentary activity, it is difficult to explain the achievement of heaven which is in another world; and that too, after the death of the performer. They want a thing which can last till the performer gets the result "Svarga". Hence they created Apūrva which gets destroyed only after delivering the result of the sacrifice to the performer. Of course this Apūrva comes into play immediately after the completion of the sacrifice.

This being the position, here Khaṇḍadeva argues that if a long lasting means, which can deliver the desired object to the performer of the sacrifice, is required, it is unnecessary to create and accept Apūrva. The very meaning of the root "Yaj" is long lasting. This meaning i.e the result denoted by "Yaj" itself can be a means. The result denoted by the root "Yaj" is destruction of one's own ownership (Sva-satvadhvaṁsa) and dhvaṁsa is ever lasting; because once a thing is destroyed, that destruction is eternal, as that thing can never be obtained; of course a new thing may be obtained but not the one destroyed. Thus the destruction is eternal. So this can be taken as a means instead of a separate entity Apūrva. But the very fact of creation of Apūrva speaks implicitly that mere result cannot be the meaning of the root, but activity also is considered as the meaning of the root.[1]

Jagadīśa in his Śabdaśaktiprakāśa' while refuting Maṇḍana's Theory, says that if we are to accept it (Maṇḍan's theory) then just like sentences "saṁyogo guṇaḥ" so also we will be obliged to accept sentences like "gatirguṇaḥ" because here the root Gaṁ signifies mere result in the form of contact (saṁyoga) and it is a guṇa and this 'Bhāve-ktin' suffix in 'Gati' simply restates (by Anuvāda) the root meaning Thus 'Gatiḥ' and Saṁyogaḥ become synonymous.[2]

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1. Satvadhvaṁsākhyasya phalasya yajipadārthatve tasyaiva phalabhābhāvanākaraṇatvena svargasādhanatāpatteḥ. Sthāyinas-tasmādeva svargotpattau apūrvakalpanā anāpatteśca. (Bhā. Rah.)
2. Phalasya dhātvarthatve samyogo guṇa iti vat, gatirguṇo anekāśrita ityādi prayogāpatteśca. (Sab. Sak. Pra)

The grammarians also put forth some more arguments justifying activity to be the denoted potentiality of the root and refuting the theory of Maṇḍana Miśra. Let us examine words like 'Pakvavān' etc. This word is explained as 'Pākaṁ kṛtavān. From this explanation we understand that the meaning of the base is the object Kāraka (Karmakāraka) and that of the suffix is agent (kartṛ kāraka.) Thus the meanings of both the base and the suffix being kārakas cannot agree with each other. If there is no agreement how can there be a question which of the two meanings is primary i.e. agreement is possible between the two kārakas only through some activity. The cause and effect relation, which (relation) determines the importance of the suffix cannot be established. Hence activity also must be accepted as the meaning of the root.[1]

Further, the system enjoining "kṛt" suffixes also, establishes that activity also is the meaning of the root, as already shown, in words like "Pakvavān" "Pacanīyaṁ" etc.. The kṛt suffixes are enjoined in the sense of karmakāraka etc., Hence, unless the base denotes activity the meaning of the kṛt suffix cannot agree with that of the root Of course Maṇḍana asks us to accept both activity and karta or karma etc. as the meanings of kṛt suffix itself, but if we are to accept two meanings in the case of kṛt then the grammarian argues that it is better to accept two meanings to the root itself, which is common in all the above words' instead of accepting the activity to be denoted by different suffixes like Tiṅ, Kṛt etc..

Further, the samāsa system enjoined by the sūtra 'kartṛ karaṇe kṛtā bahulam' (P 2.1.32) is also another proof in asserting that activity should be accepted as the denoted potentiality of the root itself because in cases like Nakhai bhinnaḥ Nakhabhinnaḥ, Harītrātaḥ etc. If activity is not accepted as the signified potentia-

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1. Evaṁ ca pakvavān ityatra pākaḥ karmakārakaṁ ktavat arthaḥ kartṛkārakaṁ. Tayośca Vakṣyamāṇarītyā anvayasaṁbhavāt prakṛti pratyayārthyoḥ anvaya niyamasyaiva abhāve kva prādhānyābodhaka ukto niyamaḥ (Vai Bhū.)

lity of the root, then they cannot get kāraka samjñā, in the absence of which (designation) there can be no instrumental case etc.; whence the compounds of the type cited above cannot be formed by the said sutra (P,2.1.32). Hence activity also is the meaning of the root.

And now coming to the age old Mīmāṁsaka maxim "Prakṛti pratyayo Pratyayārthaḥ Pradhānaṁ" etc., the grammarian proves that it is not universal from any point of view, but can be applied in only a restricted sense, in a restricted fieled only as explained elsewhere.[1] Also the Bhāṣya 'Dvyarthaḥ paciḥ' under Sūtra Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ clearly states that both activity and result are denoted by the root itself. Otherwise the sūtra Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ would become incompetent to define 'root'. Hence activity and result should be accepted as the meanings of the root.

At this stage the logician belonging to old school comes forward and argues that we may accept activity and activity alone as the meaning of the root, but not the result as enunciated by Maṇḍana Miśra. However, the later Mīmāṁsakas and logicians and grammarians refute this theory and establish that both result and activity congenial to the result are the denoted potentialities of the root. The following pages explain in detail the theory of the old logician-school and refutation of the same.

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1. Second part of the book; Chapter-1

MEANING OF THE ROOT - THE LOGICIAN :-

Among the Logicians also, there exist two different opinions as regards the meaning of the root. The old logicians like Ratnakośakṛt hold that the root denotes 'action' alone and the result is expressed by the accusative case affix.[1] The modern logicians are of the opinion that the root expresses both action and result or action qualified by result.[2]

THE VIEW OF THE OLD LOGICIAN :-

According to the old logician, the result is expressed by the accusative case affix. To him the word "Karman" in the Sutra "Karmaṇi Dvitīyā" expresses the property of 'being the object' (i.e. karmatva). Karmatva means being the substratum of the result. Since the root expresses action, the result is denoted by the accusative affix. According to the old logicians, the relation of the producer to the produced between the action and the result which are syntactically related is obtained by expectancy.[3] Though the import with reference to the result in genaral is derived from the case ending, the import with reference to it in particular is derived from the recalling of the activity expressed by the particular root. Hence one does not get the same import from the sentences Grāmaṁ tyajati and grāmaṁ gacchati. Here both the roots Gam (To go) and Tyaj (to leave) express the same meaning activity (spanda), but with regard to the former the movement has reference to production of contact subsisting in the town, etc., and with regard to the later it has reference to production of "separation" subsisting in the town etc. Similarly though the roots Gaṁ and Spand denote the same activity, there will not be wrong construction of sentences like "grāmaṁ spandate". because here the town is not the substratum of the result denoted by the root "Spand".

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1. Tatra kriyāca dhātuta eva labhyate. Janya janaka bhāvasya ca vinaiva padārthaḥ saṁsargamaryādayā bhānaṁ saṁbhavatīti phalamātraṁ pratyayārthaḥ. (Vyu. Vā).
2. Phalavyāpārayoḥ khaṇḍaśaḥ saktidvayameva dhātoḥ svīkaraṇīyam. Ākhyātasya āśrayatvaṁ eva tatrārthaḥ (Vyu. Vā).
3. Vyu. Vā.

In the case of the passive constructions of sentences like "Taṇḍulaḥ pacyate" etc., the result is expressed by the Tiṅ Suffix, and in sentences lik 'Pakvaḥ Taṇḍulaḥ' the result is denoted by the Niṣṭhā suffix. As regards the transitiveness or otherwise of a verbal root, a root is said to be transitive if the activity (expressed by the root) and the fruit (denoted by the accusative suffix) subsist in different substratums.[1] The root is said to be intransitive if the result and the action subsist in the same substratum.

Since the roots Gaṁ, Tyaj denote activity (spanda) and the root "spand" also denotes the same, it should not be mistaken that they are synonyms and that the root "Spand" also is transitive like the other. In the case of the root "Spand" there is no expectancy of the result to agree with activity, as there is no such import. It should not be argued that words having the same meaning possess the same type of expectancy. If it be so from the sentence "ghaṭaṁ ānaya" and from the words "ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṁ kṛtiḥ" one must have the same understanding, but our experience is not such. If the expectancy depends on the identity of meaning, than on the pecularity of understanding' then there would have been usages like "ghaṭaṁ yatate" on the analogy of the sentence "ghaṭaṁ Karoti", because the roots Kṛ and Yat denote the same meaning "kṛti".

Now, as regards the words "Gamanam, Tyāgaḥ" etc., the opponent points out the contingency of their being synonyms, since both the words denote "activity". And there is no co-utterance with a word in accusative suffix and as such there is no possibility in differentiating between their meanings. To this objection the old logician rejoinds that in such exceptional cases, a secondary signification to the root as qualified by the specific result is accepted. Such a secondary signification is based on the very import caused on hearing such words for a long time or we accept Nirū-

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1. Phalānvita vyāpārabodhaka dhātutvasyaiva Tanniyāmakatvāt. (Vyu. Va.)

ḍhā lakṣaṇā.[1] (conventional implication).

THE VIEW OF THE MODERN LOGICIAN :

The modern school of Logicians does not accept the above theory of the old logician. The modern logocian argues that both the result and activity congenial to produce that result, are the meanings of the root. Thus the result or objectness is defined as 'being possessed of a result which determins the meaning of the root."[2] The accusative case suffix denotes Vṛttitva (substratumness of the result) which agrees with the result part, the expressed meaning of the root. By accepting this theory, there is no ambiguity between the roots like 'Gaṁ' Tyaj, Spand etc., because the root Tyaj denotes an activity congenial to separation from the former place. Similarly the root Gaṁ denotes an activity congenial to the contact with the latter place. The root Spand does not denote such an activity as congenial either to the contact with the latter place or separation from the former place, hence there cannot be any identity between the three roots. According to this school the object of a particular verbal root is that which is the substratum of the result which is the determinant of the nature of the meaning of the root, and not simply the substratum of the result, the meaning of the root on hand. So much so we can avoid usages of sentences like Rama goes to the former place (place already left behind by him while starting i.e. Rāmaḥ pūrvadeśaṁ gacchati).[3]

Now, as regards the agreement of the result, a part of the

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1. Karmapratyayasamabhivyāhṛta tyāga gamanādi padasya tattatphalāvacchinna vyāpāre anādi tātparyaṁ kalpyate. Na tu kevala vyāpāre (Vyu. Vā.)
   Nirūḍha lakṣaṇayāpi svārasikāprayogāt (ibid).
2. Taddhātvarthatvāvacchedaka phalaśālitvaṁ karmatvaṁ, Na tu kevala prakṛta dhātvartha phalaśālitvaṁ (ibid).
3. For details Vide "The Philosophy of Sentence and Its Parts" P.112, 2nd para.

root-meaning, with the nature of the subsistent i.e. Ādheyatva (which is the meaning of the case ending), it is accounted for by a pecularity of understanding (Vyutpattivaicitrya).[1] Gadādhara is of opinion that this theory of the modern school viz., the meaning of a root is activity qualified by the particular result, is fairly acceptable in case of sentences in the active construction. But so far as the sentences in the passive voice are concerned e.g. "Taṇḍulaḥ pacyate", the result is the meaning of the verbal affix (passive), in which case, in the verbal import of the sentence cited above, the result part of the meaning of the root appears twice (i.e. Rice is the substratum of softening produced by the activity favourable to softening).[2] If this is against to experience then, Gadādhara says, we cannot but accept two potentialities for the root, one in the result and the other in the activity. In this case the meaning of the verbal affix is only substratumness (Āśrayatva). Of course Raghunātha Śiromaṇi does not accept a qualified potentiality (phalāvacchinna vyāpāra) to the root for fear of the fault of agreement with a part of the meaning of a word, which constitutes incorrect understanding.[3] Of course this has already been replied to by Gadādhara by stating that such an agreement is possible due to "peculiarity of understanding".

Now let us examine the two theories. The old school claims parsimony in its own theory and accuses of prolixity in that of the modern school. According to the old school, the root needs to express activity alone; whereas in the new school, the root needs two potentialities to denote result and activity (which produces the particular result). It is true that instead of creating a new potentiality in a large number of roots, it is parsimonious to accept a single potentiality (denoting the result) in the accusative case

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1. Here the question is how the meaning of a word can agree with a part of the meaning of another word, because "Padārthaḥ padārthenānveti na tvekadeśena" (iti niyamaḥ).
2. Viklittyanukūla vyāpārajanya viklittyāśrayaḥ taṇḍulaḥ.
3. The Philosophy of Sentence and Its Parts" P.113, and the foot note on P.114).

suffixes which are far less in number. And the relation between the result and activity is obtained by a peculiarity of understanding.

Further the old logicians are not in a position to explain their theory absolutely in all cases. Their theory fails in many places like Gamanam' Tyāgaḥ etc. wherein they resort to secondary signification or conventional implication or Anādi tātparya etc. which is a prolixity. Further even the old logician has to accept that the accusative case affix denotes subsistence (Ādheyatva) in sentences like Grāmamadhyāste, grāmam adhiśete, grāmam saṁyunakti etc. In these cases the accusative case affix does not denote the result. But to the modern logician Adheyatva is an unanalysable property (Akhaṇḍo Dharmaḥ). So he does not have the difficulty.1 Thus the modern logician establishes the superiority of his theory i.e. that "the verbal root expresses both the result and the activity congenial to that result", over that of the old school.

THE VIEW OF MĪMĀṀSAKA :

Excepting Maṇḍana Miśra, Mīmāṁsakas in general accept both activity and the result produced by it, as the meanings of a verbal root. Here activity means that which subsists in the body in the form of blowing fire etc. i.e. external or physical activity only but not internal activity (Mānasika or Ātmaniṣṭa vyāpāra). To the mīmāṁsaka, the latter activity of the form of effort is denoted by the verbal affix and is called Bhāvanā. By accepting result and activity congenial to it, as the denoted meanings of the root the mīmāṁsaka opines that he can avoid all the defects pointed out in the theory of Maṇḍana and the old school of logicians as well.

Khaṇḍa Deva differs slightly from these Mīmāṁsakas. According to Khaṇḍa Deva the meaning of a root is of the form of an unanalysable entity (Akhaṇḍopādhi) subsisting in the activity

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1. Ādheyatvasya akhaṇḍatayā saṁyogādi sama śarīratvāt saṁyogatvādyavacchinne, tadavacchinneva śaktiḥ kalpyate ityatra vinigamakāsaṁbhavāt. (Vyu. Va.).

helping to achieve a particular result.[1] It is of the form of cookingness (pākatva) etc., which is a matter of experience the existence of which is responsible for its denomination 'cooking. (pāka) etc.. According to him the entity 'cookingness' etc., exists only in the activity helping to achieve the result. Effort is denoted by the verbal affix but not by the root.

Khaṇḍa Deva is not in favour of the modern school of logicians. He does not admit qualified potentiality (Viśiṣṭa śakti) as the meaning of the root. If this be accepted, Khaṇḍa Deva argues that it will have to be maintained that the root has three meanings i.e. activity coupled with result (Phalāvacchinna vyāpāra), in sentences like "Caitraḥ Taṇḍulaṁ pacati"; and activity (vyāpāra) and result (phala) in sentences like "Pacyate Taṇḍulaḥ" etc.. Further we have to accept all these just to account for sentences like "Gamanajanya saṁyogāśrayo grāmaḥ" (The town is the substratum of the contact produced by going) etc., where 'Gamana' means the act of 'going' and not the result, because if the word 'going' here means contact itself (the result), then it will not be possible for another contact to be produced from this contact. It is evident that the determinance of potentiality is more cumbersome as three potentialities are suggested by the logician.

Another defect in the logician's theory as argued by Khaṇḍa Deva is this: The result part of the meaning of the root "Gaṁ" (to go) is separation from the former place as also contact with the latter place. Each one of these is the result of the activity of going. Thus there is a possibility for wrong constructions of the form "Caitraḥ Pūrvadeśaṁ gacchati" (Caitra goes to the former ground).[2] To obviate this defect, if the logician contends that the comprehension in the form of contact only (i.e. not separa-

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1. Ato anubhūyamānaṁ pākatva yāgatvādikameva tattatphalopadhāyakatāvad vyāpāra vṛttyā akhaṇḍopādhirūpasāmānyaṁ pacyādipada śakyatāvacchedakaṁ. (Bhā.Rah.)
2. (Ground left by him while walking) where actually the meaning is that Caitra contacts the latter place and not the former place.

tion) is to be the meaning of the root, even then wrong sentences like "The serpent goes to the tree" (when it goes from its trunk to the top) will be rendered possible even when the serpent is already on the tree (near the trunk) and when it is only going up the tree. Indeed such sentences are incorrect.

The view of the Grammarian :

The grammarian does not accept either of Maṇḍana's theory or the theory of the old logicians. As regards the meaning of the verbal root according to Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa both result and action are the meanings of the verbal root.1 This argument is based upon the observation that the roots read by Pāṇini denote the result part as well as action as laid down in the Sutra "Bhūvādayo Dhātava.". In this connection it is to be noted that in the activity favourable to the fruit (phalānukūlaḥ Vyāpāraḥ) and the fruit produced by activity (vyāpārajanyaṁ phalaṁ), the sense of "being favourable" and "being produced" are supplied by syntactical relation (Saṁsargamaryādayā) and as such "result and action" happen to be signified by the root. One need not doubt as to how there could be a syntactical connection between the two meanings recalled by the same root; because it is exactly the same way as for the logician kṛtisādhyatva and iṣṭasādhanatva expressed by the one Liṅ affix possess syntactical connection. It is due to a peculiarity of understanding (vyutpattivaicitrya). If this not be the case, then, in conjunction with the usage of the passive affix the comprehension of the result as determined by activity will be rendered possible only by admitting such a second potentiality also for the root and this is more cumbersome.2 Thus in a sentence like "Caitraḥ Pacati" the root 'Pac' has potentiality in its activity meaning like "Supplying heat", "Blowing Wind" etc. and in its result part of the meaning like "Softening" (Vikli-

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1. Phala vyāpārayoḥ dhāturāśraye tu tiṇasmṛtāḥ, (Vai. Bhū. K.2) Phala vyāpārayoḥ sādhyasādhana bhāvastu samsargaḥ (ibid).
2. Anyathā karmapratyayasamabhivyāvahāre vyāpārāvacchinna phalabodhena tathāśakterapyāvaśyakatvena guruśakyatāvacchedaka śaktidvaya kalpanāpattiḥ. (L.M. (nbp)).

ktih)-both the meanings separately. And in the case of the passive construction the result part of the meaning is qualified by the activity part. The relation of the produced to the producer subsists between the result and the activity parts of the meaning. Between these two meanings the activity part is the principal substantive and the result part is only secondary.

According to Nāgeśabhaṭṭa the meaning of a root is "activity favourable to result coupled with effort".[1] The potentialities of the root in the two meanings are separate i.e. activity qualified by the result (in the active voice) and also the result qualified by the activity (in the case of the passive voice.)[2] He does not accept mere result and activity as the signified potentialities of the root; because in such a case there is a possibility of agreement of result and activity by the relation of 'subject to predicate'. As a general rule two objects recalled separately get connected with each other by the relation of subject to predicate.[3] Hence in order to prevent such an agreement we have to bring in some external agency, which again is a matter of prolixity. Thus he argues that the result qualified by action and action qualified by result are the two potentialities of the root. The knowledge of the particular meaning is produced by the usage of the affix in the passive or active sentences respectively. Of course it is a bit cumbersome, but the prolixity is justified and hence it does not amount to any fault.[4]

Nāgeśa argues that accepting result and action, separately as the meanings of the root, constitutes prolixity. It is like this-. The import wherein the result is attributive to the action is caused by the root conjointly uttered with a suffix indicating the active voice and the import wherein the -- activity is attributive to the

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1. Phalanukulo yatnasahito vyāpāraḥ. (L.M. (nbp),).
2. Phalāvacchinnavyāpāre, vyāpārāvaccinna phsle dhātoḥ pṛthak śaktiḥ.
3. Pṛthagupasthitayoḥ Tathā anvayautsargikatvāt. (L.M. (nbp))
4. Prāmāṇikagauravaṁ tu na doṣāya iti nyāyāt.

result is produced by the root conjointly uttered with a suffix indicating passive voice. Thus we have to admit two different cause and effect relations. Further we have to create two different potentialities in the root. And more prolixity lies in accepting a specific qualified relation between the particular root and the concerned meanings.[1] Of course without accepting such a relation we cannot have the import, because an import cannot be produced from words unrelated. Hence from any point of view, Nāgeśa asserts, that it is not logical to accept two different meanings to the root. He advocates only a qualified potentiality of the form "activity qualified by the result (in the active voice) or the result qualified by the activity (in the passive voice) as the meaning of the root.

Now, as regards the theory of the old Logicians, Grammarians also refute the same almost on the same lines as the modern Logicians and Mīmāṁsakas. Some more defects in the theory of the old logicians are as follows : According to the old logician the result is the meaning of the accusative case affix. If it be so there are many instances where other case affixes are also used in the place of accusative case affix. For example the fourth case affix in the sentence Grāmāya gaccati. And the fifth case affix in the sentence 'Prāsādāt Prekṣate' etc.[2] the accusative case affix also is used in the sense of other kāraka affixes as in the sentences "Adhiśete Vaikuṇṭhaṁ etc."

Further many kṛt suffixes are also enjoined in the sense of object. Thus if we are to accept result as the denoted meaning of the suffix denoting object, we have to accept this meaning in the case of a number of different suffixes as Sup, Tiṅ, Kṛt, etc.. Hence it is more parsimonious to accept result also as the meaning of the root itself, instead of creating each time a new denotational potentiality in each of the numerous suffixes belonging to various kārakās, kṛts.etc.

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1. For further details vide L.M. (nbp).
2. Adhīti Vyākaraṇe.

Further, in sentences like "Pacyate taṇḍulaḥ svayameva" i.e. in the karma kartṛ usages the old logician cannot but admit result as the meaning of the root, otherwise the very construction of such sentences will not be possible. Again the definitions given by him to Transitiveness etc. suffer from the defects of partial applicability or non-applicability as can be observed in the case of causal sentences with intransitive roots as in Bhāvayate ghaṭaṁ Caitraḥ, Edhayate ghaṭaṁ Caitraḥ etc.. In these cases the opponent has to admit that the result is denoted by the root only. After all the result is that which is an attributive of activity, the meaning of the root. Then in the above cited sentences there are two different activities, one denoted by the root and the other denoted by the Ṇic suffix. Here the activity denoted by the root is attributive to that denoted by the suffix Ṇic. So naturally the former is the result of the latter.

Thus, in view of the above mentioned innumerable defects, pointed out by the modern logicians, mīmāṁsakas and grammarians the theory of the old logicians cannot be valid.

To sum up the following are the various views regarding the meaning of the verbal root:

1. Maṇḍana's school advocates that result alone is the meaning of the root.

2. Ratnakosakṛt etc. beloging to the school of old logicians claim that the root denotes only activity and the result is the meaning of the accusative case affix.

3. The later mīmāṁsakas like Khaṇḍa Deva are of the opinion that the meaning of a root is of the form of an unanalysable entity (Akhaṇḍopādhi) subsisting in the activity helping achieve a particular result.

4. In general all the Mīmāṁsakas, Logicians and Grammarians accept both result and action as the meanings of the root.

5. Gadādhara says that in general a root denotes an activity as

determined by the concerned result.[1] But in the passive construction, he admits that the root denotes both result and action.

6. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa argues that a root signifies only a qualified potentiality of the form of activity qualified by the result or Vice versa.

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1. Vyu. Va.

Chapter IV

Section-ii

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MEANING OF THE ROOTS TAKING TWO OBJECTS

Let us examine sentences like 'Gopaḥ gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ;' 'Rājānaṁ Vasudhāṁ yācate', 'Pitaraṁ panthānaṁ pṛcchati', 'Ajāṁ grāmaṁ nayati etc.. In all these sentences we find the verb word has two objects. Further in these sentences the words Gāṁ (Cow), Rājānaṁ (king) Pitaraṁ (Father) etc., are used in the accusative case, thus denoting objecthood. As a matter of fact an object is the most desired one of a person as laid down by the sutra[1] P,1.4.49. But in the present instance, cow is not the most desired but milk. And the cow is only a point of separation of milk from it or a substratum of milk. Same is the case with the words Rājā, Pitṛ etc.. Hence how are we to explain the objecthood in them i.e. the substratumness of the result part of the meaning denoted by the concerned verbal roots. To explain this, we have first to decide what the root denotes. In the case of these roots, scholars follow two methods to explain the nature of the root as possessing single activity denoted, or two activities denoted.

Now let us examine the theory, taking for granted that the root denotes a single activity: Take the sentence "Gopaḥ gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ (The Milkman draws milk (from) the Cow). Here the root 'Duh' denotes only a single activity (Vyāpāra) i.e. action favourable to the flow (of milk). The accusative case affix (enjoined after the word 'cow') denotes separation which agrees with the 'flow' by the relation of the producer to the produced. The meaning of the base (cow) agrees with 'Separation, being its substratum. Thus the verbal import is of the form "The Milkman (Gopaḥ) is the agent of action congenial to the flow subsisting in the milk which is favourable to the separation subsisting in the cow". Now one may question how the cow being the substratum of separation can get the accusative case, but only apādānatva. To this it is replied ablativeness is to be construed only in such cases where the separation is syntactically connected with the substantive of the knowledge produced by

1. P.1.4.49 Karturīpsitatamaṁ karma.

the root[1] as in cases like "The leaf falls from the tree" (vṛkṣāt parṇaṁ vibhājate). In the present case the separation is not syntactically of such a type. Thus the cow does not get apādāna samjña. Hence now the cow is the substratum of the result, separation, hence it gets the designation object.

Gadādhara prefers to accept the root Duh to denote "action congenial to the flow (of milk) determined (qualified) by separation, and the accusative case suffix enjoined after the base 'cow' denotes 'Locus hood' which syntactically agrees with separation [2]

On this account it may not be objected that even in the present case (Gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ) the objecthood for the word cow is secured with the help of the definition viz.: An object is the substratum of the result determined by the meaning of the root; and not with the help of the Sūtra "Akathitaṁ ca;" for as the author argues that by the phrase "determined by the meaning of the root" is ment a direct adjective of the substantive in the knowledge produced by the meaning of the root (i.e. Vyāpāra). In the present case; however, the separation (vibhāga) does not directly agree with vyāpāra which is the main substantive of the root meaning; but with the flow (Kṣaraṇa) which is different from it. And hence the distinction between the Akathita karman and the ordinary karman.

Now another point to be decided is whether the cow becomes the principal object or not. Though the cow is the substratum of 'separation' determined by the meaning of the root, it is not treated as principal object (Pradhānakarman). Of course it is true that the principal object is defined as the substratum of the result determined by the meaning (activity) of the root. And the principal result is that which is directly attributive to the

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1. Dhātvartha vyāpārānvita vibhāga eva apādānatvaṁ. (Vide Ādarśa commentary on the Vyutpattivāda).

2. Vastutastu vibhāgāvacchinna kṣaraṇānukūlo vyāpāro duhyarthaḥ, Gopadottara dvitīyārthaśca vibhāgānvayinī vṛttireva. (Vyu. Vā.).

activity, which is expressed by the verbal root as the substantive.[1] Hence in the present case, the "Separation" subsisting in the cow is not directly attributive to the 'flow" which itself is an attributive to the activity congenial to it (flow). Hence the cow is not the principal object, so much so, when the speaker intends to express the cow as the substratum of separation, as explained, the cow becomes the object, And such an objecthood is ratified by Pāṇini sutra "Akathitaṁca".[2] However, if the speaker is of the opinion that the root 'Duh' denotes mere action congenial to the flow, and the cow is treated as the point of separation, but not as the substratum of the result, then the cow gets the designation Apādana, and takes the fifth case (Ablative) affix.[3] Thus when we admit that the root denotes only one action, the object cow etc., governed by the sūtra P.1.4.51 is treated as secondary object (gauṇakarman) and Milk etc., which is governed by the Sutra P.1.4.49 is treated as the primary (Pradhāna Karman).

There is another explanation to justify the two objects in the sentences like 'Gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ'. Here, some scholars admit two activities to be denoted by the root. Hence two objects are possible as they are the substratums of the respective results. Now in the given case "Gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ", the root denotes "activity (Subsisting in the milkman) congenial to the activity (subsisting in the cow) congenial to the separation of milk existing in the cow.[4] From the sentence 'gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ' we generally understand that cow releases milk and the milk-man

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1. Pradhāna karmatvaṁ ca kartṛpratyayasamabhivyāhāre dhātupada-sakti jnāne viseśyatayā bhāsamāna vyāpāre sākṣād viseṣaṇaṁ yat phalam tasyāśrayatvaṁ. (Vyu.Vā. Comm.)
2. P 1.4.51. Akathitam ca
3. Gadāara alternatively accepts three potentialities to the root each in "Separation, Flow, and Activity". One gets the verbal import through Syntactical relation. In the passive construcution by a peculierity of expectancy their relation of attributiveness etc., gets altered. [Vyu. Vā.]
4. Duheḥ antas sthita drava-dravya vibhāgānukūla vyāpārānukūla vyāpāraḥ.

(gopaḥ) causes the cow to release milk[1] (Gauḥ payaḥ tyajati; Gopaḥ gavā Tyajayati). Basing on the experience we admit two activities denoted by the root. Thus the cow being the substratum of the result produced by the activity existing in the gopa, gets the designation object governed by the sutra P.1.4.49.[2] And milk also being the substratum of the result produced by the action subsisting in the cow, gets the designation object on the authority of the same sutra P.1.4.49. Now, if both the objects are governed by same sutra, then which of them is primary and which is secondary. To this it is replied here the cow is the primary object. Here primary object-hood is defined as "The sentence being in active construction, an object (Karman) is said to be primary (principal) if it is the substratum of the result, which (result) is directly attributive to the principal activity subsisting in the agent expressed by the verbal affix.[3]

It may be questioned why we are particular in deciding that a particular object is primary (Mukhya) or secondary (Gauṇa). To this we reply. that when such sentences as these (gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ) are changed into the passive voice, we have to decide which of the two objects gets changed into the nominative case. As a general rule it is always the principal object that is expressed by the verbal affix (Te) in the passive, where the primary object is in conformity with the definition given above. But however in the case of objects governed by the Sutra P.1.4.51, generally

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1. The roots duh etc. are treated as inherent causal roots. Antarbhūtaṇijarthānāṁ duhyādīnāṁ ṇijantavat, Siddhaṁ Pūrveṇakarmatvaṁ ṇijantaṁ niyamastathā. (VP. 3-7-73)

2. P.1.4.49, Karturīpsitatamaṁ karma.

3. Pradhāna karmatvanca, kartṛpratyaya samabhivyāhāre kartṛniṣṭha pradhāna vy vyāpāra viseṣaṇa phalāśrayatvaṁ (La. Śa Śe.)

the secondary object gets changed to nominative.1

Generally, the roots Duh etc., are treated as roots taking two objects, and objecthood for cow etc., is ratified by the sutra P.1.4.51. Hence let us examine what this Sutra explains. According to this sutra, in a sentence where the object (Karman) is associated with another Kāraka, generally Apādāna or Sampradāna or Adhikaraṇa if the speaker does not intend to express the apādānatva etc., existing in that kāraka, then the speaker can treat it as Karmakāraka. Thus strictly speaking this karman (object) is a secondary object (gauṇa), because it looses its karmatva if the speaker does not want to treat it as Karman. Thus in the sentence 'Gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ' the word 'cow' is a secondary object. If the speaker so desires to convey that the cow is the point (limit) from which milk is separated, he uses fifth case affix as "goḥ payaḥ dogdhi". The accusative case affix after the 'cow' denotes Ādheyatva (locushood) but not mere relation in general (Sambandha sāmānya) as opined by Bhaṭṭoji.2 Further the word "Akathita" means 'when not intended to express' but not 'apradhāna' as opined by some scholars.3 If we accept the meaning "apradhāna" then there will be no scope to treat the 'cow' as apādāna, because it is always an apradhāna karman. Hence sentences of the form 'Goḥ' payaḥ dogdhi' would have not been possible at all.4

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1. Gauṇekarmaṇi duhyādeḥ pradhāne nīhṛkṛsvahāṁ, Buddhi bhakṣārthayoḥ śabdakarmaṇāṁ ca nijecchayā, Prayojyakarmaṇyanyeṣām ṇyantānāṁ tādayomataḥ, Hṛkrornijecchayā kiṁ vā, prayojya bahudarśibhiḥ, Lakṣyam dṛṣṭvā nirṇayotra kartavyo bhāṣyapāragaiḥ. (Udyota under P.1.4.51.II.)
2. Tathā ceha ṣaṣṭhītvasaṁbandhamātram-dvitīyārtha iti sthitaṁ. (Manorama on P.1.4.51). But Nāgesa refutes this in his Laghu śabdenduśekhara on this sutra. Tattat śāstrabhāve sarvatra ṣaṣṭhīprāptyāsarvāsāṁ tadapavādatvena, tadapavādatvamātreṇa saṁbandhārthakatvaṁ na yuktam... etc.
3. Akathita śabdotrāsamkīrtitaparaḥ. (La. Śa. Śe.)
4. Apradhānavacana akathitaśabdopādāne tu apādānasaṁpradāna saṁjñe bādhitvā duhyādiṣu karmasaṁjñaiva syāditi asaṁkīrtitamakathitamihāśritam. (Pradipa under P.1.4.51.).

Another important point is that it is not open for us to treat every apādāna kāraka etc., as objects on the plea that we do not intend to express the ablativeness etc., in them. Further all the roots do not take two objects. The roots with two objects, are listed out as Duh, Yāc Pac etc.[1] In the case of the roots Duh, Yāc, pac etc., the other (apādāna etc.) kāraka is associated with the object (Milk etc.) before the activity denoted by the root is brought into being. But in the case of some other roots, the other Kārakas (apādāna adhikaraṇa etc.) are associated with the object, only after the action denoted by the concerned root is brought into being.[2] The Mahābhaṣyakāra listed out only eight roots, Duh, Yāc, Rudh, Prath, Bhikṣ, Cin. In respect of these roots ; that kāraka which is associated with the Karman (of course obtained on the authority of P.1.4.49) before the action, denoted by the concerned root is brought into being; is called Akathitaṁ. With regard to the roots Bṛ Śās the apradhānakarma is related with primary object only after the action denoted by the concerned root comes into being.[3] By following this convention, we can avoid karma samjñā to the vessel into which the milk is drawn, though the vessel is associated with milk. The various kārakas that can be treated as objects are governed by the Sūtra P.1.4.51[4]

The mention of the roots as made by the Bhāṣyakāra does not mean that they are only eight in number. It is only indicative of the peculiar nature of roots that can take two objects. That is why by the time of Bhaṭṭoji etc., the number of these roots increased. Dīkṣita clearly mentions that the list is not exhaustive but all the roots having a similar nature are also to be included. He quotes many instances where different roots like, Gad, Bhāṣ, Dadh with the upasarga 'abhi' etc., take two objects. The Bhāṣya-

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1. Duḥ yāc pac daṇḍ rudhi pracchi ci bṛ śāsu ji math muṣāṁ, karmayuksyādakathitaṁ tathā syānnīhṛkṛṣvahāṁ. (S.K. under Sl. 539).
2. Karmayuktvaṁ. dhātvartha vyāpārātprāk, tadanantaraṁ vā tat sambdandhatvaṁ. (La. Śa. Śe.)
3. Guruprasada-Commentary on La. Śa. Śe.
4. P.1.4.51 Akathitaṁ ca. P.1.4.49, Karturīpsita tamaṁ karma,

kāra favours such an interpretation as is evident from his own usages of the root "Cudi" as a Dvikarmaka root.[1]

When the sentences in the active voice with verbs like Duh etc., with two objects are changed into passive voice the secondary object (governed by Sūtra P.1.4.51) alone gets expressed by the verbal suffix and hence takes the nominative case affix. However in the case of roots Nī, Hṛ, Kṛṣ etc., it is only the primary object (say goat, etc.) that takes the nominative case affix.[2]

Thus we can explain the meaning of the roots taking two objects. Depending on the standard usages we have to decide whether a particular root is a dvikarmaka or not and accordingly determine the meaning of root.[3]

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1. "Ahamapīdamacodyaṁ codye" iti Tadrājasūtrabhāṣye pracchi paryāyasya Cuderapi dvikarmakatvadarśanāditi bhāvaḥ evaṁ ca nāthatyādayo bahavo dvikarmaka bodhyāḥ. (Manorama on P.1-4-51)
2. Gauṇe karmaṇi duhyādeḥ pradhāne nīhṛkṛṣvahāṁ.
3. Lakṣyaṁ dṛṣṭvā nirṇayotra kartavyotra bhāṣyapāragaiḥ. (ibid)



Chapter IV

Section–iii

COMPLEX ROOTS AND THEIR MEANING 107-125

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COMPLEX ROOT FORMATION (SANĀDYANTA DHĀTUVṚTTIH)

INTRODUCTION :—

The sage Pāṇini introduces a group of eleven affixes, popularly known as "Sanādi Suffixes" in the first quarter of the third chapter of his book "Aṣṭādhāyī".[1] One more suffix "kvip" is added to the above list by Kātyāyana, the Vārtikakāra. Of these suffixes some are enjoined after the simple (verbal) roots, and some are enjoined after nouns The speciality of these suffixes lies in that, that when they are added either to a simple root or a nominal base or a noun (as sanctioned by the various aphorisms) both of them (i e. the Root or the nominal base or the noun; together with the suffix) becomes a single complex unit. In order to facilitate this unit to behave like a simple verbal root, Pāṇini confers root-ness on it by a special aphorism.[2] Hence this complex unit takes after it all the lakāras, or Tiṅ suffixes, kṛt suffixes etc., to form verbs or nouns. Since this kind of roots are derived from other sources they are called derived roots or complex roots.

This technique of forming verbal roots is technically called Dhātuvṛtti, one among the four techniques[3] used by the Indian grammarians to formulate various complex words. This complex formation has rendered great service in improving the status and flexibility of the Sanskrit Language. The system of forming the Desiderative, Frequentative, Denominative roots etc., has greatly contributed to the expressional faculty of the language and lengthy ideas can be expressed through one single word or phrase. Since this is a "Vṛtti", before enjoining the suffix to the root etc.,

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1. From the Sutra "Guptijkidbhyaḥ San" (P.3.1.5) upto and including the Sutra "Kameṛṇiṅ" (P.3.1.30).
2. Sanādyantā dhātavaḥ (P.3.1.32).
3. According to Nāgeśa the techniques (vṛttis) are only four viz., kṛdvṛtti, Taddhitavṛtti samāsavṛtti and dhātuvṛtti. To him Ekaśeṣa vṛtti comes under samāsa vṛtti only, For details vide L.M. (kk)

we have to ensure "Sāmarthya", i.e. Ekārthībhāva etc. as in the case of other vṛttis.[1]

Each of the Sanādi suffixes has its own meaning and generally this meaning is the substantive with respect to that of the root etc., after which the suffix is appended. These roots, being derived from other sources, are not enumerated among the two thousand simple roots of Pāṇini. Another interesting feature of these suffixes is that the same root when joined with different suffixes in turns forms different complex roots with different meanings. For instance the word Putrakāmyati (Putra + Kāmyac + Ti) gives the meaning "one desires a son for one's-self" and the word Putrīyati (Putra + īyaṅ + Ti) gives the meaning "one treats the other as one's own son". Thus lengthy ideas can be compressed and expressed through a single word. Similarly the idea that one desires to go; or read can be expressed through a single word Jigamiṣati or pipaṭhiṣati etc., Thus breivity is the main basis in forming such complex roots. This being the case, now we examine the meanings signified by these suffixes in detail.

Now, as already stated, these suffixes are twelve in number viz. 1. San, 2. Kyac, 3. Kāmyac, 4. Kyaṅ, 5. Kyaṣ, 6. Kvip 7. Ṇic. 8. Yaṅ, 9. Yak, 10. Āya, 11. Īyaṅ 12. Ṇiṅ.[2] Of these suffixes Kyac, kāmyac, Kyaṅ and Kyas are enjoined after nouns. The sixth one "kvip" is enjoined after nominal bases. Ṇic is enjoined after a verbal root and also after a few nominal bases. The first and eighth viz. San and Yaṅ suffixes are enjoined after roots only. The ninth one 'Yak' is enjoined after the roots and after the nominal bases enlisted in "Kaṇdvādi Gaṇa". The tenth one Āya is enjoined after five roots only. The suffix īyaṅ is enjoined after a single root "Ṛti". The last suffix Ṇiṅ is enjoined after a single root "kamu" and also after three nouns. As already stated, before enjoining these suffixes to their respective bases

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1. For details Vide 'The Philosophy of a Sentence and Its Parts' Chapter VIII.
2. San Kyac kāmyac kyaṅ kyaṣo'thācāra kvip Ṇijañau tathā, Yagāya īyaṅ ṇiṅ ceti dvādaśāmī sanādayaḥ.

we have to ensure that there is capacity (sāmarthya) in these to give a single combined meaning (Ekārthibhāva). In the absence of such a sāmarthya (Ekārthībhāva), complex formation is not justified. Thus with this background let us examine each suffix and the respective complex root in more detail.

1. "SAN" SUFFIX.

In the form 'San' the letter 'N' is a mute and the actual suffix is 'Sa' ending in the vowel 'A'. The mute letter 'N' indicates that the first letter of the complex root is udātta and the rest are anudāttas, as governed by P.6.1.197[1].

The San suffix is of two types. With respect to certain roots it is a suggestive suffix and in the sense of Desire or Suspicion it is an expressive suffix. Thus this suffix is popularly called Swārthe San in the suggestive sense and 'icchā san' in the expressive sense. When the suffix is enjoined to a root, the root gets reduplicated.[2]

Swārthe San :—

The San affix is enjoined after seven roots only,[3] by the Sūtras P.3.1.5, and 3.1.6.[4] Here the suffix does not denote any independent sense of its own but brings out the peculiar meaning inherent in the root itself, after which the suffix is added. Thus the verbal forms are jugupsate, titīkṣate etc.

Icchā San :—

The San suffix in the sense of "desire" can be enjoined

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1. P.6.1.197 Nanityādirnityam.
2. Sanyaṅoḥ (P.6.1.9),
3. P.3.1.5 Guptijkidbhyaḥ San.
4. P.3.1.6 Mān badhadānśānbhyo Dīrghaścābhyāsasya.

after any Root' and is governed by the Sūtra P.3.1.7.[1] To append this suffix in this sense after a verbal root certain conditions are to be satisfied. We know the meaning of the suffix 'San' is desire. Naturally a desire has an object to be achieved. So this suffix is to be appended to a root, when the meaning of the root itself becomes the object in the desire. Again the agent of the action denoted by the root and that of the desire must be one and the same. For instance let us take the sentance 'Rāma desires to go'. Here the person who desires and the person who wants to perform the action denoted by the root "Go" are one and the same i. e. Rāma. So to convey this sense the 'San' suffix is appended after the root 'Gam' and the sentence is 'Rāmaḥ jigamiṣati'. Thus the verbal import is "Rāma is the agent of going which is the object in his desire". But when one desires another person to go (or to do), then to convey that sense we have to use a sentence only as "caitraḥ Maitrasya gamanaṁ icchati"; but suffix should not be appended to the root. Hence sentences like 'caitraḥ Maitrasya jigamiṣati' are wrong constructions.

Further, when the object in the desire is qualified by another word like "He desires to go quickly", then also the root cannot take this San suffix after it, because there is no Sāmarthya.[2] The idea is to be conveyed through a sentence only. Another pecularity that this suffix can be appended to any root (simple or complex) but not the one already ending with the San suffix in the sense of desire.[3]

San - in the sense of Āsankā :—

This suffix is appended to a verbal root in the sense of suspicion or expectation. This complex root with a San after it, does not convey the sense of desire, but conveys that the agent suspects or anticipates some undesirable happening to himself. Besides the sense of "Desire", we have to admit this meaning

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1. P.3.1.7, Dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkāt iccāyāṁ.
2. Saviśeṣaṇamasamarthaṁ (M. B. under P.2.1.1).
3. Sannantāt na Sanniṣyate.

"Āsaṅkā" also, to the suffix in order to account for usages like "Svā mumūrṣati", 'Kūlam pipatiṣati'. The usage of this suffix in this sense also is sanctioned by Kātyāyana, the Vārtikakāra.[2] Thus the sentences 'Svā mumūrṣati, or Kūlam pipatiṣati' are to be explained as "The dog suspects its own death or the bank anticipates its own fall.[3] But taking the spirit of these sentences into account it is generally explained as the speaker anticipates the death of the dog or the fall of the bank etc.

2. KYAC (YA)

Of the suffixes enjoined after a noun to form a complex root, kyac is one. In the form "Kyac" the letters K and C are mutes and the actual suffix is "YA". The mute 'K' is for the sake of bringing Kyac and Kyan into one unit and denote the both by a single word 'Kye' as in "Nah kye (P.1.4.15). The use of the mute 'C' is to make the suffix as one having two mute letters, so that the word 'Kye' is in 'Naḥ Kye' denotes both the suffixes Kyac and Kyan."[4]

This suffix also is enjoined in the sense of desire, just like the San Suffix. The San suffix is enjoined after a verbal root and the meaning of the root, action is the object in the desire of the agent (the desirer), while the Kyac suffix is used after a noun which (Dravya) is the object in the desire of the person who desires it for himself only. This suffix is enjoined after the noun as governed by the Sutra[4] P.3.1.8. Thus when Caitra desires to beget a son for himself then the word Putra denoting the object in the desire takes the suffix 'Kyac' and the sentence is 'Caitraḥ putriyati'. When the object desired is meant for another and not for person

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1. Āsaṅkāyāṁ Sanvaktavyaḥ (Vārtika under P. 3-1-7)
2. This type of explanation is inevitable because this suffix is enjoined in this sense subject to the other condition 'Samānakartṛkāt.' But this vārtika is refuted by the Bhāṣyakāra.
3. Ekanubandha grahaṇe dvyanubandhakasya grahaṇam na iti niṣedhaḥ parihṛta.
4. P.3.1.8 Supa Ātmanaḥ Kyac.

who desires, the suffix cannot be appended after the noun word denoting the object, but the whole idea is to be expressed in a sentence as Guruḥ Śiṣyāya Putraṁ icchati".

It is to be noted that when the desired object is qualified by another word then the noun word, denoting the object of the desire, cannot be appended with the suffix Kyac to convey the sense. Let us consider the sentence "Caitra desires a beautiful son for himself". Here the object 'son' is qualified by the word 'beautiful'. Hence the word 'Putra' cannot take the suffix Kyac, and the whole idea is to be expressed through a sentence as "Caitra sundaraṁ putraṁ Ātmanaḥ icchati", but never as "Sundaraṁ putrīyati " Thus the verb word "Putrīyati" gives an import of the form an activity of the form of desire which has son as its object."

The Kyajanta is always an intransitive root since the object is included in the meaning of the verbal root itself.[1]

3. KĀMYAC (KĀMYA)

The next suffix, enjoined after nouns to form complex roots is Kāmyac. This operation is governed by the Sutra "Kāmyacca".[2] This affix also, like 'Kyac', denotes the desire of a person wishing to possess something for himself. Thus when one desires fame for oneself, the idea is conveyed by the complex verb "Yaśas Kāmyati". Hence this suffix is appended to noun word denoting the object in the desire of the person desiring.

In the word Kāmyac, the letter 'C' is a mute and the actual suffix is 'Kāmya'.

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1. Dhātvarthenopasaṁ grahāt. However, in the sense of sexual intercourse, roots like 'Aśvasyati, Vṛṣasyati etc. are found to be transitive as in usages' jāraṁ vṛṣasyati bandhakī; 'Raviratha hayānasvasyanti dhṛvaṁ vadhvāḥ'... rathāṅgavihaṁ gamī, ... Vṛsasyati saṁprati.' For details vide Pa. Vā. Ra.
2. P.3.1.9 Kāmyacca.

4. KYAṄ (YA)

In the form 'Kyaṅ' the letters K and Ṅ are mutes. The real suffix is 'YA' only. The mute Ṅ indicates that the complex root takes Ātmanepada suffixes after it. The mute 'K' is for the sake of grouping Kyac and Kyaṅ together and denote by 'Kye' as in the Sūtra "Naḥ Kye'.

This suffix 'Kyaṅ' is enjoined after different nouns and crude forms (Prātipadikās) in different meanings. So let us examine the same.

(a) In the Sense of "Behaving like" ;—

This affix is optionally enjoined, in the sense of "Behaving like", after a noun denoting a person with whose behaviou the behaviour of another person is compared. Thus when we want to say that Caitra behaves like Maitra, the suffix is enjoined after the word Maitra and the complex verb. "Maitrāyate" gives us an import "behaves like Maitra", Here also if the object of comparison is qualified by another word this suffix is not enjoined.[1] Thus the enjoining of this suffix is governed by the rule P.3.1.11[2]

(b) In the sense of "To become what it was not Previously :

This suffix 'Kyaṅ', in the sense of "becoming that, what the thing or person previously was not, enjoined after the crude forms (Prātipadikas) like Bhṛsa etc. enumerated in Bhṛśādi Gaṇa, The operations are governed by the Sūtra P.3.1.12.[3]

Thus the verb 'Bhṛśāyate gives us an import that it has become much which it was not previously. Similarly from 'Śīghrāyate' we understand that it was not swift previously but now it becomes swift. Similarly 'Sumanāyate' gives an understanding

1. Saviśeṣaṇānāṁ vṛttirna.
2. P.3.1.11 Kartuḥ kyaṅ salopaśca.
3. P.3.1.12 Bhṛśādibhyo Bhuvyacverlopaśca halaḥ.

that a person who was not kind previously is now becoming kind.

(c) This suffix Kyaṅ is appended to the words Romantha (ruminating) and Tapas (Austerity), when they are used as object of the action of repetition and performance respectively. Thus the verb 'Romanthāyate' gives us an import that it (a cow etc.) ruminates very frequently, and Tapasyati means "performs Austerity". The operation is governed by the sūtra P.3.1.15.[1]

(d) **In the Sense of Emitting :—**

This suffix Kyaṅ is enjoined after three words Bāṣpa (vapour) ūṣma (Heat) and Phena (Froth), in the sense of emitting, when these become the object of action emitting. Thus when we want to say it emits Bāṣpa etc. we add the suffix to these words and the complex verb is of the form Bāṣpayate, ūṣmāyate and Phenāyate. The operations are governed by the Sūtra P. 3.1.16 and the Vārtika under it.[2]

(e) **In the sense of "To feel or Experience" :—**

This suffix Kyaṅ, in the sense of "feeling or experiencing" is enjoined after the words Sukha, Duḥkha etc. as enumerated in Sukhādi gaṇa; when the pleasure or pain belongs to the agent himself.[3] Thus the verbs, Sukhāyate Duḥkhāyate etc. give us an import that "one feels happy, or one feels unhappy etc.. However this suffix is not enjoined after these words when the agent himself is not the enjoyer as in sentences "Caitraḥ Maitrasya Sukhaṁ Vedayate", etc.. Thus when one knows the pains or pleasures of others this suffix is not enjoined.

(f) **In the sense of "Exerting Dishonesty or Sin" :—**

This suffix, Kyaṅ, in the sense of exerting dishonesty or interested in doing sins and the like, is enjoined after a few words

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1. P.3.1.15 Karmaṇo romantha tapobhyāṁ varticareḥ.
2. P.3.1.16 Bāṣpoṣmābhyām udvamane. Vārtika-Phenācceti vaktavyaṁ.
3. Sukhādibhyaḥ Kartṛ Vedanāyāṁ P.3.1.18.

like Kasta etc., as regulated by the Sūtra P.3.1.14 and the Vārtika thereunder.[1] Thus the verbs Kaṣṭāyate, Kakṣāyate, Kṛcchrāyate etc. gives us an import that "one exerts dishonesty", or 'one is interested in doing sins' etc.. The words enumerated in the Vārtika are more or less synonyms having the ultimate sense evil or sin.

(g) **In the sense of "Making" :—**

This suffix Kyaṅ, in the sense of "making" comes after the words Śabda, etc., as the object of action. Thus instead of saying Śabdaṃ karoti, we can say śabdāyate, similarly 'Kalahāyate' 'one quarrels', etc.. These operations are governed by the Sūtra P.3.1.17 and also the Vārtika thereunder.[2]

Thus this suffix Kyaṅ is enjoined after different words in different senses as explained above. These verbal forms are very frequently used in the language by the poets to beautify their works.

5. KYAṢ (YA)

In the form Kyaṣ the letters K and Ṣ are mute and actual suffix is 'Ya'. According to Bhaṭṭoji[3] the mute 'K' serves no purpose and Ṣ indicates that the complex root is a ubhayapadin.

This suffix 'Kyaṣ' is added after certain words Lohita etc.[4] in the sense of 'Becoming what the thing previously was not'. And these words should not have already taken the suffix 'cvi'

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1. P 3.1.14, Kaṣṭāya Kramaṇe. Vārtika: Śatra kakṣa kaṣṭa kṛchra gahanebhyo kaṇvacikīrṣāyām iti vaktavyam.
2. P.3.1.17 Śabda Vaira Kalahābhra Kaṇva meghebhyaḥ karaṇe. Vārtika Sudina durdina nīhārebhyaśca.
3. Na caivaṃ kāmyacaiva kyaṣopi kakāraḥ śrūyeta uccāraṇa-sāmarthyāditi vācyam, Tasyāpi Bhāṣye Pratyākhyānāt. (Bhaṭṭoji S.K. on P.3.1.13).
4. P.3.1.13 Lohitādi ḍājbhyaḥ kyaṣ.

afṭer them before taking Kyaṣ. This sense is obtained by the Anuvṛtti of the word 'Achveḥ' from the previous sūtra.

Thus when an object, originally being not black (Lohita) now becomes black, then to convey this idea the suffix Kyaṣ is appended after the word Lohita. Thus the complex roots Lohitāya, etc., are formed. The import we get from this verb is 'one which was not originally black is now becoming black'.

Further this suffix is added, after the words ending with 'Dāc' suffix, in the sense of 'Making a sound similar to'. Thus 'Paṭapaṭa' a word formed by taking Dāc suffix, takes after it the Kyaṣ suffix, and the verb Paṭapaṭāyate gives an import that 'one makes the sound similar to Paṭapaṭa'. Similarly Gaḍagaḍāyate etc. are formed.

6. KVIP

This suffix 'Kvip' is a very peculiar suffix and at the same time it is a very important one. It is appended after any nominal stem in the sense of 'Behaves like' (Ācārārthe). The peculiarity of this suffix lies in the fact that the whole suffix elides immediately, without bringing any physical change in the nominal stem but gets the designation verbal root' to it. Thus, when we want to express the idea that Caitra behaves like Kṛṣṇa, then this suffix is appended after the object of comparison i.e. Kṛṣṇa. As the suffix elides immediately, the nominal base Kṛṣṇa now becomes a complex denominative verbal root 'Kṛṣṇa'. Thus the complex verb 'Kṛṣṇati' gives us an import 'one behaves like Kṛṣṇa' i.e. one's say Caitra's behaviour is similar to that of Kṛṣṇa.

The usage of these verbal forms in the Poetic literature beautifies the work.

As already said the suffix is introduced by Kātyāyana, the Vārtikakāra but not by Pāṇini. Bhagavān Pāṇini, reads a suffix

1. Kamalati vadanaṁ yasyāṁ alayantyalakā mṛṇālabāhū, Śaivālati romāvaliḥ adbhuta Sarasīva sā bālā: (Rasagangādhara).

'Kvip' among the kṛt suffixes. That 'Kvi ' is added to any verbal root, just to convert it into a nominal stem. There also the entire 'Kvip' suffix gets elided, and now the verbal root becomes a nominal stem and takes after it all the 'Sup' suffixes, e.g. Liṭ, Lihau, Lihaḥ, Rāṭ..Rājau . Rājaḥ etc.. So taking this fact into account it appears that Kātyāyana, the Vārtikakāra, has extended this technique in the reverse order changing any nominal stem into a verbal root ; of course in the sense of 'behaves like, (Ācārārtha).

7. ṆIC (I)

Of all the suffixes this suffix Ṇic is a very important one. This suffix is suggestive after certain nouns and verbs. As an expressive suffix it is enjoined after any verbal root. In the form Ṇic, the letters Ṇ, C are mutes and the actual suffix is 'I' only.

ṆIC - as a suggestive suffix :—

This suffix Ṇic is appended after certain nouns, Muṇḍa, Miśra etc., as governed by the Sutra P.3.1.21[1] in the sense of 'making', taking, showing etc. On adding this suffix to them, they become derived roots. Thus the verb Muṇḍayati gives us an import 'one shaves (the other). Halayati gives the sense one takes Hala etc.'[2]

Similarly this suffix is enjoined after some specific nominal bases and all the simple verbal roots enumerated in the Tenth conjugation, by the Sūtra P.3.1.25.[3] Here also the suffix is said to be suggestive. The words from Satyāpa to cūrṇa are nominal stems, while Curādi stands for the roots of the Tenth conjugation. Thus

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1. P.3.1.21. Muṇḍa, Miśra, Ślakṣṇa, lavaṇa, vrata, vastra, Hala Kṛta tūstebhyo ṇic.
2. For details Vide Kāśikāvṛtti on P.3.1.21
3. P. 3.1.25. Satyāpa, pāśa, rūpa, vīṇā, tūla śloka, senā loma, tvaca, varma, varṇa, cūrṇa, curādibhyo ṇic.

on adding this suffix the derived verb 'Satyāpayati' gives the import 'one speaks truth (satyamācaṣṭe) etc.[3] Thus the Ṇic suffix, enjoined by the two sutras P.3.1.21 and 3.1.25 is treated as a suggestive suffix.

Ṇic as an Expressive Suffix :—

This suffix Ṇic in the causal sense is enjoined by the Sutra P.3.1.26 (Hetumati ca). Now we know in our experience that one employs, induces or causes another person to perform a particular activity to achieve a particular result. This activity existing in the employer or the inducer is expressed by the suffix Ṇic. This suffix can be enjoined after any simple or derived root, any number of times depending on the number of agents directing or causing one the other to act; but in the final verb word only one Ṇic suffix remains and all the others elide; but the words denoting these inducers and the induced remain in the sentence, all in instrumental case, except the word denoting the first agent who begins employing the others to act. Thus the suffix added to the simple root Pac, gives the forms 'Pāci' the derived root; thus the import we get from the derived verb 'Pācayati' is of the form 'one gets (rice) cooked (by another). Similarly from the sentence 'Caitraḥ Maitreṇa yājayati' the import is 'Caitra causes, (induces) Maitra to perform the sacrifice'. In the sentence 'Caitraḥ Maitreṇa Puṣyamitreṇa Yājayati' though there are two employed agencies only one Ṇic suffix remains in the verb.

In the sentence 'Caitraḥ Maitreṇa pācayati' Maitra is the substratum of the action of cooking, but this vyāpāra is the result of the activity subsisting in Caitra, the inducer (Prayojaka); yet Maitra does not get the designation of Karman and consequently the objective case. The reason is simple. As a matter of fact Maitra is the substratum of the result of the activity expressed by the Ṇic and also the substratum of the activity denoted by the root Pac. Thus there is a scope to Maitra

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3. For the meanings given by the nominal stems after becoming roots-Vide Kāsikāvṛtti on this Sūtra P. 3-1-25.

to get both Kartṛ Saṃjñā and karma saṃjñā. But Kartṛ saṃjñā being later (para) he gets only kartṛ saṃjñā but not karma saṃjñā. But as this Kartā is not expressed by the Tiṅ suffix the word Maitra cannot take the nominative case, thus it takes the instrumental case affix.[1] Caitra being the agent of activity signified by the causal suffix Ṇic, is expressed by the verbal affix and he gets the Nominative case. Thus in the active voice the words denoting prayojaka always takes the nominative case affix and the words denoting the induced persons (Prayojya) always take the instrumental case.

However in the case of certain roots as specified in the Sutra P.1.4 52[2] the employed agency (Prayojya) gets the karma saṃjñā and hence rests in the accusative case. Thus when the non-causal sentence 'Śatravaḥ Svargaṃ gacchanti (enemies go to heaven) is changed into a causal form the subject Śatravaḥ' changes into object and the sentence is of the form 'Hariḥ Śatrūn svargaṃ gamayati' (Hari causes the enemies to go to heaven). Though the words 'Śatru' etc. are the induced agency, they take accusative case but not instrumental in accordance with the Sutra cited (P.1.4.52). Here the Karma saṃjñā is enjoined to 'Śatru' in order to facilitate the passive construction with the word 'Śatru' in the nominative case.[3]

Now let us observe the sentence in the active like 'Caitraḥ taṇḍulaṃ pacatu'. When this is changed into a causal passive construction the original object alone gets changed into the nominative and the original and induced agents take the instrumental cases. Thus the sentences in the causal passive construction is of the form 'Caitreṇa Maitreṇa taṇḍulaḥ pacyate'.[4]

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1. Kartṛkaraṇayostṛtīyā (P.2.3.18).
2. P.1.4.52 Gati buddhi pratyavasānārtha śabdakarma akarmakāṇāmaṇikartā sa ṇau.
3. Śatravaḥ Hariṇā svargaṃ gamyante. This is probably because the śatrus are both karta and karma with reference to the activity and result subsisting in them. But as the śatru is not svatantra, it does not get kartṛ saṃjñā.
4. Caitreṇa maitraḥ taṇḍulaṃ pācayati - is the active causal form.

According to the grammarian the Ṇic suffix expresses the activity subsisting in the employing agency i.e. which causes the other to act to bring the particular activity congenial to the particular result. This prompting or inducting agency may be a human being or even an in-animate object.[1] For instance 'Bhikṣā vāsayati' (Alms cause on to live) Kārīṣo Agniḥ Pāṭhayati (the fire from the dung cakes causes one to read).

The nature of its employment is of different varieties. Sometimes it may be in the form of command or polite request, or even of the form consent.[2]

Thus the causal root 'Pāci' denotes an activity of the person who induces another to bring in an activity congenial to the production of the result 'Viklitti' subsisting in the object 'Taṇḍula'.

8. YAṄ (YA)

In the form Yaṅ the letter Ṅ is a mute which indicates that the complex root takes Ātmanepada suffixes. This suffix is enjoined after the simple verbal roots in the sense of totality of action (Kriyāsamabhihāra) crookedness (Kauṭilya) and censure (garhā) as specified in the concerned sutras.

In the sense of 'Totality of Action' (Kriyāsamabhihāra) :—

This suffix is enjoined by Pāṇini after any root which has a single vowel and begins with a consonant to suggest the sense of 'frequency or intensity' of action signified by the root.[3] Thus when we want to convey that 'one cooks again and again (or

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1. Prayojakaḥcetanācetanaḥ sādhāraṇyena vivakṣitaḥ, Kvacit siddhaḥ kvacit phalarūpaḥ. M.B. under P.3.1.26.
2. Anumatyādityādi śabdenātra upadeśānugrahayorupādānam (Tat. Bo. under P.3.1.26).
3. P.3.1.22 Dhātorekāco haladeḥ kriyāsamabhihāre yaṅ, Paunaḥpunyaṁ bhṛśārthaśca kriyāsamabhihāraḥ. Tasmin dyotye yaṅ syāt (S.K. on P.3.1.22).

frequently), the suffix Yaṅ is added to the root 'Pac' and the derived verb 'Pāpacyate' conveys that sense. Thus the complex verb (frequentative) 'Jājwalyate' gives us an import that 'one shines very brilliantly. It should be noted that this suffix is appended to a simple root without a prefix (upasarga). Otherwise reduplication to preposition also is to be affected.1 And if we consider the whole (upasarga and dhātu together) as a single unit and consider it as the root then it has lost the character of having 'a single vowel'.

Kātyāyana, the Vartikakāra, however, states that this suffix is added after some specific roots which have either more than one vowel or a vowel in the beginning,2 to convey the same sense of 'Kriyāsamabhihāra'.

In the Sense of Crookedness :—

Pāṇini enjoins this suffix after the roots having the meaning of movement (Gati) to suggest the sense of 'crookedness (Kauṭilya), and in the case of such roots, the suffix Yaṅ never suggests the sense of 'Kriyāsamabhihāra'. This is evident from the word 'nitya' in the aphorism.3 Thus the derived verbs Camkramyate (kraṁ + yaṅ + te) and Vavrajyate (vraj + yaṅ + te) etc. gives an import of the form that one moves or goes crookedly. However, if the sense of 'frequency or intensity' of the action of this type of roots (gatyarthadhātu) is to be conveyed, then separate words like Bhṛsaṁ or punaḥ punaḥ etc., should be used with the verb e.g. Bhṛsaṁ kramati, punaḥ punaḥ vrajati etc..

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1. Dhātūpasargasamudāyasya kriyāviseṣāvagati hetutvāt, tato yadi pratyayaḥ syāt tataḥ sopasargasya dvirvacanaṁ prasajyeta. (Pradīpa on P.3.1.22.)
2. Sūci, sūtri, mūtri, ati, aṭi, ūrṇotibhyo yaṅ. For the details of the verb form and meanings vide Kasikāvṛtti on P 3.1.22
3. Nityaṁ Kauṭilye gatau. P.3.1.23. (Gatyarthāt Kautilya eva yaṅ syānnatu kriyāsamabhihāre) P.3.1.23.

In the sense of 'Ceasure' :—

Pāṇini enjoins this suffix after certain roots to suggest the sense of 'censuring the action (Bhāvagarhā).[1] Thus the root 'Lupa' (cut) when added to this suffix forms the derived verb Lolupyate and gives us the import of the form 'one cuts badly'.

YAṄ - LUK FORMS :—

This suffix yaṅ elides itself after certain roots as governed by the Sūtra P.2.4.74.[2] Still the remaining entity itself is treated as a complex root and is enjoined with the verbal suffixes. This elision results in giving very peculiar forms. For instance take the simple root Bhū. Its yaṅanta form in the present tense third person singular number is 'Bhobhūyate'; but its yaṅ luganta forms is either 'Bobhavīti or Bobhoti'. Of course these forms are not now frequently used by poets except to indicate their proficiency in grammar.

Thus yaṅ is a suggestive suffix. It generally suggests the petition or intensity of action denoted by the root after which it is appended. It also suggests under certain conditions either crookedness in motion or censure of action, denoted by the root concerned.

9. YAK (YA)

In this suffix 'Yak' the letter 'k' is a mute, and the actual suffix is 'YA' only.

This suffix is enjoined by Pāṇini after the words listed under the name 'Kaṇḍvādigaṇa.'[3]

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1. P.3.1.24, Lupa sada cara japa jabha daha, dasa gṛbhyo bhāvaghrhāyāṁ. For details of froms and meanings vide Kāsika on P.3.1.24.
2. Yaṅo aci ca P.2.4.74.
3. Kaṇḍvādibhyo yak, P.3.1.27.

As regards the meaning of this suffix there exists differences of opinion between the old grammarians and the modern grammarians like Bhaṭṭoji etc. The old grammarians like Kāśikākāra, are of the view that the words read in this gaṇa are all nominal stems and this suffix is enjoined after them in the sense of making (kṛñarthe). Thus the verb 'Kaṇḍūyate' is explained by them as 'Kaṇḍūm karoti' iti kaṇḍūyate. However this opinion is refuted by the modern grammarians.

According to the modern grammarians the words in this particular gaṇa are treated either as nouns or verbal roots as the speaker intends. When they are treated as verbal roots they always take after them, this suffix before they are appended with Tiṅ suffix just like curādi roots which take Ṇic suffix after them. This is how the modern grammarians argue. They further supplement their arguments thet the root-hood to these words is indicated by the mute 'K' in the suffix 'Yak', so that when this suffix is added to them no Guṇa or Vṛddhi takes place. And the reading of words 'Kaṇḍū' with an elongated vowel discloses that these words are nominal stems. Therefore, when these are treated as verbal roots, they always first take the suffix 'Yak' and then the Tiṅ suffix. In this context the suffix is purely suggestive.[1]

10. ĀYA

This suffix is enjoined after only five roots viz., Gupū, Dhūpa, Vicchi, Paṇi, Pani, in the sense of the root only.[2] Thus the derived root is of the form Gopāya and the verb Gopāyati gives us the import that 'one protects'. These roots take Parasmaipada suffix after them.

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1. Ebhyo dhātubhyo nityaṃ yak syāt swārthe (S.K. on P.3.1.27). For details vide Tattvabodhini commentary, Śabdenduśekhra etc. on P.3.1.27. Ubhayam Kandvādīni, Dhātavasca Prātipadikāni ca. (M.B, under P.3.1.27.)
2. Gupū (to protect) dhūpa (to heat) vicchi (to approach) paṇi and Pani (to praise). Gupūdhūpavicchi paṇi panibhya āyaḥ. P.3.1.28. Ebhyaḥ āya pratyayaḥ syāt svārthe (S.K. under P.3.1.28).

11. ĪYAṄ (ĪYA)

This suffix is enjoined only after a single root Ṛtī (to re. proacah or pity). This root is not read in any of the ten conjugations, except in the Sūtra P.3.1.29.[1] Such roots as this are known as aphoristical roots (Sautra dhātu). This suffix does not have any sense of its own but is enjoined in the sense of tho root itself. The derived root 'Ṛtīya' always takes the Ātmanepada suffixes. Thus the derived verb 'Ṛtīyate' gives us an import that 'one shows contempt or reproaches'.

12. NIṄ (I)

In the suffix Niṅ' the letter N and Ṅ are mutes and the actual suffix is 'I' only.

This suffix Niṅ is enjoined after only three nominal stems and one simple root. The nominal stems after which this suffix is enjoined are Puccha (tail), Bhāṇḍa (Pot) cīvara (Rag). But on adding this suffix to them the derived roots have different meanings. They, as said by the Vārtikakāra are.[2]

1. In the sense of 'lifting up (the tail) or throwing it) about. Thus the derived verb utpucchayate, means 'one lifts up the tail, Paripucchayate means 'one throws about the tail'.

2. the derived verbal root Bhāṇḍa (Bhāṇḍāya) means to accumulate pots. Thus the derived verb 'Bhāṇḍāyate' means 'one accumulates pots'.

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
1. P.3.1.29 Ṛterīyaṅ (Ṛtiḥ sautraḥ tasmadīyan syāt svārthe. Jugupsāyāmayaṁ dhāturiti bahāvaḥ kṛpāyāṁ cetyeke-S.K. under P.3.1,29).
2. Pucchabhāṇḍe cīvarāṇṇiṅ. P. 3-1-20. And the Vārtikas "Pucchādudasane, vyasane, paryavasane ca. Bhāṇḍātsamācayane. Cīvarādarjane paridhāane ca. (Arjanaṁ dravyalābhopāyo yācnādi).

3. the derived verbal root 'cīvari' (cīvarāya) means to 'wear or acquire' rags. Thus the derived verb 'cīvarāyate' gives us an import that 'one accumulates or wares rags'.

It is to be noted that all these meanings are spoken of those, of the concerned derived roots only and thus the suffix is only suggestive of these meanings.

This suffix is enjoined only after a single verbal root 'Kamu' (Kāntau, kāntiricchā) in the sense of the verbal root only. Thus the derived verb 'Kāmayate' means 'one desires.'

Thus the introduction of these Sanādi suffixes enriches the language to convey very subtle ideas with the utmost possible breivity.



Chapter IV

Section-iv

UPASARGAS

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PREPOSITIONS (UPASARGĀH)

We have accepted that the word Ākhyāata means a fully inflected verb word (Tiṅanta). And we find some verb words are prefixed by a particular entity called Upasarga (preposition). Since it also forms a part of the verb word let us have a discussion about its meaning, whether it is suggestive or expressive in nature.

Durgācārya explains this word in his commentary on the Nirukta as one which, on its association (or on being prefixed to) with verb or a noun generates a particularity (Viśeṣa) in the meaning of the following word (to which it is prefixed).[1] The Bṛhaddevata also defines Upasarga in a similar way as introducing modification in the meaning of the nominal or verbal base.[2] The Ṛk Prātiśākhya endorses the same view.[3] Peculiarly enough Pāṇini defines that the words Pra etc., which do not denote a substance (Dravya) and when in juxtaposition with the words denoting activity are called Upasargas.[4] Patañjali, the Bhāṣyakāra, maintains that Upasarga is one which brings about some speciality[5] in the verb meaning. Kātyāyana explains Upasarga as one that when prefixed to a word denoting action, it expresses the special character of the action. Bharata Muni, the author of the Nātya Śastra also is of a similar view.[6]

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1. Upetya nāmākhyātayorarthasya Viśeṣaṁ Sṛjantyutpādayanti iti upasargāḥ (Durga under Nir. 1-3).
2. Upasargāstu vijñeyāḥ kriyāyogena viṁśatiḥ, Vivecayanti tehyarthaṁ Nāmākhyāta vibhaktiṣu. (Bṛd. 2-93)
3. Upasargo viśeṣakṛt (Ṛk. Prā. XII-25.)
4. Upasargāḥ kriyāyoge. P.1.4.59; Prādyaḥ kriyāyoge upasarga samjñā gati samjñāśca syuḥ. (S.K. under P.1.4.60.)
5. Kriyāviseṣaka upsargaḥ. Upasargāśca punarevamātmakāḥ yatra Kriyāvāci śābda prayujyate tatra kriyā viśeṣamāhuḥ (MB. 1-3-17)
6. Prādipadikārthayuktam dhātvarthamupa sṛjanti ye swārthaiḥ. Upasargāḥ Upadiṣṭāḥ. (Nātya Sastra XV-26,)

Thus it is observed that an upasarga brings out a particularity or peculiarity in the meaning of the verb word to which it is prefixed. To this extent there is no difference of opinion among scholars. But the question before them is this :

1. Are we to hold that the meaning, obtained after prefixing the upasarga to a verb word is, as that of the upasarga itself or not.

2. Are we to accept that the entire meaning we obtain from the verb word (including the upasarga) is as that of the verbal root itself and this upasarga is only a helper in comprehending that particular meaning denoted by the root just like a candle which helps us in picking up the required object from a group of objects lying in darkness. Or

3. Are we to consider that the entire meaning is that of the upasarga only and the root is a mere tātparya grāhaka that which makes us arrive at the import.

Thus to say in brief the question before the scholarly world is whether these upasargas are vācakas or dyotakas.

THE MEANING OF UPASARGAS IN GENERAL - A DISCUSSION

Regarding the nature of prepositions there are two divergent opinions since the remote past. This is evident from the statements recorded by the sage Yāska in his work, 'The Nirukta' the earliest available work, both on grammar and etymology. According to these statements Śākaṭāyana, a great grammarian holds that prepositions can not express any sense of their own but they simply serve to reveal the sense inherent in the word to which they are prefixed.[1] On the contrary, the sage Gārgya holds that the upasargas have an expressive sense, and different Upasargas

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1. Na Nirbaddhā upasargā arthānnirāhuriti Śākaṭāyanaḥ. Nāmākhyātayostu karmopa saṁyoga dyotakā bhavanti. (Nir. 1-3.).

have different meanings.[1] These two diverse theories have such a strong reasoning behind them that, through all these ages the scholarly world is divided in opinion and takes sides with one theory or the other. Yaska himself upholds the view of Gargya, Katyayana and Patañjali follow the sage Sākatāyana and fortify his views with their arguments. The latter grammarians, and the Logicians with a few exceptions, follow the theory that Upasargas are only revealers (Dyotaka) but not expressors (Vācakas). The arguments of different scholars advanced in support of their view-points are presented in brief hereunder.

THE VIEW OF ṢĀKATĀYANA :—

According to Ṣakaṭayana prepositions independently i.e. when they are not prefixed either to a noun or a verb, cannot express any sense, just in the same way as the letters taken out of a word, cannot express any meaning. Just as the different qualities like colour etc., of an object are revealed in the presence of a burning candle, in the same way a different meaning originally inherent in the word itself is made clear or revealed where the particular word is prefixed with an upasarga. Thus upasargas are only revealers.[2]

Kātyayana follows Ṣākaṭayana's theory and strengthens it with his own argument that the nature of the preposition is to suggest the particular chracter of the action.[3] Patañjali also supports and clarifies the contention of Katyāyana. He says that the verbs have many meanings and accordingly the same root e g. "Stha" expresses both the meanings viz. stoppage of motion and the the action of motion also. But the prepositions simply manifest the meaning to be denoted by the verb. Hence the nature of a preposition is to make explicit what is implicit in the root itself.

1. Uccāvacā ḥ Padārthā bhavantīti Gārgyaḥ, Tadya esu padārthaḥ prhaurime Tannāmākhyātayorartha vikaraṇam (idid).
2. Ibib Durga's Commentary.
3. Kriyāvisesake Dhatuḥ (M.B. on P.1.3.1).

THE VIEW OF BHARTṚHARI :—

Bhartṛhari specifically deals with this matter in detail in his Vākyapadīya. There, at the very outset he offers three alternative solutions to the problem on hand.[1] The first alternative is that the prepositions with their juxtaposition suggest a specific peculiarity in the denotation of the verb, which peculiarity of meaning is not manifest from the root in the absence of the upasarga. For example consider the word "Prapacati". Here the sense intensity is due to the preposition 'Pra', and this preposition suggests what is not expressed by the mere root.[2] The second solution is to accept Upasargas as expressive of meaning For instance let us take the word "Pratisthate". Here the root "Sthā" originally denotes stoppage of motion. But with the addition of the preposition we get the meaning of "being in motion". Hence this meaning is that of the preposition but not that of the root and as such the upasargas are significant by nature.[3] The third alternative is that the prepositions are used as axuiliaries because it is the preposition and the root together that denote the meaning one in conjunction with the other. In fact the verbal root inclusive of the preposition becomes the verbal root. However Bhartṛhari finally decides that upasargas are revealers of the special meaning implicit in the root to which they are prefixed. This he established following the two kinds of inferences. The syllogism concerned is this : The word 'Pra' suggestive of sense ; since it is the word 'Pra' just like the word 'Pra' which is found in the aforesaid verbs like 'Prapacati'.[4] Thus by the inference of particular nature (Viseṣato dṛṣṭa) ; it is established that all prepositions like 'Pra' that have common character with the afore said 'Pra' which has the nature of suggesting the sense, are only suggestive of sense,

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1. V.P.-II-189 etc. Upasargeṇa Sambandhe vyajyante praparādini.
2. V.P.-II-190 Savācako viśeṣaṇaṁ.
3. V.P.-II-192 Aprayogesdhi...tābhyāmanarthakaḥ.
4. 'Pra' śabdo dyotakaḥ, praśabdatvāt, pūrvodita pacyādi dṛṣṭa praśabdavat.

Similarly with the help of inference of generic nature (Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa) it can be established that the verb has different meanings. The syllogism in this regard is in the following way. The root 'Sthā' has different meanings, since it is a root, like the root Yaj which is accepted, as having different meanings, by both the parties.[1] In this way with the help of inference of a seen generic nature (Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa) it can be established that the other verbs having a common character with the root 'Ṣthā' have different meanings. Thus since it is established that a root has many meanings, the root 'Sthā' can denote the meaning "Stoppage of motion" and also "the act of motion". The preposition 'Pra' merely serves to reveal the particular sense. Hence Upasargas are only revealers (Dyotakas) but not signifiers (Vācakas).

THE VIEW OF KAUṆḌABHAṬṬA AND BHAṬṬOJI :—

The later grammarians also followed the same theory and brought forth some more arguments to establish that the upasargas are mere revealers of the meanings of the words to which they are prefixed. They showed many instances that become incongruous in the acceptance of the view that the prepositions are significant. In the instance 'Prajayati' we get the comprehension of "Distinguished" victory. This meaning "Distinguished victory" is not the meaning of the preposition. If it were so, it not being the meaning of the base to which the verbal affix "Ti" is enjoined, the sense of the verbal affix (Ti) would not be syntactically connected with it (the meaning of the upasarga). For; the rule is that "Terminations express their own sense syntactically connected with the sense of the base".[2] Further, in the instance "Pratiṣṭhate", it will not be possible to get the sense of motion, because the root 'Sthā' signifies 'Stoppage of motion' while the whole word comprehends "motion". Now if it is argued that 'Pra' has the sense of "Distinguished" (as in the case of Prajayati)

1' Tiṣṭhetiranekārthaḥ, dhātutvat, ubhayavādi sammatānekārtha-yajatyādi dhātuvat.

2. Pratyayānāṁ prakṛtyarthānvita svārthabodhakatva vyutpatteḥ (Vai. Bhū.).

then the word "Pratiṣṭhate" shoulb signify "Distinguished stoppage of motion" but it is not the meaning concerned. On the other hand if it is accepted that the upasarga 'Pra' denotes 'absence' then in the instance 'Prajayati' also it should mean the same 'absence'; and as such in the present case the word should signify 'Absence of victory' but in fact it is not so. Hence accepting different meanings to the 'upasarga' at different places and creating various cause and effect relations to explain its agreement with the base, is a matter of prolixity.1 Nor can we accept that the upasarga and the root together form a new root, so that the new comprehension arising from such words can be treated as that of this new root; because no such formation is sanctioned by any grammarian, nay even Pāṇini. Therefore Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa etc., argue that it is better to keep in line with Kātyāyana and the Bhāṣyakāra and accept that a root denotes many meanings2 but the preposition determines the particular meaning of the root suitable to the context. This nature of the preposition, revealing the meaning of the following base or word, is called 'Dyotakatva'.3

Further, in the instance 'Upāsyate Guruḥ' the like, let us accept that 'worship' is the sense of the preposition.4 In that case the root "Ās" cannot be used in the passive construction, becaus the root is intransitive. And no authority sanctions to enjoin lakāra after a preposition. So worship cannot be the meaning of the preposition. As a second alternative let us accept that the entire unit "Upās" be the root. But no such root or Ās with the combination of the preposition is read in the Dhātupāṭha. Hence 'Upās' not being the root by itself, no lakāra can be appended to it. If it be argued that the list of the roots is not

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1. For details of argument vide Vai. Bhu.
2. Anekārthakāni Dhātavaḥ (Dhātūnāmanekārthatvāt). Bahvarthā api dhātavo bhavanti. (M.B. on P.1.3.1)
3. Dyotakatvaṁ ca eva samabhivyāhṛta padaniṣṭha śaktyutbodhakatvaṁ.
4. Upāsyate ityādāvupāsanā kimupasargārtho, viśiṣṭasya dhātumātrasya vā (Vai. Bhū).

exhaustive but indicative, even then, there will be difficulty in the grammatical operations such as reduplication in Liṭ etc. and adding the augument 'aṭ' in the case of Lakāras like Laṅ Luṅ Lṛṅ etc.. But no such forms are found in the language. Hence the composite unit 'Upās' cannot be accepted as the root.1 Now let us take the only other alternative that the root 'Ās' only denotes the meaning 'worship' and the preposition is merely suggestive of the sense. In such a case the above mentioned inconsistencies do not arise. Therefore in view of all the advantages, it is better to admit that the prepositions are mere revealers[2] (Dyotakas) and the root alone denotes the particular meaning.

Further, if the prepositions are accepted as expressive of sense, then we have to use them independently to denote the same sense as Bhūyān Pra to denote Bhūyān Prakāśaḥ and similarly "kīdṛśo ni" in the sense of "kīdṛśo niścayaḥ. But there are no such usages in vogue. And this type of incorrect usage will not be possible, because for the grammarian the prepositions have no meaning but they are simply suggestive. If it be held that it is judicious to give two different meanings to each of the two words on the grounds of parsimony, then on the same principle let the root itself have a secondary meaning in it i.e. 'distinguished victory' is the meaning of the root 'ji'.[3] Therefore the prepositions do not possess any denotative power in them.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa concurs with these arguments. He quotes the Ṛk prātiśākhya wherein it is stated that "The Upasargas are twenty in number and are expressive when conjointly uttered with other words".[4] From this it is evident that upasargas inde-

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1. Na dvitīyaḥ. Viśiṣṭasya gaṇapāṭhābhāvena, dhātutva alābhena lakārānupapattiḥ (ibid).
2. Tṛtīyetvāgatameva upasargasya tattvam. (ibid)
3. Yadi pravṛtti nimitta bhedamātreṇa śaktibhedo lāghavāditi vibhāvyate, tadāstu prakṛṣṭa jaye lakṣaṇaiva. (Si. Su. Ni P.9).
4. Upasargā viṁśatirarthavācakāḥ. Sahetarābhyāṁ itare nipātāḥ, (and also) kriyā vācakamākhyātaṁ upasargo viśeṣakṛt. (ṚK. Prā XII-25).

pendently cannot denote anything, hence non-denotative; but because they bring in some change or peculiarity in the meaning of the word following them, they are called revealers (Dyotakas). Thus all the grammarians accept that upasargas are revealers (Dyotaka) but not signifiers (vācaka).

THE VIEW OF MĪMĀMSAKA :—

The Mīmāṁsakas are also of the same opinion that the prefixes are mere revealers. This is evident from the statement of Kumārilabhaṭṭa. He says that though the words are divided into four kinds viz., Nouns, Verbs, Prepositions and Particles, yet it is only the first two that are taken into consideration because, it is only with regards to the denotation of these and not that of prepositions and particles, that certain doubts are found to arise.1 Specially prepositions and particles do not, by themselves, serve to denote any substances and they only serve to manifest the meanings of Nouns and Verbs which are really expressive. This line of thought of Kumārila is followed by all the latter mīmāṁsakas.

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN :—

The logician also argues that Upasargas cannot have any independent denotation of their own but simply reveal of the peculiar meaning inherent in the following word.

The author of the "Maṇidarpaṇa" argues that the prepositions are not denotative. The argument of a few scholars who propose that the prepositions are denotative and the concerned root itself is the Tātparyagrāhaka, leads to absurdity. For instance in the word 'Pratiṣṭhate' if the preposition alone is denotative and the root is Tātparyagrāhaka, then the 'effort' meaning, denoted by the Tiṅ suffix, has to agree with that of the preposition but not with that of root (because the root meaning is not primary), and

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1. Caturvidhe pade catra dvividhasyārtha nirṇayaḥ, Kriyate saṁśayotpatteḥ; nopasarga nipātayoḥ. (Tan. Vār. Adhyāya-1, Pada-3).

such an agreement is not in common experience. Hence it is to be admitted that root alone is denotative but not the preposition. Of course it may be urged that "in the present instance the root denotes "action contrary to movements and the 'effort' meaning of the Tiṅ suffix agrees with it and the preposition 'Pra' denotes its absence and thus there is no irregularity of the agreement". But this argument is not wise, because in such a case the verbal import we get from the word 'Pratiṣṭhate' will be of the form "one possessing the absence of effort whose (effort) theme is the activity opposed to going not of the form where the meaning of the root is attributive to yatna" as in the case of the import from the word Gacchati,[1] And the former is contrary to our experience. Hence upasargas are not denotative of any meaning but only suggestive.

Some people argue that the root Sthā in the instance 'Pratiṣṭhate', denotes the opposite meaning "movement" by implication (Lakṣaṇā) and the preposition is only a tātparya grāhaka. But this argument also is not logical because in such a case, in the sentence "Ghato Na", it may be argued on the same lines "the absence of ghaṭa" as the meaning of the word 'ghaṭa' itself and 'na is only a Tātparya grahaka, but no body accepts this. Hence, it is not wise to accept denotational potency to prepositions.

Jagadīśa clearly says that prepositions are not denotative of any meaning.[2] Even the Maṇikāra is also of the same opinion.[3] Thus according to logicians in general an upasarga is non-denotative of sense.

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1. Evaṁ sate pratiṣṭate ityatra samjña-virodhivyāpāra viṣayaka yatnābhāva-vānityeva pratītiḥ syāt, Na tu gacchatītyatreva gamantva prakāraka dhīḥ (Maṇidarpaṇa P.125).
2. Prādayastūpasargā na sārthakāḥ. Sārthakaśchennipātā api (Sā. Sā' Pra.).
3. The view of the Maṇikāra was contrabicted by the author of Tarkatāṇdava (Tar. Tān. P.107-108).

UPASARGAS AS SIGNIFIERS :-

In the foregoing pages we have observed how the various scholars tried to establish that upasargas are revealers (Dyotakāḥ). Now the various arguments of scholars justifying signification of the prefixes are summarised hereunder : As already said Gārgya is the earliest known scholar favouring this theory of signification of the prefixes.

THE VIEW OF GĀRGYA :-

Durgācārya, elaborating the theory of Gārgya, observes that a peculiar modification of the sense occurs in the meaning of the verb or noun when the preposition is prefixed to them, but in the absence of these prepositions no such modified sense is comprehended from the pure verb or noun. Thus it is clear from this fact in 'affirmation and negation' that the prefixes are signifiers. Whatever additional sense is observed that additional sense is to be accepted as the meaning of the preposition. Just as a noun word or a verb word has many meanings, in the same way a single preposition can have many meanings. Thus the preposition Pra etc. are found to denote the meaning intensity (Bhṛśatva) even independently.[1]

Now as regards the argument that 'the prepositions when they are detached from the noun or the verb do not convey any meaning, just like the letters constituting words' also is wrong; because it cannot be accepted that the individual letters are without meaning.[2] On the other hand it is observed that letters have a capacity of signifying objects. It is just like the particles of clay possessing indiscriminately the potentiality of making the clay jar,

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1. Viyuktānāmapi nāmākhyātābhyāmiti ; tadyathā, 'Pra' ityādikarmāṇi bhṛśārthe : ityabhidhāne śaktirastyevamādyupalakṣitavyam. (Durga under Nir. 1-3-5)
2. Yatpunaretadoktam varṇavaditi - anabhyupagamāt ayuktam (Durga under Nir. 1-3-5).

and when they constitute the jar, the potentialities that were latent in them, become manifest and the jar becomes manifest, so also, all the letters constituting a word possess the potentiality of denoting meaning in general (without any specification) and when they combine to constitute a word they denote a specific meaning. Further a word consisting of meaningless letters cannot be meaningful just as the cloth, made of yarn which is not white, cannot be white. Thus this simple argument that letters are not individually meaningful leads to a great undesirable consequence. Therefore, it is to be admitted that letters have meanings, so also these prepositions also have their own meaning.

Further, the argument that 'like the lamp, which makes us perceive the various objects existing in a dark room, the prepositions too bring out the different meanings latent in the word that follows them' cannot be accepted. The lamp, having its own illumination, while helping us perceive the various objects, makes itself also perceivable by its illuminating potentiality. Likewise, prepositions too have their own signification and this they do through their own substratum viz., the noun or the verb.[1] Thus from the above arguments it is clear that the prepositions are meaningful and are expressive of sense. Further it should not be urged that the peculiarity in the meanings signified by the noun or verb in combination with the preposition, is the signification of the particular noun or the verb itself, because it is a matter of experience that one capable of discharging his own duties does not require the help of another person. But here the noun and the verb are in need of the help rendered by the preposition to signify a particular meaning. Hence it can be concluded that the particular meaning denoted by the word should be that of the element other than the noun or the verb. In the present context, that element is none other than the preposition itself. Hence it is proper to conclude that the preposition signifies a particular meaning which qualifies the meaning of the following noun or

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1. Evam Upasargaḥ arthavantopi santaḥ svārthābhidhāna śaktimaneka prakāraṁ vidyamānamapi svārthābhidhāna śaktyādhārabhūte nāmākhyāte pratyayyābhivyañjayeyuḥ.' (Nir. 1.3.5).

verb, and in some cases it can change the entire meaning of the verb and signify a new meaning as in the case of "Pratiṣṭhate". Hence Gārgya concludes that the prepositions signify particular action and the verb expresses action in general.[1]

Vyāsatīrtha, the author of the Tarkatāṇḍava vehemently opposes the view that prepositions are mere dyotakas but not vācakas. He tries at length to establish that prepositions are signifiers (vācakas) of certain meanings. The various arguments put forth by him are as follow :

Take the word 'Prajayati' which means "one has a profound victory'. The root "ji" denotes victory. So the additional sense 'profound' is understood only after prefixing the upasarga 'Pra' to the root "ji". Therefore this additional meaning is that of the preposition 'Pra'.[2] Similarly the other prepositions are also significant of their particular meanings. The author of the Maṇi argues that prepositions have the nature of suggesting the meaning concerned i.e. upasandana which means delimiting the potentiality of the verbal root. But Vyāsatīrtha does not accept this view of the Maṇikāra. He argues that signification like intensity etc. to the prepositions 'Pra' and the like, is observed by the process of inclusion and exclusion (Āvāpa-udvāpa), as we find in the case of words 'go' etc., The meaning intense victory is comprehended from the root 'ji' which has a fixed signification "Victory" only in the proximity of the preposition 'Pra'. It cannot be urged that the entire sense "intense victory" is the meaning of the verb "jayati" itself. This type of argument involves prolixity. For in sentences like Śuklāṃ Gāmānaya, (bring the white cow) we have to admit that the word 'cow' itself indicates "white cow" and the word white (Śukla) is only suggestive. Thus you cannot attribute any signification to a qualifying word ; it can be treated only as a

1. Tasmādupapannamupasargasya kriyāviśeṣārthaḥ, kriyāsāmānyamākhyātasyeti. (Durga under Nir. 1.3.5).
2. Prajayate ityādau prādinopasargeṇa prakarṣādirūpārtha viśeṣa pratīteḥ prādeḥ prakarṣādau śaktireva. (Tar. Tān. Voi.3-P.97).

revealer and the entire qualified meaning is that of the qualified, which, none with commonsense accepts.

Further, if it cannot be argued that since prepositions are incapable of denoting meaning by themselves, they are accepted as suggestive of sense ; because, if 'not being capable of denoting meaning independently', alone be the criterion for being meaning less, then even words like 'Ca' 'iva' 'Eva', the base, the affix etc. should be admitted as meaningless. This cannot be admitted. So the contention "that which ever cannot give an independent signification is suggestive or meaningless" is wrong. Now it may be questioned that if prepositions are considered expressive, can a simple preposition express the meaning for itself, and why does it repuire the combination with the verb etc.. To this the author replies that the preposition never requires the help of the verb to signify its own meaning. But it requires the presence of a verb just to have the appellation "upasarga", since preposition-hood (upasargatva) is enjoined in the presence of a verb only ; just as the base and the affix need mutual help for their own correctness of form according to the maxim 'neither the base alone nor the affix alone is to be independently used,'[1] it is better to admit that by the process of "inclusion and exclusion" the word 'Pra' in the instance "Prajayate" signifies intensity and the verb 'Ji' signifies victory.

Further one may argue fhat the root 'Sthā' normally is fixed in the meaning "stoppage of motion", but it denotes "the action of motion" by secondary signification, when it is preceeded by the preposition 'Pra' because there exists incompatibility (virodha) with the expressed meaning. Similarly in the instance 'Prajayate' the meaning "intense victory" is the meaning got through the secondary signification when the root "Ji" is preceeded by the preposition "Pra". Thus there is no need to accept a separate

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1. Na copasargasyāpi śaktatve dhātvapekṣā na syāditi vācyaṁ, Prakṛti pratyayābhyāṁ pratyaya prakṛtiyorivopasargeṇa sādhutvārthameva dhātorapekṣaṇānarthabodhanārtha manapekṣaṇāt. (Tar. Var. Vol.iii)

signification for the prepositions". But this argument is not logical, because in instances like "Anubhavati" and 'Pariṇamati' etc., there is no relation consistant with the signified meaning even in the form of incompatibility (virodha). And if it is tried to establish some sort of relation with the signified meaning, let that be adopted in the case of the word "Pra" also and let it signify the act of motion in the instance "Pratiṣṭhate" through secondary signification. Further the question of taking recourse to secondary signification arises only in instances like 'Gangāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' where both the words together are treated as a single sentence and they express a unitary meaning. But it is not the case with upasargas. Hence this argument is untenable. Therefore Vyāsatīrtha concludes that prepositions are expressive and they signify their own meanings.[1]

Mahimabhaṭṭa, author of the Vyaktiviveka, also is of the same view. His line of argument is also more or less on the same lines of Āvāpa-udvāpa or Anvaya-vyatireka. Further according to him the opponent may argue that roots like 'pac' etc. are denotative of action in general. It is an accepted fact that generality includes particularity.[2] Consequently on the comprehension of generality, the particularity also amounts to have been apprehended, but their specific nature of the particularity is revealed only in the presence of the upasarga. Therefore in the instances like 'Prapacate', the particularity of the meaning in the form of "intense cooking" is made known by the root in the presence of the upasarga. Thus it is better the opponent holds to accept the suggestiveness of the prepositions negating expressive capacity to them.

Of course every word denotes a particularity and generality. These two are like the two sides of a coin. But the speaker's enthusiasm is not satisfied by denoting that much of the particularity in the meaning. He wants to further qualify this

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1. Tasmādupasargāḥ svārthe śaktāḥ eva. Opcit p.108.
2. Nirviśeṣaṁ Na sāmānyaṁ bhavecchaśaviṣāṇavat.

particularity by other words which we generally call adjectives.[1] For instance the word 'cow' denotes the generality 'cowhood' and also 'an individual cow' in particular. But we qualify it by using an adjective as a white or, black etc. So also in the case of verb words, though some particularity is expressed by the verb word itself, an upasarga qualifies that particular nature of the activity as quickly, frequently etc. This additional sense of qualification is expressed by the upasargas like Pra etc.. Now with the help of concomittance in "Affirmation and Negation", it can easily be proved that the exclusive (or additional sense of) particularity in question is secured from the prepositions like 'Pra' etc. but not from mere verb words Thus it is established upasargas are signifiers. Otherwise in instances like 'Nīlotpala' the word 'Nīla' becomes an indicator (Dyotaka), because the word "Utpala" itself denotes both generality and particularity. As a result, the relation of "the qualifier to the qualified" which is actually experienced between the two meanings of the words Nīla and Utpala will be rendered impossible.[2]

And as regards the arguments that upasargas are dyotakas Mahimabhaṭṭa says that it is due to misunderstanding of the fact or ut-most they can be treated as suggestive of the meaning (dyo takas) only in a secondary sense i.e. to serve some grammatical operations etc.. But by that a word cannot lose its expressive nature.[3] Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes that the upasargas are expressive.

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1. Yadapratītau sāmānya pratītireva na paryavasyati. Tadviśeṣa mātraṁ tebhyaḥ pratīyatāṁ nāma. Na tu tāvātā vyavahāra siddhiḥ kācit. Tasya pratiniyata viśeṣavasāyatva nibandhanatvāt. (Vya. Vi. P.151-154).
2. Anyathā nīlotpalādau sarvasyaiva viśeṣanābhimatasya nīlādi-śabdasya viśeṣyavācinaśca utpalādeḥ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva vyavahārostvanupagacchet. (Ibid P.152).
3. Prādīnāṁ dyotakatvaṁ yat kaiścidupagamyate, Tad bhākta-meva, tatreṣṭaṁ, na mukhyaṁ tadasambhavāt. (Ibid P.157, verse 75).

Among the Mīmāṁsakas, Gāgābhaṭṭa, the author of the Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, is also in favour of the view that the upasargas are expressive. He rejects the other view on the grounds of prolixity. If it is argued that the upasargas are suggestive, then one has to admit two potentialities, (Primary and secondary) for the root-one in the absence of the preposition and the other in the presence of the preposition. Further a separate suggestive potentiality for the preposition is also to be accepted. And such an acceptance leads to prolixity. Thus in view of the various arguments put forward, it is better to accept that the prepositions are all expressive of sense.1

Another scholar Śitikaṇṭha, the author of the 'Tarkaprakāśa' expresses a peculiar view. According to his opinion some of the prepositions which do not convey any meaning through primary denotative power are suggestive of sense, as in the instance "Pra sūte". And where they are found to convey some meaning through a pramāṇa there only such prepositions are said to be expressive as ih the instance "upakumbhaṁ". Thus it seems he opines that there is no hard and fast rule regulating the expressive capacity or suggestive capacity to upasargas. Therefore such a conclusion arrived at, with the help of usages avoids all the difficuluties in determining the nature of the prepositions.2

JAYANTABHAṬṬA'S VIEWS :—

Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of the Nyāyamañjarī, also is of similar opinion. He says that prepositions prefixed to a verb word, attribute some peculiarity to the meaning of the verb, and

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1. Anyetu Dhātau Śaktilakṣaṇayoḥ upasargasmabhivyāhāra, tadabhāva hetukatvasya, upasargāṇām dyotakatvaśkteśca kalpanāyaāṁ gauravāt, vācakataiva yuktā. (Bhā. Cin.

2. Upasargāṇāṁ madhye yatra yasyopasargasya kincidertha śaktirna prāmāṇikī tatra tasya dyotakatvaṁ. Yathā prasūte ityādau. Yasya śaktiḥ pramāṇikī tasya vācakatvameva. (Trk. Pr. Vide Nyāyakośa).

agree with it as a qualifier. Of course in certain cases an upasarga may entirely change the meaning of the verb and give an opposite meaning as in Pratiṣṭhate. Even then the Upasarga, only qualifies the meaning of the root by particularising it from the various meanings denoted by a root.[1] Further Jayantabhaṭṭa says that the meaning of the preposition can be decided by following the process of "Anvaya-Vyatireka". And as regards the fact that such an understanding is caused by a preposition by being expressive or suggestive is immaterial.[2] Thus Jayantabhaṭṭa seems to admit that prepositions have their own meanings.

In view of the various arguments presented for and against the denotation of Upasargas, it is better to accept expressive meaning through a pramāṇa. Otherwise we can safely conclude that they are suggestive.

Here ends the meaning of verbal root (Dhātu). now let us invertigate the meaning of the verbal affix (Pratyaya) in the second part of the book.

THE END OF PART-I

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1. Arthāntarābhidhāna sāmārthyāpādānameva Dhātoḥ Vidadhat upasargo viśeṣaṇam bhavitumarhati. Anekārtha abhidhāna śaktiśca dhātuḥ upasargeṇa niyate arthe avasthāpyatīti tasya tadviśeṣaṇatā.
2. Tadāgame tatpratīteḥ tadabhāve tadagrahāt. Te tu kiṁ Vācakāh sarve tadavagatimupadadhati kiṁ vā iti-kimanena? (Nyāyamañjari P.299).

